Senior managers in Iraqi society: their background and attitudes by Sulieman, Moayaid S.
Glasgow Theses Service 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/ 
theses@gla.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Sulieman, Moayaid S. (1984) Senior managers in Iraqi society: their 
background and attitudes. PhD thesis 
 
http://theses.gla.ac.uk/6555/ 
 
 
 
Copyright and moral rights for this thesis are retained by the author 
 
A copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or 
study, without prior permission or charge 
 
This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first 
obtaining permission in writing from the Author 
 
The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any 
format or medium without the formal permission of the Author 
 
When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the 
author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given. 
 
SENIOR MANAGERS IN IRAQI SOCIETY: 
THEIR BACKGROUND AND ATTITUDES 
by 
MOAYAIO S. SULIEMAN 
Thesis 
submitted in part fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of 
Doctor of Philosophy 
to 
THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW 
Research Conducted in 
the 
Department of MQnagement Studies 
JANUARY. 1954 
IMAGING SERVICES NORTH 
Boston Spa, Wetherby 
West Yorkshire, lS23 7BQ 
www.bl.uk 
BEST COpy AVAILABLE. 
VARIABLE PRINT QUALITY 
OED I CAT ION 
To my deceased parents, 
whose encouragement has 
sustained me for so many 
years. 
DEC L A RAT ION 
No portion of the work referred to in 
this study has been submitted in support of 
an application for another degree or qualifica-
tion of this or any other university or other 
institution of learning. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
ABSTRACT 
CHAPTER ONE 
TWO 
THREE 
FOUR 
FIVE 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION •••••••••.••.••••••••••••••.• 
THE GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION OF IRAQ ••••• 
1. Location and Geographical Character-
is tics ............................. . 
1 
53 
53 
2. Population ••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 57 
SOCIAL COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ ••••••••••••••• 
1 • 
2. 
The Bedouin Community 
The Village Community 
. .............. . 
. .............. . 
63 
64 
72 
3. The City Community................... 79 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC 90 
DEVELOPMENT IN IRAQ FROM 1921-1980 
1. Political Environment ................ 90 
2. Economic Environment ••••••••.•••••••• 94 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS. PRACTICES AND EDUCATION 
Of THE PEOPLE IN IRAQ •••••••••••••••••••• 
1. Islam and Economic Progress of the 
Arab World .......................... 
117 
117 
2. The Ethnic Composition of the Society. 120 
3. Islam Beliefs and Practices •••.•••••• 122 
4. Educational Status of the People ••••• 127 
i 
CHAPTER SIX 
SEVEN 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'O) 
BACKGROUND AND CAREER PATTERNS OF 
IRAQI MANAGERS WITH SOME INTER-
NATIONAL COMPARISONS ••••••••.••••••••• 
1 • Personal and Social Characteristics. 
1 - Age of Managers 
139 
140 
140 
2 - Education •••••••••••••••••••••• 142 
3 - Size of the family............. 145 
4 - Social origins ••••••••••••••••• 149 
2. Career Patterns ....•............... 
1 - Length of service 
2 - Length of service in the current 
companies ........••......•..... 
3 - Length of time served in the 
current past .................•. 
4 - Inter-firm mobility ........•..• 
3. Managers' Backgrounds and Career 
Patterns in the light of Size of 
153 
153 
154 
156 
156 
Company ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 1 S9 
HOW MANAGERS SPEND THEIR TIME AND WHAT 170 
ACTIVITIES DO THEY PERFORM •••••••••••••• 
1. Managers' Activities •• ••• ••••••••••• 173 
1 - How long do they work 175 
2. How long do they Spend on Each Activity 
and Why ............................ 175 
1 - Paperwork activity ••••••••••••••• 175 
2 - Planning activity................ 176 
3 - Organising activity.............. 180 
ii 
EIGHT 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'O) 
4 - Communication activity •.•••••••• 
5 - Research activity ............... 
6 - Personal activity ............... 
182 
191 
193 
7 - Complex activity................ 194 
SOCIAL PRESSURES ON MANAGERS ............. 
1. Socia-Cultural Pressures 
1 - Strong family end tribal relation-
203 
205 
ships ......................... II... 205 
2 - Dislike of manual work •••••••••• 206 
3 - Low Level of industrial consciousness 206 
and literacy •••••••.•••••••••••••• 
4 - Low value of time ••••••••••••••••• • 207 
2. Business and Social Community......... 209 
1 - Patronage and Nepotism •••••••••••• 209 
2 - ShortaEe of skilled manpower...... 213 
3 - Low Level of Productivity......... 214 
4 - Private visits at the office •••••• 215 
5 - Marketing constraints ••••••••••••• 218 
6 - Workers are of agricultur~ and rural 
origin ............................... 219 
NINE THE MANAGER'S DECISION-MAKING STyLES •••.•••• 235 
1. Decision-Making Styles ••••••••••••••••• 235 
2. A DeciSion-Making Profile of the Iraqi 
Munagers ................................. 240 
1 - The frequency distribution ••••••••• 242 
2 - The power-sharing continuum •••••••• 250 
TABLE OF CONTENTS (CONT'Ol 
CHAPTER TEN SUMMARY •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................... 
APPENDIX .................................... 
Page 
.256 
317 
iv 
~." ..... , f~ 
'- .-:~-' --
TABLES 
LIST OF TABLES 
1.1 A Statistical Profile of Arab Executive 
Presented by Muna's Study in 1980. 
2.1 The Population of Iraq in 1965, 1970 and 
1977 • 
2.2 Distribution of Population by Area and 
Age Groups in 1977. 
4.1 The Kings and Presidents who Ruled Iraq 
between 1921 and 1979. 
4.2 Gross Domestic Product of the Public 
Sector, 1971-1978, at Current Prices. 
4.3 Total Investment Allocations of the 
Economic Sectors, 1951-1959. 
4.4 Industrial Manpower in the Large Companies 
Classified by Occupational Categories and 
Sectors: 1977. 
5.1 Percentages of Illiteracy Among the 
31 
57 
60 
94 
96 
104 
110 
Population Classified by Sex and Area.1977. 129 
5.2 Levels of Education in Iraq. by Area of 
Residence, 1977. 
5.3 Number of Schools, Students in Iraq in 
1970/71, 74/75 and 1978/79. 
6.1 
6.2 
Age Distribution of the Managers by Sectors. 
Mean, Standard Deviations and Variances of 
Managers' Ages Classified by their Sectors. 
6.2A Analysis of Variance of Managers' Ages 
According to their Sectors. 
130 
131 
140 
141 
142 
v 
TABLES 
LIST OF TABLES (CONT'O) 
6.3 Comparison of Educational Level of Managers 
in Three Countries: United Kingdom. United 
States and Japan. 
6.4 Comparison of Managers' Education Levels 
Classified by Sectors. 
6.5 Managers' Education Levels According to 
their ages. 
6.6 
6.7 
Managers' Children Classified by Sectors. 
Number of Children Classified by the Age of 
their Fathers. 
6.8 Managers' Education Level and Number of 
Children. 
6.9 Children Classified According to their 
Father's Place of Birth. 
143 
144 
145 
146 
147 
148 
148 
6.10 Mean. St. Dev. and Variance of the Children 
Classified by their Father's Place of Birth. 149 
6.10A Analysis of Variance of Managers' Children. 149 
6.11 Managers' Social Classes. by Sectors. 151 
6.12 Social Classes of the Managers Classified by 
Age. 
6.13 Relationship Between Social Class and Managers' 
6.14 
Education. 
The Relationship between Managers' Social 
Classes and the Number of Children. 
6.15 Means. St.Dev. and Variance of Managers' Years 
151 
152 
153 
of Service in his Current Company by Sector. 155 
vi 
TABLES 
LIST OF TABLES (CDNT'DJ 
6.15A Analysis of Variance of Managers' Years of 
Service in the Current Company. 
6.16 
6.17 
Managers' Inter-Firm Mobility, by Sector. 
Managers' Ages Classified by the Size of 
Companies. 
6.18 Managers' Number of Children, by Size of 
6.19 
6.20 
6.21 
Company. 
Managers' Education, by Size of the Company. 
Managers' Years of Service, by Size of the 
Company. 
Managers' Mobility, by Size of the Company. 
6.22 Managers' Social Classes, by Size of the 
Company. 
6.23 Managers' Place of Birth, by Size of the 
Company. 
7.1 Time Spent on Planning Activity, by 
Managers per Working Day 
7.2 Time Spent on Organising Activity, by 
Managers per Working Day 
8.1 Social Pressures as Reported by the Iraqi 
Managers (N = 44). 
8.2 Level of Patronage and Nepotism During the 
8.3 
Last Five Years as Reported by Managers. 
Reasons of Mediation as Reported by the 
Managers (N = 44). 
155 
157 
160 
181 
162 
163 
164 
164 
165 
178 
181 
204 
211 
212 
vii 
TABLES 
LIST OF TABLES (CDNT'D) 
9.1 Comparison between Decision Styles 
Employed in this Research and those of 238 
Previous Investigators. 
9.2 Distribution of Decision Styles for each 
Decision, by Managers. 
9.3 Distribution of Decision Styles for each 
Decision, by Managers and Sectors. 
9.4 Distribution of Responses by Styles for 
Three Decision Groups. 
9.5 Distribution of Responses by Styles and 
Sector for Three Decision Groups. 
9.6 Mean Score of Managers for Three Categ-
ories of Decisions, by Sector. 
243 
248 
252 
254 
255 
viii 
FIGURE 
MAP 
1.1 
1.2 
LIST OF FIGURES AND MAPS 
Fiedler's Model of Leadership 
The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership 
1.3 The Manager's Roles "Activities" 
According to Henry Mintzberg 
3.1 Social Structure of the Tribe 
4.1 Planning System in the Public 
Sector in Iraq 
5.1 Weber's Thesis of the Protestant 
Ethnic 
7.1 Relative Importance of Managerial 
Skills 
7.2 Average Work Time Allocation of 
Managers 
7.3 Time Spent in Oral Communication by 
Managers with Subordinates,Customers, 
Superiors. 
7.4 Average Time of Manager Interactions 
with Subordinates, Superiors and 
Customers 
9.1 
9.2 
The Power Sharing Continuum 
Decision-Making Styles: A Comparison 
Between Muna's Study and the Current 
Study 
9.3 The Frequency Distribution of Decision 
Styles for Each Decision by Managers 
and Sectors 
IRAQ GENERAL MAP 
13 
20 
34 
65 
98 
118 
171 
174 
185 
186 
237 
246 
249 
55 
ix 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
Whatever a man's achievements. they are unquestionably a 
product of affectionate people who nurtured his aspiration. Those 
who hold one in high esteem. who encourage him in moments of 
confusion and despair. who criticise. evaluate. and support his 
self-confidence by sharing his dreams. and who urge him into the 
future by their expressed faith in his capacities. are surely the 
agents of his unfolding. Many have done that for me; some have 
indeed been exceptional persons. I count myself particularly 
fortunate in being able to admit this debt to so many: 
Professor David H. Weir. Professor of Organisational Behaviour 
and Head of the Department of Management Studies. Glasgow University. 
He provided much of the intellectual support and stimulation. His 
wealth of knowledge and experience proved invaluable throughout this 
study. I am greatly indebted and thankful to him for his supervision. 
continual encouragement and support. I am also indebted to 
Professor Simon Coke. the leading expert on Japanese management at 
the University of Edinburgh. His wide knowledge in the field of 
Japanese management was of great advantage for this study. 
I should also like to express my gratitude to the members of 
staff of the Department of Management Studies at the University of 
Glasgow. and in particular to Or. David Buchanan and David Daddy. 
for their invaluable advice and assistance. 
I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Dr. Joseph L. Latham 
and his wife. Mary. at the University of Glasgow. for their friendly 
x 
help in using "CLUSTAN" and "SPSS" packages in analysing the data 
on the Iraqi managers. My debt is immeasurable. 
In Iraq, the forty four managers and other employees of the 
xi 
firms studied, were extremely generous with their time and dis-
cussions. lowe all of them a deep sense of gratitude for their 
assistance and co-operation. Without their understanding, encouragement 
and assistance, this thesis would never have seen the light of day. 
I am also indebted to the University of Baghdad and the 
Government of Iraq for their financial support throughout my study 
in the United Kingdom. 
My thanks are extended to Mrs. Pauline Connelly who took on the 
tedious work of typing the final draft of this thesis. 
Finally, words simply cannot sincerely express my deep feelings 
of gratitude to my wife, Nada, and brothers. Without their patience, 
understanding, encouragement, and financial assistance, this thesis 
could not have been completed. 
Moayaid S. Sulieman. 
ABSTRACT 
The aim of this thesis is to cast light on a group of senior 
managers currently working in Iraq. It investigates their personal-
social background. career patterns and decision-making styles in the 
light of the Western management standards. The thesis also tries to 
bring into the light how the Iraqi managers spend their time and 
what activities they exercise inside their firms. In addition. it 
attempts to show the contemporary social constraints or pressures 
which face managers in Iraq. 
The assumption is made that in order to understand management 
styles and the principal personal-social background and career 
patterns of a group of managers in a given country. prior understanding 
of their social and cultural values is vital. Without such prior 
understanding of the social and cultural context. the analysis and 
the interpretation of the managers' characteristics and their manage-
ment styles will be incomplete. 
Thus, the point of departure is to start the analysis by careful 
examination of Iraq; its geography, social communities, religions, 
education, political and economic development. In addition, the 
analysis extends itself to cover the past and the contemporary attitudes 
toward men and women, time. manual work and toward the size of the 
family. 
The thesis then proceeds to discuss the principal characteristics 
of forty four Iraqi manuging directors. The results broadly 
indicate that most of the personal-social characteristics and career 
xii 
patterns of these managers are a reflection of their larger society. 
The same is equally true with their management styles. 
What already exists in the industrial firms studied also exists 
in the larger society; the links between industrial organisations 
and the Iraqi society in terms of social values and attitudes toward 
time. manual work. superiority of men over women. remain strong 
despite the fact that the society is undereoing considerable social 
and economic changes. So. too, the principal characteristics of the 
managers studied. whether in terms of their personal-social background. 
their career patterns or their decision-makine styles. are by and large 
similar to the general features of the society in large. 
The analysis also indicates that in order to work according to 
Western management standards. the Iraqi manager needs not only a long 
period of time, but also requires massive efforts to get rid of a 
heavy heritage of different but interlocking social pressures and 
constraints. 
xiii 
CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1. LEADERSHIP THEORIES: 
It is virtu~lly impossible to discuss and analyse in a systematic 
way a group of managers who plan, organise, lead and control the work 
of other people (subordinates) to achieve predetermined objectives 
without discussing leadership theories. 
Many theories of leadership have been developed and research 
undertaken attempting to prove or disprove them. Rather than present-
ing an overwhelmingly long catalogue of all these. the intention here 
is to discuss only a few of these theories. 
Before discussing these theories, two important points need to 
be made clear: first, what is leadership? Second. what are the 
differences between the role of leader and manager? 
What is leadership? 
Attempts to define leadership or describe a leader have been 
many and varied. According to Stogdill: 
"There are almost as many different definitions 
of leadership as there are persons who have 
attempted to define the concept." 1 
In the past, some reviewers have focused on outstanding personal 
characteristics and have defined leadership around those personal 
traits. For example. Tead. in 1929, regarded leadership as a 
combination of traits which enable an individual to induce others 
1 
2 
to accomplish a given task. 2 Others, including Allen and Bennis, have 
looked at leadership as the art of 'inducing compliance. 3 Compliance 
refers both to a relation in which an actor behaves in accordance with 
a directive supported by another actor's power, and to the orientation 
of the subordinated actor to the power apPlied. 4 
In addition, there are others, recognising the complexity of 
social situations in which we all operate, who have taken into account 
the many social variables that are present and interacting. 
Definition of leadership, then, depends on the focus of attention. 
Interest in the influence process might develop the definition of a 
leader as one who either influences others or who causes the group to 
reach predetermined objectives. Attending to leadership as a selection 
5 process might define it as one of the sociometric choices. A simpler 
representation of an accomplished fact would characterise the leader 
as an individual in a certain office, while a more arbitrary character-
6 ization depicts a leader as one who engages in "leadership behaviour". 
A further approach is one that concentrates on specific descriptive 
7 functions of a leader. The symbolic leader has prestige but no 
power. the administrative leader "gets things done", while the expert 
or more precisely the theorist, stands out because of his special 
6 qualifications. 
Some attempt may be made, however, to focus this diversity of 
information toward a shorter verbal definition of leadership based on 
a unitary conceptual framework. The concept of "role" for instance. 
'is one that may be useful in a description of leadership. In this 
9 
view, leadership, quite simply, is a role that is occupied by a person. 
Defining leadership in this way identifies a leader as a member of a 
3 
group where he is assigned a certain status by that group and engages 
in the behaviour that is associated with the position he occupies. 
Many other definitions are listed in the literature; the great 
variety of the few definitions listed above suggest that there is 
little agreement as to the meaning of the concept and that little 
exists in the way of unifying theory. 
The differences between leader and manager: 
Many of the activities in the leadership role seem to relate 
also to the duties of the manager; certainly such items as setting 
objectives and giving feedback on work performance do overlap the 
two roles. This is not to say that the leader and the manager are 
one and the same. A manager "may" be a leader and a leader "may" be 
10 
a manager - but neither need be the same. A manager is appointed 
to fill a particular formal position within the organisational 
hierarchy. with the primary responsibility of attaining assigned 
objectives. On the other hand. the leader is a uniquely personal-
istic phenomenon. in that followers (not the organisation) define 
who 1s and who is not a leader - should a "leader" have no followers. 
11 
no leader exists. The leader is also more nearly concerned with 
the well-being of his followers. encouraging by personal appeal the 
efforts of his followers toward the accomplishment of goals to which 
the members already have a sense of obligation or personal commitment. 
By contrast, the manager typically operates within objectives 
that have been imposed on both manager and subordinate from a higher 
level: subordinates mayor may not have a personal commitment to 
4 
organisational objectives or a sense of involvement and an obligation 
to achieve task-oriented goals. In the worst situation. the m~nager 
is responsible for achieving objectives toward which the members of 
the group unit are completely antipathetic and in which they are quite 
12 
uninterested. 
The major differences between manager and leader lie in their 
source of influence. While the manager obtains authority from the 
organisation and employs it to obtain results from his subordinates 
and to achieve organisationally prescribed objectives, the leader 
exists in the relationship with followers and receives power directly 
from those followers. In rather pure terms, this is the difference 
between the formal theory of authority and the acceptance theory of 
13 
authority. Based on such a point one can say that there is another 
principal difference between manager and leader: it is their work 
continuity in this position. The harsh taskmaster manager may 
continue in office as long as his performance is accepted by the 
formal organisation, whereas the leader maintains the leadership 
position only through the day-to-day wishes of the followers. Their 
criterion for continuing to accept that person as a leader is how 
well he is facilitating the group's accomplishment of their objectives. 
THE TRAITS THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP 
The first systematic effort by psychologists and other theorists 
to understand leadership was to attempt to identify the traits or 
personal characteristics of individual leaders. Until the middle 
1940's leadership research centred on identifying the traits of leaders 
and such traits as honesty, loyalty, ambition. aggressiveness, 
initiative and drive were deemed important. 14 
The traits theories rest on the assumption that the individual 
is more important than the situation. that if we can identify the 
distinguishing traits of successful leaders. we shall have the clue 
to the leadership problem. that if we cannot make good leaders we 
15 
will at least be able to select good leaders. 
In general. the traits theories have not been a very fruitful 
approach to explaining leadership. It holds that leadership traits 
are widespread throughout the population; tt~t they can be observed 
5 
and measuredJ and that their possession is causally related to leader 
success. In fact. it is not this simple in reality. In Iraq. for 
example, not all leaders (managers) possess the same traits, and 
many non-leaders (non-managers) may possess all the personal traits 
which are relevant to successful management. In the same way, it 
is difficult to define many of these traits; it is not possible to 
identify universal, specific traits common to all leaders. In a 
specific culture. specific traits are doomed; out of dozens of studies. 
there is no uniformity of identified traits or any significant 
correlations of traits with actual instance of leadership. In 1940. 
Byrd examined twenty lists of traits that were attributed to leaders 
in various surveys and discovered none of the items appearing on all 
16 lists. Jennings in 1961 said: 
"fifty years of study have failed to produce one 
personality trait or set of qualities that can 
be used to discriminate between leaders and non-
leaders." 17 
Yet, one of the most obvious weakness of traits theories is that it 
failed to consider the influence of situational factors in determining 
who is the leader (or the manager) and what type of characteristics he 
~. : 
18 possesses. In Iraq. for example. it is very difficult to understand 
why managers have a certain set of traits unless we understand the 
society and its economic and social developments including that of 
political development. Traits are important. but they are only one 
part of the whole situation. The members of the work group and the 
situation itself (task. technology. goals. structurel are also major 
variables for leadership is a function of the leader. the followers 
and the situation. 
However, despite their failures, the traits theories should not 
be discarded too hastily, for they have made some contributions 
toward clarifying the nature of leadership. Several studies have 
indicated a significant correlation between certain traits and leader-
ship effectiveness. Stogdill in 1948 found from a review of the 
literature that there was a definite correlation between the traits 
of intelligence, scholarship, dependability, responsibility, social 
participation, and socio-economic status of leaders compared with 
19 
non-leaders. Ghiselli, in 1961, noted significant relationship 
between leadership effectiveness and the traits of intelligence, 
supervisory ability, initiative, self-assurance, and individuality 
20 in the way work was done. Davis. likewise. observed in 1972 that 
leaders do have high intelligence. broad social interests and maturity, 
strong motivation to accomplish. and great respect for, and interest 
21 in, people. 
THE BEHAVIOURAL THEORIES OF L.EADERSHIP 
When it became evident that effective leaders did not seem to 
have any distinguishing traits. researchers tried to isolate the 
6 
7 
behaviours that made leaders effective. They tried to discover 
what effective leaders did, how they delegated tasks, how they 
communicated with and tried to motivate their subordinates, how 
they carried out their tasks. and so on. Unlike traits, however, 
behaviours can be learned; it followed, therefore, that individuals 
trained in the appropriate leadership behaviours would be able to 
22 lead more effectively. Research showed, nevertheless, that 
leadership behaviours appropriate in one situation were not necessarily 
appropriate in another. 
Nevertheless, despite growing evidence that effective leadership 
behaviour depends at least partially on the leader's situation. some 
researchers have reached the conclusion that certain management 
behaviours are more effective than others in a wide variety of 
circumstances. These researchers have focused on two aspects of 
leadership behaviour: leadership functions and leadership styles. 
Leadership functions and Styles: 
The first aspect of the behavioural approach to leadership 
shifted the focus from the individual leader to the functions that 
leaders performed within their group. According to leadership 
functions researchers, in order for a group to operate effectively, 
the leader has to perform two principal functions: "task-related" or 
problem-solving functions and "group maintenance" or social functions. 
Studies in this area have found that most effective groups have 
some form of shared leadership in which one person (the manager) 
performs the task function, while another group member performs the 
23 
social function. An individual who is able to perform both roles 
successfully would obviously be an especially effective leader. 
8· 
The second perspective on leadership behaviour focuses on the 
style a leader uses in dealing with subordinates. Researchers have 
identified two leadership styles: a task-oriented style and an 
employee-style. Task-oriented managers direct and closely supervise 
subordinates to ensure that the task is performed to their satis-
faction. Employee-oriented managers try to motivate rather than 
control subordinates. They encourage subordinates to perform tasks 
by allowing them to participate in decisions that affect them and by 
forming friendly. trusting. and respectful relationships with 
subordinates. 
Research has tried to determine which of these two leadership 
styles leads to the most effective group performance. At Ohio State 
University. researchers (Stogdill and Shartle) studied the effective-
ness of what they called "Initiating structure" (task-oriented) and 
"consideration" (employee-oriented) leadership behaviour. 24 They 
found that employee turnover rates were lowest and employee satis-
faction highest under leaders who were rated high in "consideration". 
Conversely. leaders who were rated low in consideration (high in 
initiating structure) had high grievance and turnover rates among 
their subordinates. 
Similarly. researchers at the University of Michigan distinguished 
between job-centred and employee-centred managers. Job-centred 
managers set rigid work standards. organised tasks down to the last 
detail. prescribed the work methods to be followed. and closely 
supervised their subordinates. Employee-centred managers encouraged 
subordinates participation in goal setting and in other work 
decisions and helped ensure high performance by inspiring trust and 
respect. They found that the most effective leaders were those who 
had supportive relationships with their subordinates. tended to use 
group rather than individual decision-making. and encouraged their 
subordinates to set and achieve high performance goals. 25 
THE SITUATIONAL THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP 
The trait and behavioural theories produced research showing 
that effective leadership seemed to depend on a number of variables. 
such as organisational climate. the nature of the tasks and work 
activities. and managerial values and experience. No one trait was 
common to all effective leaders; no one style was most effective in 
26 
all situations. Researchers then took the next logical step. They 
tried to identify the factors in the situation that influence the 
effectiveness of a certain leadership style. Since the early work 
of Tannenbaum and Schmidt (1956) many researchers have added to. and 
elaborated on. the situational factors that affect the leadership 
27 
style a manager selects and how effective a particular style is. 
How the work situation affects a manager will depend on his 
perception of the situation. For example. a manager who believes 
that his subordinates are lazy and low in ability will manage them 
on that basis for a prolonged period. even if the subordinates are 
actually eager to work and have excellent skills. 26 In order for 
the manager's leadership style to change to one that is more 
9 
appropriate to the situation. the manager's perception of the situation 
29 
will first have to change. 
As regards those factors that influence leader effectiveness. 
Reitz, Hersey and Blanchard found that these factors include 
the leader's personality, past experience, and expectations; the 
superior's expectations and behaviour. the subordinates' character-
istics; expectations and behaviour; the requirements of the task; 
the organisational climate and policies; and the expectations and 
behaviour of peers. 
These factors also influence the leader in return. The 
10 
influence process is "reciprocal". Th~t is, leaders and subordinates 
influence each other and affect the effectiveness of the organisation 
30 
as a whole. 
THE CONTINGENCY THEORIES OF LEADERSHIP 
While the situational theories of leadership concentrated on 
the importance of situation and identified various situational 
factors that can influence leadership behaviour. the contingency 
theories attempt to: 
a) identify which of these factors is most important 
under a given set of circumstances, and 
b) predict the leadership style that will be most 
31 
effective under those circumstances. 
In the section below, a review of three of the more recent and 
well-known contingency theories of leadership are given: 
11 
Fiedler's Theory of Leadership 
Fiedler's basic assumption is that it is quite difficult for 
managers to alter the styles that have helped them develop successful 
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careers. for this reason. he believes that trying to change a 
manager's style to fit the situation is inefficient or useless. Since 
styles are relatively inflexible. and since no one style is appropriate 
for every situation. effective group performance can be achieved by 
matching the manager to the situation or by changing the situation to 
33 fit the manager. 
The leadership style that Fiedler contrasts are similar to the 
"employee-centred" and "task-oriented" styles discussed above. What 
differentiates his theory from the others is the measuring he used. 
He measured leadership style on a simple scale that indicated "the 
degree to which a man described favourably or unfavourably his least 
preferred co-worker (LPC)" - the employee with whom the person could 
work least well. It is this measure that locates an individual on 
the leadership style continuum. According to Fiedler's findings: 
"a person who describes his least preferred co-workers in 
a relatively favorable manner tends to be permissive. 
human relations-oriented and considerate of the feelings 
of his men. But a person who describes his least preferred 
co-worker in an unfavorable manner - who has what we have 
come to call a low LPC rating - tends to be managing. task-
controlling. and less concerned with the human relation 
aspects of the jo~." 34 
Fiedler has identified three elements in the work situation that help 
determine which leadership style will be effective: 
a) The leader-member relationship. which is the most 
critical variable in determining the situation's 
favourableness. 
b) The degree of task structure. which is the second 
most important input into the favourableness of the 
situation; and 
c) The leader's position power obtained through formal 
authority. which is the third most critical dimension 
of the situation. 35 
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The situation is favourable to the leader if all three of the 
above elements are high. In other words. if the leader is generally 
accepted by followers (high first element). if task is very structured 
and everything is "spelled out" (high second element), and if a 
great deal of authority and power is formally attributed to the leader's 
position (high third element). the situation is very favourable. If 
the apposite exists (if the three elements are low), the situation 
will be very unfavourable for the leader. Fiedler was convinced that 
the favourableness of the situation in combination with the leadership 
style determines effectiveness. 
Fiedler concluded that under favourable and very unfavourable 
situations. the task-directed or "hard-nosed" type of leader was 
mast effective. However, when the situation was only moderately 
favourable or unfavourable (the intermediate range of favourableness), 
the human relations leader was most effective. Figure 1.1 summarises 
this relationship between leadership style and the favourableness of 
the situation. 
FIGURE 1.1 
Style of 
Leadership 
Task 
Directed 
Human 
Relations 
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FIEDLER'S MODEL OF LEADERSHIP 
Very _ .... ~~ ____ _ ----~>~ 1- Very 
unfavourable Unfavourable Favourable Favourable 
Favourableness af the Situation 
Source: F.E. Fiedler, A Theory af Leadership, ap.cit., pp. 146. 
Why is the task-directed type of leader successful in very 
favourable situations? Fiedler offered the following explanation: 
"In the very favorable conditions in which the leader 
has power, informal backing, and a relatively well-
structured task, the group is ready to be directed, 
and the group expects to be told what to do. Consider 
the captain of an airliner in its final landing approach. 
We would hardly want him to turn to his crew for a dis-
cussion on how to land." 35 
As an example of why the task-oriented leader is successful in a highly 
unfavourable situation, Fiedler cited: 
"the disliked chairman of a volunteer committee which 
is asked to plan the office picnic on a beautiful 
Sunday. If the leader asks too many questions about 
what the group ought to do or how he should proceed, 
he is likely to be told that "we ought to go home." 37 
Although the validity of Fiedler's theory has been questioned, it is 
widely agreed that he has made a significant contribution to our 
understanding of how leaders and situations can be matched for effective 
38 performance. 
Path-Goal Theory of Leadership 
Like other contingency theories, the path-goal theory tries to 
help understand and predict leadership effectiveness in different 
situations. The theory, formulated relatively recently by Evans and 
39 House. represents a new and evolving approach. 
The path-goal theory is based on the expectancy/valence theory. 
Briefly the expectancy/valence theory states that an individual's 
motivation depends on his expectation of reward and the valence, or 
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attractiveness. of that reward. The path-goal theory focuses on the 
leader as a source of rewards. It attempts to predict how different 
types of rewards and different leadership styles affect the motivation. 
performance and satisfaction of subordinates. House and his colleagues 
identified four specific types of leader behaviour on three subordinate 
expectations: 
a) Directive leadership - the behaviour involved in letting 
subordinates know what is expected of them. providing 
specific guidance. standards. and schedules of work to be 
done as well as rules and regulations 
b) Supportive leadership - is characterised by a friendly 
and approachable leader who shows concern for the status. 
well-being and needs of subordinates 
c) participative leadership - a leader who consults with 
subordinates, solicits their suggestions before making a 
decision 
d) Achievement-oriented leadership - the activity of setting 
challenging goals of emphasising improvement in performance, 
expressing confidence in and high expectations of subordinates' 
ability to perform at the highest standards. 
The three types of subordinate expectations are: Job satisfaction; 
Acceptance of the leader; and Expectations about effort performance-
reward relationship. 
The path-goal theory involves two propositions. First. leader 
behaviour is acceptable and satisfying to subordinates to the extent 
15 
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that the subordinates see such behaviour as an immediate source of 
satisfaction or as instrumental to future satisfaction. Second. 
the leader behaviour will be motivational (e.g. will increase effort) 
to the extent that it makes satisfaction of subordinates' needs 
contingent on effective performance and it complements the environment 
of subordinates by the guidance. clarity of direction. and rewards 
40 
necessary for effective performance. 
In the light of these propositions, the motivational functions 
of the leader consist of increasing the number and kinds of personal 
pay-offs to subordinates for work-goal attainment and making paths 
to these payoffs easier to travel by clarifying the paths. reducing 
the barriers and increasing the opportunities for subordinates' 
satisfaction. 
Path-goal contingency variables: 
Two kinds of situational variables are presented as contingency 
variables that help determine the most effective leadership style: 
(1) the personal characteristics of subordinates, and (2) the 
environmental pressures and dernc1nds in the workplace with which 
subordinates must cope. 
The leadership style subordinates favour will, according to House, 
be partially determined by their personal characteristics. He cites 
studies suggesting that individuals who believe that what happens to 
them occurs because their behaviour - "internals" - are more satisfied 
with a participative leadership style. Individuals who believe events 
occur to them bocause of luck or fate - "externals" - are more satisfied 
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with a directive leadership style. 
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Subordinates' evaluation of their own ability will also influence 
subordinate style performance. Those who feel highly skilled and 
capable may resent an overly controlling manager. whose directives 
will be seen as counterproductive rather than rewarding. Subordinates 
who feel less skilled or able. on the other hand. may prefer a 
manager whose more directive behaviour will be seen as enabling them 
to carry out their tasks properly and therefore makine it possible 
for them to earn organisational rewards. 
As regards the environmental variable - the environment of 
subordinates. it consists of those factors that are not within the 
control of the subordinate but which are important to satisfaction 
or to the ability to perform effectively. These include the task. 
the formal authority system of the organisation. and the work group. 
Each of these factors may serve as stimuli to motivate and direct 
the subordinate to perform his work. They may also act to reduce 
variability in behaviour. and they may serve as rewards for 
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accomplishing desired performance. 
The path-goal theory indicates that leader behaviour will be 
motivational to the extent that it helps subordinates cope with 
environmental uncertainties. threats from others. or sources of 
frustration. It further indicates that when goals. and paths to 
desired goals. are apparent because of the routine nature of the 
task. clear group norms. or objective control of the formal authority 
system. attempts by the manager to clarify paths and goals would be 
redundant and would be seen by subordinates as an imposition of 
unnecessarily close control. 
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It seems that this theory is more realistic than Fiedler's 
theory. It takes into account the personality characteristics of 
subordinates. as well as situational variables. It should also 
be noted that the path-goal theory does not only attempt to 
suggest what type of manager behaviour may be more effective in 
particular situations. it also attempts to explain why manager 
15 effective. However. the empirical evidence to date suggests 
that the theory. like many others. has problems predicting sub-
ordinate performance. One study suggests that subordinate perform-
ance may cause changes in manager behaviour instead of. as predicted 
43 by the theory. the other way around. These uncertainties will 
probably be reduced as future research on the theory becomes more 
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standardized and well-defined. 
The Life Cycle Theory of Leadership: 
The third major contingency approach to leadership is Hersey's 
and Blanchard's "life cycle theory".45 which holds that the most 
effective leadership style varies with the "maturity" of subordinates. 
These scholars define maturity not as age or emotional stability 
but as desire for achievement. willingness to accept responsibility. 
and task-related ability and experience. 
Hersey and Blanchard believe that the relationship between a 
manager and subordinates moves through four phases as subordinates 
develop and "mature" and that managers need to vary their leadership 
style with eiJch phc1se. (See Figure 1.2). 
In the first phase - when subordinates first enter the 
organisation - a high task orientation by the manager is most 
appropriat~. Subordinates have to be instructed in their tasks 
and familiarized with the organisation's rules and procedures. As 
subordinates begin to learn their tasks (phase 2), task-oriented 
management remains essential, because subordinates are not yet 
willing or able to accept full responsibility. However, the 
manager's trust in and support of subordinates can increase as the 
manager becomes familiar with subordinates and wishes to encourage 
further efforts on their part. Thus, the manager can start to 
use employee-oriented behaviour (phase 3). 
In the third phase, the subordinates' ability and achievement 
motivation are increased, and subordinates actively begin to seek 
greater responsibility. The manager will no longer need to be 
directive (indeed, close direction might be resented). However, the 
manager will continue to be supportive and considerate in order to 
strengthen the subordinates' resolve for greater responsibility. 
As subordinates gradually become more confident, self-
directing, and experienced, the manager can reduce the amount of 
support and encouragement (phase 4). Subordinates are then "on 
their own" and no longer need or expect a directive relationship 
with their manager. 
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FIGURE 1.2: THE LIFE CYCLE THEORY. OF LEAnERSHIP 
(High)r-----------------,-----------------~ 
Relationship 
Behaviour 
(Low) 
(Low) 
High Relationships 
and 
Low Task 
(Phase 3) 
Low Task 
and 
Low Relationships 
(Phase 4) 
/ 
High Task 
and 
High Relationships 
(Phase 2) 
High Task 
and 
Low Relationships 
(Phase 1) 
Task Behaviour ~ (High) 
(Mature) (Immature) 
Source: Paul Hersey and Kenneth H. Balanchard, op.cit., p. 165 • 
. 
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The life cycle theory of leadership has generated interest 
because it recommends a leadership that is dynamic and flexible 
rather than static. The motivation, ability and experience of 
subordinates must constantly be assessed in order to determine 
which style combination would be most appropriate. If the style 
is appropriate. according to these researchers, it will not only 
motivate subordinates but also help them move toward "maturity". 
Thus. the manager who developes his subordinates, increases their 
confidence. and helps them learn their work • will constantly be 
shifting his style. 
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Although this theory is focused on the maturity of subordinates, 
it gives little attention to other variables which have an important 
influence on the way that a manager behaves. Among these variables 
are, the amount of time available for goal accomplishment, the nature 
of the job or the task to be done, the·manager's own personality 
traits. and the expectations of the manager's boss. For example, 
a manager might be unable to use low-task and low-relationships 
(phase 4) with his subordinates if his boss's style is high-task and 
low-relationships (phase 1). In addition, most of us are not completely 
flexible and feel more comfortable with some leadership styles than 
with others. Some people find it quite difficult to change their 
style to any degree. However, and as Hersey and Blanchard say, 
the maturity concept is a good means for use in choosing the 
appropriate behaviour with an individual or a group at a particular 
time. 46 
The previous discussion of leadership theories indicates the 
following points: 
1 - There are almost as many different definitions of leader-
ship as there are persons who have attempted to define the 
concept. This reflects that there is little agreement as 
to the meaning of the concept and that little exists in the 
way of unifying theory of leadership. 
2 - Based on the above point, it is no surprise therefore to 
find that there are many different theories in leadership; 
the traits theoriesl the behavioural theories; the situa-
tional theories and the contingency theories. While the 
traits and the behavioural theories have ignored the 
situational and environmental variables in determining a 
leader or a manager behaviour, the situational and 
contingency theories paid special attention to these 
dimensions and looked at a leader behaviour as the outcome 
of three interlocked groups of variables; the leader and 
his characteristics; his subordinates and their character-
istics and the situation and its characteristics. Thus, in 
order to understand the behaviour of the leader or the 
manager, special attention must be paid to the situation in 
which he worKsl to the people with whom he interacts. 
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3 - Though some researchers have distinguished between the 
leaders and the managers in the light of their source of in-
fluence and authority, leadership is a means rather than an 
end in itself, and this means can be used by everyone regardless 
of his position, whether he is a manager of corporation or a 
husband in a family. Indeed. this idea calls us to point out 
at this stage that not all leadership behaviour of a certain 
leader is directp.d toward achi~ving organisational objectives. 
23 
2. CROSSCULTURAL STUDIES IN MANAGEMENT 
The demand for studies of management in various countries of 
the world has grown rapidly in the last three decades. This demand 
comes both from academic specialists who are searching for 
fundamental administrative concepts and from practicing managers 
who must direct organisations in other countries. 
Many researchers have signalled out the need for crosscultural 
studies in management. Robert Dahl, for example. was among the 
first to express the need for comparative studies in this field: 
"The comparative aspects of public administration have been 
largely ignored; and as long as the study of public admin-
istration is not comparative. claims for - a science of 
public administration - sound rather hollow." 47 
Heady. in a recent summary of the subject, mentioned: 
"Those who are attempting to construct a science of admin-
istration recognise that this depends, among other things. 
on success in establishing propositions about administra-
tive behavior which transcend national boundaries ••••• 
The limitations and hazards of •.•• parochialism are now 
being recognised. and we are on the threshold of a new era 
in administrative studies that will stress comparative 
analysis." 48 
A careful examination of the crosscultural management studies 
reveals that there are two schools of management theories in this 
field: the universal school and the cultural school. 
The universalists believe that no appreciable difference 
exists in managerial behaviour across cultures. Since managers must 
perform the same basic functions regardless of culture, their 
49 general behaviour is determined functionally. Should differences 
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exist. they are products of the individual or organisational situation. 
Among the theorists of this school are Likert. Mouton and Blake. 50 
Koontz also has suggested that there is universality of management 
practices in such areas as network planning. variable budgeting. 
utilization of rate-of-return on investment. and break-even analysis. 51 
As regards the cultural school, it believes that culture is 
the independent variable in explaining managerial behaviour and 
attitudes. The researchers of this school have postulated that 
international attitudinal and behavioural differences are the result 
of divergent values within different cultural sPheres. 52 
Abundant evidence has suggested that cultural values do affect 
management behaviour. Vroom indicated that particular worker values 
may prohibit the worker from participating in decision-making. 53 
And for Ryterband and Barrett. managers in a culture may adopt styles 
and values that are unique and even abrasiVe to others' ways of doing 
54 things and still achieve "Western" organisational goal s. Richman 
concluded that it seems apparent that cultural constraints will 
continue to have varying. and often major, impacts on managerial 
performance and the achievement of corporate objectives in international 
55 business firms, throughout much or most of the world. 
Farmer and Richman have shown how all elements of the management 
process (e.g. planning, control. organisation, staffing, marketing, 
production. procurement. etc.) are potentially constrained by variables 
56 in the cultural environment. 
One of the most important features of the cultural school is 
that management style in developing countries is authoritarian-paternalistic 
and that this style is the result of their socia-cultural milieu. 57 
The observation made by Barrett and Bass in 1970 seems to typify 
the conclusions of these studies: 
"There are differences among countries in the preferred 
style of leadership. These differences in leadership 
styles appear to be largely culturally based and at 
this point in time it would be naive to advocate one 
model of leadership style as being optimum for all 
cuI tural groups." 58 
Many of these studies have also believed that the stage and the 
phase of industrialisation is a major factor in determining manager-
subordinates relationship. Harbison and Myers. for example. 
indicated that: 
"The process of industrialisation tends. other things 
being equal, to limit managerial authority, both as 
a consequence of its direct effects on the industrial 
system and of its indirect effects on society as a 
whole." 59 
There are, however, a number of reservations about the majority of 
crosscultural studies. First, the basic data of these studies 
have distilled from mailed questionnaires. In addition to the 
usual problems connected with questionnaires, there is the possi-
bility that the questions might be interpreted differently by 
managers using different languages and in different cultural settings. 
Second: most of the literature in crosscultural management is written 
by scholars who have grown up in an environment alien to the countries 
they describe. Although outsiders may be more objective in their 
observations. their perceptions are hampered by their own cultural 
backgrounds and their lack of understanding of foreign environments. 
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Third. the current literature of crosscultural management studies 
covers only a small part of the world's countries. It needs to be 
expanded to cover such countries as China. Spain. Turkey. Iran. and 
the Arab countries in order to make better Judgements. 
In the Arab world. there is. according to the author's knowledge. 
only one crosscultural study on the Arab managers. It is Muna's 
60 
study • In the section below. a summary of this study and its main 
shortcomings is presented. 
3. MUNA AND THE ARAB EXECUTIVE 
Muna investigated fifty-two Arab executives from six Arab 
countries; Egype. Jordan. Lebanon. Kuwait. Sudi Arabia and the United 
Arab Emirates. 
Through his semi-structured interviews he described what these 
managers think. feel and do within the present Arab environment and 
given the social pressures placod upon them. He also investigated 
their decision making styles and tried to explore to what extent 
these managers permit subordinates' participation in decision making. 
61 Muna identified four decision-making styles as follows: 
- Style 1 (Own decision): Executive makes decisions without 
consulting subordinates. but may consult superiors. partners. 
or outsiders. 
- Style 2 (consultation): Prior consultation with subordinates. 
- Style 3 (Joint decision-making): Joint decision making with 
subordinates. and, 
- Style 4 (Delegation): Delegation of decisions to subordinates. 
That is the manager asks subordinate to make decision on his 
own. 
In addition he prepared seven problems (decisions) and asked 
the manager to indicate which style he uses in each decisidn. The 
seven decisions were grouped by Muna into three sub-groups as 
follows: 62 
Personnel decisions group: Includes three decisions (a) the 
decision to promote one of the employees directly supervised 
by one of the manager's subordinates} (b) the decision to 
discipline one of the employees directly supervised by one 
of the manager's subordinates and, (cl the decision to terminate 
the services of one of the employees directly supervised by one 
of the manager's subordinates. 
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Departmental decisions group: Includes three decisions or problems 
(a) the decision to reduce the total workforce of the company by 
20 per centl (b) the decision to increase the workforce in a 
subordinate's department/division; (c) the decision to alter or 
modify the formal organisation chart of a given department in the 
company. 
Organisational decision group: includes only one decision. The 
decision to introduce a new product, or enter a new market. or 
take on a new project; or expand existing work facilities. 
The main findings of Muna's study can be summarized as follows: 
1 - The Arab managers are under strong social pressures. Pressures 
from their families and relatives. Pressures from their 
friends and from the wider society as a whole. These pressures 
have a great negative influence on the manager's thinking. time, 
behaviour and, consequently, on their performance. 
The problem of low value placed upon time by the people working 
with these managers, the problem of low "industrial mentality" 
of the workers, the problem of visiting at work office as well as 
the problem of social restriction on women's work are only a few 
examples of the pressures these managers face. furthermore, 
the Arab manager lives in a society where family and friendship 
remain important and prevalent factors even in the functioning 
of formal institutions and groups. The use of personal (family 
and friendship) ties and connections is not only widespread. but 
is also an important and necessary means of doing business. In 
the Arab world, Muna says, the use of such personalities and 
connections is evident in a wide range of activities. Typical 
examples that were provided by Muna's managers included: 
(a) expediting and getting a work-permit. a passport or a visa. 
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and generally by-passing or expediting most governmental formalities 
and paperwork; (b) obtaining referrals or employment; and (c). 
knowing about, negotiating. and eventually securing a multi-
63 
million dollar business contract. 
2 - The Arab manager uses style 2 (consultation) in decision-making 
more than any other style. According to his findings 55% of all 
the managers studied use style 2; 22% use style 1 (own 
decision); 13% use style 3 (joint decision) and only 10% 
64 
use style 4 (delegation). Muna's findings also indicate 
that managers interviewed involved their subordinates more 
in personnel-related decisions than in departmental and 
55 
organisational decisions. 
3 - The study also revealed that such variables as the age of 
the manager and his level of education have significant effect 
on manager's decision-making approach. The older the Arab 
manager is the more autocratic he tends to be - sharing less 
of his decision-making power with his subordinates. The only 
reason for this. Muna argues. is that the Arabs respect age. 
On the other hand. managers without a university education are 
more democratic with their subordinates in decision making when 
compared to university-educated managers. 
4 - Munals study also indicated that the Arab managers tend to be 
more person-oriented than role or task-oriented. They engage 
in prolonged rituals when starting a business discussion, they 
value loyalty over efficiency; they use personal ties and 
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connections extensively; and they adhere to the open-door tradition. 55 
Doubtless Muna's study has uncovered many interesting points 
of the Arab managers and enriched the crosscultural management studies 
in this respect. However, Muna's study suffers from the following 
shortcomings: 
1 - Muna did not analyse the managers' decision-making styles 
according to the nature of their business (manufacturing. trade and 
services) nor did he analyse them according to company ownership 
(public company. private company). Indeed. he analysed them only 
as a group. As can be seen from Table 1.1 there are 24 managers 
(46%) work in manufacturing organisations while the remainder 
work in trade and services. or in mixed organisations. Had Muna 
taken such differences in his analysis he would have been. probably. 
reached different results particularly in such matters as the 
decision-making approaches of these managers. What is mentioned 
above can also be applied in the field of the type of the ownership 
of the companies - there are 20 managers (38%) working in family 
organisations. 
2 - Muna's study daBs not represent all the Arab countries. nor 
.does it statistically represent each one of the country's studied. 
Take for example. he interviewed only 9 managers from EgyptJ 10 
managers from Jordan and 9 managers from Kuwait. despite the fact 
that Egypt is the biggest country in the Arab world in terms of 
population (43 million) whereas both Jordan and Kuwait have less 
than 3 million. 
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3 - Muna confuses the issue fundamentally when he divides the managers' 
social background into the following three categories: tribal. 
rural and urban. Social background cannot be divided in this way 
for a very simple reason. the tribe is a social community and it can 
be found in towns as well as villages or rural areas. The term "rural" 
and "urban" refer to places more than anything else. 
TABLE 1.1 A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF ARAB EXECUTIVE PRESENTED BY MUNA'S STUDY IN 1980 
Country N Age: University Social Background Ownership 
mean education 
(range) With Without Tribal \ Rural Urban Family Partner- Govern-
ship ment 
I \ I ! I I Egypt 9 S2 9 - - \ 1 I 9 3 - 6 (40-62) i I i I 
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(33-53) 
\ 
Sudi Arabia 10 42 8 I 2 1 I 4 S 3 3 4 (29-50 I 
UAE 6 45 4 2 2 1 3 2 4 1 
(38-53) 
Totals 52 46 44 8 3 25 24 20 20 12 
(29-69) 
L--~ 
-- -- - - '---
_L ... ___ .. ___ 
Source: F.A. Muna. op.cit •• p. 126. 
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4 - Muna did not give us any idea on such matters as how these 
managers spend their daily work; what activities they perform. In 
addition. he did not mention anything about mobility and career 
patterns. Furthermore. at the time he talked about managers' 
responsibilities for their families he did not give us any information 
about the size of these families. So too. he did not indicate the 
social classes of these managers. 
5 - Finally. Muna did not compare the Arab managers social background 
with those working in the developed countries. 
4. MINTZBERG AND THE MANAGER'S JOB 
Perhaps the newest approach to management theory to catch 
the attention of academics and practitioners alike is the managerial 
role approach in analysing managers' activities, popularized by 
67 Henry Mintzberg of McGill University. Essentially, this approach 
aims at observing what managers actually do and from such observation 
come to conclusions as to what managerial activities (or rules) are. 
Although different researchers have studied the actual work 
of managers from chief executive~ to "in suoervisors, Mintzberg has 
given this approach sharp visibility.68 
By systematically studying the activities of five chief 
executives in a variety of nrganisations, Mintzberg concluded that 
there is considerable similarity in the behaviour of managers at 
all levels. All managers, Mintzberg argued, have formal authority 
over their subordinates, and they derive status from that authority. 
This status causes all managers to be involved in interpersonal 
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relations with subordinates. peers. and superiors. who in turn. 
provide managers with the information they need to make decisions. 
These different aspects of a manager's job cause managers at all 
levels to be involved in a series of interpersonal. informational. 
and decisional roles, which Mintzberg defined as "organised sets 
of behaviours." See Figure 1.3. 
1 - Interpersonal Roles: 
As can be seen from Figure 1.3. there are three interpersonal 
roles or activities which help the manager keep the organisation 
running smoothly. Thus, although the duties associated with these 
activities are often routine, the manager cannot ignore them. As 
head of a unit. the manager sometimes acts as a "figurehead" by 
performing certain ceremonial duties - greeting viSitors. attending 
a subordinate's wedding. taking a customer to lunch, and so on. In 
addition. the managers adopt the leader role-hiring. training, 
encouraging and motivating his employees. Finally, the manager 
also plays the interpersonal role of "liaison". by dealing with 
people other than his subordinates or superiors such as suppliers. 
customers and peers. 
2 - Informational Roles: 
There are three informational roles (monitor. disseminator 
and spokesman) in which managers gather and disseminate information. 
As "monitor". the manager constantly looks for information that can 
be used to advantage. Subordinates are questioned and unsolicited 
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FIGURE 1.3: THE MANAGER'S ROLES "ACTIVITIES" ACCORDING TO 
HENRY MINIZBERG. 
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- Entrepreneur 
- Disturbance 
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~ - Resource Allo-
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- Nego tia to r 
Source: H. Mintzberg. "The Manager's Job: Folklore and Fact". 
op.cit •• p. 55. 
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information is also collected, usually through the manager's system 
of personal contacts.' In the "disseminator" role. the manager 
distributes to subordinates important information that would other-
wise be inaccessible to them. Finally, as a "spokesman", the manager 
transmits some of the information he has collected to individuals 
outside his unit. 
3 - Decision Roles: 
Figure 1.3 also indicates that there are four decisional roles 
the manager adopts. In the role of "entrepreneur". the manager 
tries to improve the unit. For example, when he receives a good idea. 
he launches a development project to make that idea a reality. In 
the role of "disturbance handler". on the other hand. the manager 
responds to situations that are beyond his control. such as a strike. 
bankrupt customer. and the like. As a "resource allocator". the 
manager is responsible for deciding how and to whom the resources of 
the organisation and the manager's own time will be allocated. In 
addition. he screens all important decisions made by his subordinates 
before they are put into effect. 
The fourth and last decisional role the manager exercises is 
that of "negotiator". Managers spend a great deal of their time 
as negotiators. because only they have the information and authority 
that negotiators require. 
Some Notes on Mintzberg's Work: 
Mintzberg's concept of the manager's job offers a useful 
reminder that our definition of management as a series of functions -
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planning, organising, leading and controlling - is a somewhat 
idealised but useful overview of what managers try to do. In fact, 
managers operate in a constantly changing environment. Although 
they attempt to follow systematic and rational procedures, they 
are often interrupted in their work. 
The idea of Mintzberg is important because it yields 
perspectives for a more realistic view of traditional managerial 
functions. The functions help explain managerial processes, 
whereas the Mintzberg approach helps us picture the realism of the 
day-to-day behaviour of managers. In the present study of the Iraqi 
managers, for example, the reader will discover that these managers 
not only exercise managerial activities but they also exercise 
personal activities. However, Mintzberg's work is still of limited 
usefulness, at least for the following reasons: 
1 - The sample used in his study is too small. 
2 - Many of the activities Mintzberg found are, in fact, evidences 
of planning, organising, leading and controlling. For example, 
but 
what is resource allocation/planning? Likewise, the entre-
preneurial role is certainly an element of the whole area of 
planning. And the interpersonal roles are mainly evidences of 
leading. So, too, the informational roles can be fitted into 
a number of the functional areas. 
3 - We believe that the manager's roles presented by Mintzberg are 
incomplete. Where in them does one find such important managerial 
activities as selecting and appraising managers, determining 
major strategies, structuring organisation and research activities? 
36 
4 - The five chief executives studied by Mintzberg were only 
from medium and large organisations. 69 Without including 
all the sizes (small. medium and large organisations). it is 
difficult to make a comprehensive managerial study. particularly 
when one deals with the work of the managers. 
5. THE OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The present study has eight major objectives: 
1: To find out the principal characteristics of the Iraqi top 
managers from the point of view of their personal character-
istics (age. place of birth. level of education) and their 
social characteristics. including size of the family and social 
origin. 
2: To show their career patterns (length of service and inter-
firm mobility).o 
3: To compare these characteristics with other managers working 
in some Western countries. such as the United States of America. 
the United Kingdom and Japan. 
4: To find out the type of interr~lationships that exist between 
these characteristics. on one hand. and to discover whether 
these characteristics differ according to the size of the 
companies in which these managers work. the ownership of the 
company (public or private) and the place of birth of the 
managers, on the other hand. 
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5: To show how these managers spend their time and what activities 
they perform during their working day and to find out whether 
the length of each activity differs across the morning and the 
evening periods, and if so, why? 
6: To find out what are the principal social pressures the Iraqi 
managers face in their work, and to explain the main factors 
responsible for their existence. 
7: To find out their decision-making styles and to discover which 
style they are normally using. In addition, to find out whether 
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this style differs across different types of decisions (problemsJ.sectors. 
or not. Likewise, to make a comparison between these results 
and that of Muna's study. 
8: It is also among the objectives of this study to investigate 
the soundness of some of the crosscultural management researchers 
who confirm that management styles in the developing countries 
are authoritative and that the managers in these countries tend 
to reduce subordinates' participation in decision making to the 
lowest degree. 
6. SIZE OF THE SAMPLE, RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND DATA ANALYSIS 
Size of the Sample: 
It was originally intended to base the analysis on a sample 
of 100 managers, drawn equally from the public and private sectors. 
However, due to unforeseen difficulties in arranging interviews with 
sampled managers. a final achieved sample of 44 managers was obtained. 
The subjects of this study are. thus. forty-four managing 
directors working in the industrial sector. Twenty managers work 
in the public sector and the remainder are from the private sector. 
The organisations in which these managers work are different 
in size (small. medium and large organisations). The biggest 
organisation has 5.005 employees. while the smallest one has 48 
employees. 
These organisations are located in Baghdad Province, Ninevah 
Province, Aribl Province and Sulaimaniyah Province. The majority are 
located in Baghdad Province. This is mainly because Baghdad is the 
capital of Iraq and the bulk of the industrial organisations are 
located in it. On the other hand, Baghdad is the biggest city in 
terms of population. 
As a capital, it 1s more developed than any other city in 
Iraq. 
The forty-four organisations produce different types of products 
including foodstuffs, beverage and tobacco, textiles, ready-made 
clothes, leather industries, manufactured metal industries and cement 
industry. 
Admittedly, the size of the sample is nat very large. However, 
taking into account the novelty of industry in Iraq, as well as the 
various handicaps that the researcher has faced, the sample can be 
regarded as representative. In addition, if we compare the size of 
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the sample of this study with Muna's and Mintzberg's samples, we 
would be in a favourable position. 
Among the principal difficulties that we encountered in the 
fieldworK of this study are the following: 
1: In Iraq it is very difficult to arrange an interview with a 
managing director particularly if the interview takes more than 
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two hours. To get an interview with a public sector managing 
director one must pass through a prolonged procedure of formalities. 
For example, to achieve this study, the researcher had been forced 
to take prior approval from two ministries, the Ministry of Industry 
and Ministry of Planning. This alone tOOK from the researcher's 
time almost one month. 
2: Many managers have avoided my interview, either because (as I 
heard from their secretaries) they were "too busy", or because they 
did not want others, particularly researchers, to unveil what 
they actually did. 
3: The length of the interview, together with other methods which 
the researcher used to verify what these managers said, particularly 
when they were discussing their decision-making approaches. have 
put another obstacle toward achieving more interviews. Take, for 
example, my interviews with each manager and his assisting managers. 
which tooK more than one day. 
4: Add to this the researcher was interviewing his subjects in their 
companies and these companies were not located in one place. On 
the contrary. they were scattered through different places and 
provinces. This also put another difficulty towards achieving 
larger sample. To give an example. he had to travel from 
Baghdad to Arbil twice and stayed in Arbil two weeks in order 
to interview three managers. 
Methodology and Data Analysis: 
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To achieve the objectives of this study, several different methods 
have been used to gather the relevant material. In the first place, 
a careful review of what has been written on leadership theories and 
crosscultural management studies was undertaken. The work of other 
scholars who made studies on managers and their job, whether in the 
Western countries or in the Eastern countries. has been also carefully 
reviewed. The aim of this procedure was threefold: 
First: to show that leadership theories have become a very complex 
subject on one hand, and that the modern leadership theories 
have paid especial attention to the importance of the environ-
mental variables in defining a leader behaviour and in 
determining management performance in a given organisation 
or society. 
Second: to show that the crosscultural management studies need to 
be more precisely directed to take account of other cultures 
and cover more countries if we really seek a better develop-
ment of manugement theories and what managers actually do. 
Third: to compare the results of the present study with the results 
of crosscultural management studies. 
• 
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Another review of what has been written in both the Western 
and Eastern countries about the Arab society and culture in general 
and the Iraqi society and its culture in particular was also undertaken. The 
principal reason for this stems from the author's view which can 
be summarised as follows: 
"To understand a group of managers and their personal-
social characteristics as well as their management 
styles, prior understanding of their society and culture 
is vital" 
In the second place, the forty-four managing directors have 
been interviewed at their companies. None of them have been inter-
viewed outside his company. The items of the interview have been 
gathered from the work of different researchers including Heller, 
70 Clark, Muna. 
The material of the interview have been grouped into four 
sections, as follows: 
1) General information about the manager and his company. 
2) The manager's decision-making approaches. 
3) The manager's attitude toward his subordinates and the Iraqi 
society as a whole. 
4) The manager's average time spent in the various activities 
in a working day. (See the appendix). 
In addition to ,these methods, various governmental and 
organisational reports and documents and censuses have been used 
to shed light on the current characteristics of the people of Iraq, 
the successive government and the economic development during the 
last decades. 
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Data Analysis: 
Before starting the analysis presented in this study. a 
preliminary cluster analysis using the "CLUSTAN PACKAGE" had been 
run for the data gathered to discover the most frequent patterns 
f ' t' I t 71 a assoc~a ~ons or c us ers. This analysis showed two patterns 
of clusters. The first was the cluster of the public sector 
managers and their personal-social as well as their career pattern 
attributes. while the second cluster was the private sector 
managers and their personal-social and career pattern characteristics. 
It is these two clusters that we analysed in depth by using the 
STATISTICAL PACKAGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES (SPSS).72 The aim was to 
expand the analysis of these two clusters in the light of the major 
variables that caused such a difference on the one hand. and to 
examine the associational degree that exists between a given variable 
"characteristic" and the other variables, on the other. 
Because the current study is an exploratory study, most of 
the data collected were based on nominal and ordinal level scales. 
2 The simple X test as well as Cramer's and Kendall's tests and 
coefficient test were used. 
As regards the assumption of interval scale we made when we 
analysed the managers' decision-making styles, it is consistent with 
assumptions made by other researchers. Thus, Heller, Muna, using a 
similar continuum, assumed a four-point equal interval scale. The 
same process can also be found in the work of Vroom and Yetton. All these 
researchers have looked at delegation (style 4 in this study) as a 
separated style distinguishes itself by an equal distance (see 
Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1). 
7. THE STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS 
Immediately after this introduction. ch2pter two gi\les an 
idea about the geography and the population of Iraq. It indicates 
that there are three different districts in Iraq: the mountains; 
the desert and the alluvial plain. The desert district forms 60% 
of the whole area and its climate covers more than half of the 
country. Iraq owns its existence to the rivers Tigris and Euphrates 
more than any other natural resources. despite the fact that the 
people have suffered a lot from them and were victims rather than 
beneficiaries of these rivers. The chapter also shows that the 
continuous threat of the desert and the rivers has affected the 
national economy and influenced people to follow a certain type of 
social adaptation. The chapter also indicates that Iraq is not going 
to be under population pressure within the next future. 
Chapter three deals with the society of Iraq. It shows that 
there are three interlocked social communities: the Bedouin, the 
village and the city communities. These communities are highly 
interrelated and share common social values. The chapter also 
discusses the principal factors that link these communities with 
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each other. Chapter four investigates the political and economic 
development in Iraq between 1921 and 1980. It shows that the problem 
of political instability, particularly before 1968, has split people's 
personality and widened the gulf between the people and the successive 
governments. The chapter also shows that agriculture was, until the 
recent past, the principal occupation of the people and modern industry 
is new in Iraq and the year 1950 can be regarded as the real beginning 
of this new era. 
In Chapter Five we turn our attention to the religious beliefs. 
practices and education of the people in Iraq. 
Chapter six investigates the Iraqi managers and their personal-
social characteristics. It compares these managers according to 
their age. edUcation. place of birth, size of the family. and social 
origins. The chapter also investigates the managers' career patterns. 
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In addition. it compares these characteristics with the characteristics of some 
of those managers who are working in the United States. the United 
Kingdom and Japan. The chapter also compares the Iraqi managers' 
characteristics in the light of their organisations ownership on one 
hand. and the size of their organisations. on the other. 
Chapter seven discusses how the Iraqi managers spend their 
time and sheds light on their major activities. and how long they 
spend on each activity. 
Chapter eight attempts to uncover and discuss the principal 
social pressures or constraints that interfere with the managers' 
work in Iraq. It also shows to what extent these managers can 
control such constraints. 
Chapter nine discusses the managers' decision-making styles. 
It tries to show to what extent the Iraqi managers let subordinates 
participate in decision-making and what style is the most common 
among these managers. The chapter also tries to examine the thesis 
of the crosscultural scholars which indicates that the authoritative 
decision-making style is the prevailing style in the developing 
countries. Chapter nine also tries to examine the argument which 
insists that there is no universal leadership style that is "best" 
in all situations (or different problems), and that leadership is 
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a contingent variable depends on the situation in which a manager 
works. The chapter also compares Muna's results of the Arab managers' 
approach in decision-making with the results of this study. 
A brief summary of the study, arguments and conclusions 
described in chapters two to nine is given in chapter ten. An 
attempt is made in this chapter to evaluate the success of this 
study in meeting its stated objectives. 
As regards the appendices, appendix 1 shows a brief summary 
of methodology, data analysis and representativeness of the 
sample that is used in the study. Appendix 2 shows the interview 
schedule and its four divisions, background information about the 
manager and his organisation; the manager's attitude subordinate(s) 
and the Iraqi society and, finally, the managers' activities and 
the average time spent in each activity in a working day. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE GEOGRAPHY AND POPULATION OF IRAQ 
INTRODUCTION 
From early times men have reflected on the influences of 
geographical conditions on human society. Perceiving the differences 
between the modes and exigencies of human life in the mountains, on 
the plains. and by the seaboard, in the desert and in the forest, in 
temperate regions and in the tropics. various thinkers attributed a 
dominant role to geography, regarding it as the primary determinant 
of the wealth and health, the size and energy of population, of their 
customs and social organisations and so forth. 
While the author rejects the idea that geography is the primary 
factor in determining the major characteristics of a given population, 
he agrees with Maciver and Page that it has an influence on their 
health and wealth, their work and their modes of living. 1 
The task of this chapter is to cast light on the geographical 
and population characteristics of Iraq. 
1.0 LOCATION AND GEOGRAPHICAL CHARACTERISTICS 
Present Iraq covers an area of approximately 438,000 sq. km. 
It is situated on the south-west of Asia, bounded on the north by 
Turkey, on the east by Iran. on the West by Syria. Jordan and Saudi 
Arabia, on the south by Arab Gulf, Kuwait and Sudi Arabia. 
The country can be divided into three districts: mountains, 
desert and alluvial plain. The mountainous district is situated in 
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the north and north-east of the country and forms one fifth of the 
total area. The desert (approx. 60% of the whole area) is situated 
plain 
in the west of Iraq. The alluvial/is in the form of a rectangle 
(650 km. long and 250 km. wide) and extends between Balad on the 
Tigris river and Ramadi on the Euphrates river in the north and Iranian 
frontiers on the east and the desert plateau on the west. It is broken 
in the south by marsh land. 2 (See the following Map) 
1.1 Climate 
Though there are three different climates - Mediterranean, 
steppes and desert, the desert climate is the prevailing one and covers 
about 70% of Iraq's area. The Mediterranean climate covers the 
mountains and characterises by cool winter where snow falls and rain-
fall ranges between 400-1000 mm. annually. The steppes climate exists 
between the highlands and the desert. The hot desert climate is 
characterised by a great temperature variation between day and night, 
summer and winter. the maximum of which reaches 40-45C. To subsist 
in such an environment. people have been forced to maintain strong 
family and tribal relatiOnships and grant the very highest value to 
the solidarity of members of these social institutions for everyone 
is dependent on the support and co-operation of his fellows. 
It is this desert environment. as will be seen later. that forced 
the people to place high value on man's superiority over women. 
3 hospitality and disparage manual work. 
1. 2 Rivers 
Iraq has two main rivers: Tigris and its tributaries. and the 
river Euphrates. Sir William Willcocks. a British engineer. whose 
stUdies of the Tigris-Euphrates system form the basis for the unified 
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development of the central valley of Iraq, has contrasted the 
unpredictability and violence of these rivers to the manageability 
of the Nile. Those streams are being harnessed today, but their 
rampages are a historic feature of the area. 4 
Tigris is 1718 km. long, of which 1415 km. in Iraq, while 
Euphrates is 2,300 km. long, of which 1213 km. in Iraq. The 
two riVers united in the southern part of Iraq to constitute Shatt 
AI-Arab. 110 km. long, which pours into the Arabian Gulf. Though 
the country owns its existence to these rivers, more than any other 
natural resources such as oil, the people until the recent past 
were victims rather than the beneficiaries. Not very long, as 
recently as 1956, devastating floods threw Iraq's economy into a 
state of acute emergency. The total losses of these floods were 
estimated, at that time, at about 10 million Iraqi Dinar. 5 Indeed. 
these rivers have posed a challenge to the riparian agricultural 
population since Barliest times. Yet, they play tantalizing tricks 
on farmers. For example, in the spring, the surging rivers pour out 
an oVer-abundQnce of wuter, whereas during the summer, when the sun 
parches the land, the water of these rivers contain a heavy proportion 
of salt and silt, and due to their bifureating nature which allows 
small amounts to be dammed, the more the water supply is increased, 
the worse the salt problem becomes. Salinity of the soil at present 
affects about 60% of all irrigated land and the annual 105585 of 
fertile land are estimated at 70 thousand donums. 6 
The continuous threats of desert and rivers have, as will be 
seen later, affected the national economy and influenced individuals 
to follow a certain type of social adaptation. In addition, the 
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desert environment on the one hand. and the continual threat of the 
rivers. on the other. are largely responsible. in my opinion. to the 
problem of rural-urban migration in Iraq. 
2.0 POPULATION 
-
The 1977 census placed the population of the country at 12 million 
7 
with an annual growth rute of about 3.3% per annum. During 1965 to 1977 
the urban population shurply increased while the rural population de-
creased. Table 2.1 which shows a comparison between the rural and urban 
populations for the years 1965. 1970 and 1977. indicates unusual rates 
of increase for urban dwellers. 
Table 2.1 The Population of Iraq in 1965. 1970 and 1977 (in thousands) 
Year Rural Urban Total· 
1965 3.935 4.112 8.047 
% 49 51 100 
1970 3.959 5.247 9.206 
% 43 57 100 
1977 4.454 7.645 12.099 
% 37 63 100 
Republic of Iraq. 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics for different Years. 
• Figures do not include citizens abroad. 
Such imbalance increases in the urban population can be explained 
by two points: 
First: there is a continuous process of migration from the 
villages to the cities. For example. while the annual growth 
rate is 3.3% per annum. the urban population grew at 5.3% and 
the rural population at 0.9% per annum. This means that 
about 1.9 million of the villagers have migrated from the 
rural areas to settle in the cities. 8 
Second: the current regime. since its establishment in 1968# 
has announced that Iraq is a homeland for any Arab who wishes 
to live in this country. 
As a result of the second point. there are many thousands of Egyptians 
working nowadays in the public and private sectors. AI-Hassan gives 
a very conservative estimate of their number# about 100 thousand~' 
Indeed. the problem of migration not only gave the government an 
urbanisation problem but also (as will be seen later) reduced the 
productivity of both industrial and agricultural sectors. Despite 
massive spending in cities for housing and other social welfare. there 
is still a serious risk that the process of urbanisation may proceed 
at a more rapid rate than the government can cope with. particularly 
in the short run. 
2.1 Population Density 
Population density ranges from 4 persons per sq. km. in Muthana 
province (to the south of Baghdad) to 619 in Baghdad province# but 
these averages have little meaning since they include large desert 
10 
areas having no sedentary population whatever. The density for the 
present agricultural area of Iraq is 200 per sq. km. 
The largest area empty of sedentary population is the desert 
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south and west of the Euphrates. Other large districts without 
settled inhabitants. such as the desert of AI-Jazirah. lie west of 
a line running southward from Mosul. The most densely settled 
region lies along the rivers. On the Euphrates the heaviest settle-
ment is to the south. principally in the cities of Kerbela. Najaf 
and Al-Simawah. The region of closely settled land on the Tigris 
begins near Samarra and follows the river and its tributaries. notably 
the Gharraf and Dujaylah systems. To the south. in Maysan province. 
rice supports a large population. and in the Shatt AI-Arab a narrow 
belt of close settlement follows the line of irrigated date palm 
gardens. 
On the northern plain the population is fairly heavy between 
Mosul and Kirkuk. In the mountains settlement is confined to a 
series of valleys. and the chief mountain centre. the city of 
As-Sulaimaniya. is located in the largest of these valleys. Settle-
ment thins out as the terrain becomes higher and more broKen. 
Age-group distribution of the population. as given in the 1977 
census, indicates that over one third of the population (37%) is 
under 9 years of age. It also indicates that almost two thirds of the 
population (74%) is under 30 years of age. Only 11% of the popula-
tion are above 50 years of age. The following Table reflects such 
a fact. 
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Table 2.2: ~istribution of population by Area and Age Groups in 
1977 (thousands) 
Age groups 
years Rural Area Urban Area Total 
Less than 9 1.804 2.623 4.427 
10 - 19 830 1.721 2.551 
20 - 29 650 1.278 1.928 
30 - 39 360 753 1.113 
40 - 49 292 504 796 
50 - 59 231 334 565 
60 - 69 150 227 377 
70 and more 152 204 356 
Source: Annual Abstract of Statistics 1978. op.cit •• 27. 
% 
36 
21 
16 
9 
7 
5 
3 
3 
As regards sex distribution, the same census indicates that 48% 
of the population are females as against 52% of males. In 1977, 
the birth rate was estimated at 40 persons per thousand, the death 
11 
rate at 14 per thousand. 
Figures presented above show that the general picture in Iraq 
is one of a young and rapidly increasing population. Though the 
country is not immediately threatened by population pressure, the 
rapid rate of expansion presents the possibility that at some time in 
the future, over-population may result. 
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Summary 
Iraq has three different districts; mountains. desert and the 
alluvial plain. The desert district forms 60% of the whole area and 
its climate covers almost 70% of Iraq's area. The country owns its 
existence to the rivers Tigris and Euphrates. 'more than any other 
natural resources despite the fact that the people. until the recent 
past, were victims rather than beneficiaries of these rivers. In 
addition to the flood problems which were quite common during the 
previous decades. these rivers contain a heavy proportion of salt and 
silt. Due to the bifureating nature of these rivers which allows 
small amounts to be dammed. the more the water supply is increased. 
the worse the salt problem becomes. 
The continuous threat of desert and rivers has. as will be seen 
later. affected the national economy and influenced people to follow 
a certain type of social adaptation. The harsh environment coupled 
with the continual threat of the rivers have also influenced individ-
uals to migrate into cities and this argument will become more obvious 
in the next chapters. On the other hand. the 1977 census placed the 
population of Iraq at 12 million with an annual growth rate of about 
3.3% per annum. Between the years 1965 and 1977 the urban population 
has sharply increased at the expense of rural population. Population 
density ranges from 4 persons per sq. km. in Muthana province to 619 
persons in Baghdad province. The most densely settled region lies 
along the rivers. Age-group distribution of the population indicates 
that over half of the population is under 24 years of age and this 
confirms that the general population picture in Iraq is one of a young 
and rapidly increasing population. However. this increase does not 
mean that Iraq is going to be under population pressure within the 
next future. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
SOCIAL COMMUNITIES IN IRAQ 
INTRODUCTION 
The term "community" denotes a collectivity of people who 
occupy a geographical area; people who are together engaged in 
economic and political activities and who essentially constitute 
a self-governing social unit with some common values and experience 
feelings of belonging to one another. Examples are a city. a town. 
1 
a village. With such a definition in mind. the people of Iraq can 
be divided into three broad kinds of communities; the bedouin. the 
village and the city communities. each of which has its own social 
and economic conditions. 
We do not give in this chapter a full comprehensive study of 
the main characteristics of each community; however. both the bedouin 
and the villager are important from the perspective of this study 
for they hold a key role in sustaining the traditional Arab values. 
Furthermore. and as will be seen later, the majority of the industrial 
workers as well as the managers, are of rural origin. Many of the 
practices, customs, institutions and instincts of the early bedouin 
life have developed over several centuries to become the warp and woof 
of the urbanized personality in Iraq. In his many writing. AI-Wardi 
confirms that and says: 
"The civilization in Iraq, more than any other Arab country 
in the area, had for centuries fallen under the pressure 
of the tribal culture. The latter is viewed as a reservoir 2 
from which urban civilization derived its principal customs. 
Thus. an understanding of the main characteristics of these communities 
not only helps in explaining the major characteristics of the Iraqi 
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senior managers, but also interprets most of their managerial and 
personal behaviour. 
1.0 THE BEDOUIN COMMUNITY 
The bedouins of Iraq, or the tent dwellers, inhabit the Desert 
Administration areas west of the Euphrates, across the river, the 
Jazirah region, adjacent to Nanavah province. The bedouin community, 
whether in Iraq or in other Arab countries, is the source of human 
being and civilization in the Arab society. Ibn Khaldun. five 
hundred years ago, wrote that the desert is the basis and reservoir 
of civilization and cities ••• the existence of bedouins is prior 
3 to. and the basis of the existence of cities and towns. 
The bedouins consider themselves of noble lineage and are the 
most elevated and distinguished of mankind because they are free men 
4 
and warriors. They claim that they alone have the right to be 
called Arab. S 
No precise statistics on their number are available; however 
Harris in 1958 estimated the number as about 250,000 persons, with 
about half of them living in Kerbela province; 70.000 in Mosul province; 
6 30,000 in Muntafik and 2,500 in oulaim province. 
Bedouins have long depended upon the villages and town communities 
mainly because they are far from being self-sufficient on the one hand 
and because they acquire some of their needs by force in raid 
(Ghazu) which are entirely disappeared nowadays, on the other. However. 
traditionally, the raid and counter-raid were elevated by the economic 
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and social conditions of the desert life to the rank of a major institution. 
Consequently. vestiges of this practice lie at the base of the economic 
structure of bedouin society. According to the rules of the game. a 
raid is a sort of national sport - no blood should be shed except in 
cases of extreme necessity.7 
1. Social Structure of the Bedouin Community 
The tribe "Oabilah" is the main social structure in the desert. 
The size of each tribe varies from one place to another. One tribe 
may consist of only a few families while others may consist of hundreds 
or even thousands of tents. 
The tribe is usually subdivided into two or more sub-tribes 
(Ashirah, literally clan); each clan, in turn, is divided into two or 
more sub-divisions (Firgah, literally troop). The latter consists of 
two or further divisions (Fakhdh); the fakhdh is divided into two or 
more (Hamulah), and finally the hamulah into two or more related extended 
8 families. These divisions can be shown clearly in the following Figure: 
Figure (3.1) Social Structure of the Tribe 
IA tribe] 
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2. Leadership of the tribe 
Each tribe is headed by a man called ~Sheikh" or ~Aga" or "Beg".9 
He comes from one of its aristocratic houses. The Sheikh's main duties 
are to represent his tribe in dealing with the government; to mediate 
intratribal disputes: to act as arbitrator and judge in conflict cases 
concerning his tribe: to give consent to marriage and divorce: to 
receive the guests in the guest tents which he maintains on behalf of 
the tribeJ and to work generally for the tribe's welfare. He also takes 
a certain due from tribal members according to their ability to pay. 
The position of Sheikh is a heredity one for it tends to pass 
from father to son if the latter has such personal qualities as courage, 
tempered by caution and wisdom, wealth to enable him to be generous. 
He is expected to have a fatherly or patriarchal attitude toward his 
followers - be firm but just and kind. 10 
3. The Majlis 
A Sheikh does not exercise his office alone. He advises in 
all matters by a council. This councilor parliament (so to speak) 
serves two things: first it is the guest-house of the tribe and. 
second, it is the centre from which the sheikh administers his tribe. 
The members of the council are the heads of the various sub-divisions 
of the tribe. It is intended to reflect the "sense~ of the tribe 
on any matter of importance. All adult males of the tribe may attend 
the Majlis, but when more serious matters are brought up for discussion, 
young adults usually leave the tent. 
4. Some Related Concepts and Attitudes 
Under the never-ending pressure of hostile environment the bedouins 
have established some social concepts and attitudes. We need to keep 
them in mind for most of these concepts and attitudes are still in 
existence in modern Iraq. We shall argue later in this thesis that 
some of these concepts and attitudes are largely associated with the 
backwardness of the managers and management. While such facts will 
become more obvious in the next chapters. the aim in the following pages 
is to cast light on some of these concepts and attitudes. 
4.1 Superiority of men over women 
The man, irrespective of his position or job, regards himself as 
highly superior to the woman. Within each family, the man is the strong 
chief, the boys are the future chiefs; the woman is the weak creature 
or servantJ the girls the future servants. By the same token, within 
each tribe the men are all-powerful and the women totally subservient; 
the man dominated completely whereas the women are good insofar as 
they served the men and deliver more boys. 
4.2 Loyalty and Affiliation 
The mark of the bedouin is his complete absorption into tribal 
life. The tribe and its parts are the primary objects of personal loyalty. 
Tribal affiliation is the source of safety and, conversely. expulsion 
from the tribe for some grievous offence is the gravest sentence. 
Professor Hitti. in explaining the tie of a bedouin to his tribe. 
indicates that "no worse calamity could befall a bedouin than the loss 
of his tribal affiliation. for a tribeless man is practically helpless. 
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11 His status is that of an outlaw beyond the pale of protection and safety." 
Traditionally. the loyalty of the bedouin may be traced along 
12 three main basis: 
(a) Kinship: which goes from the family to the tribe. 
(b) Religion: which goes from sub-sect to sect and to religion. 
For example, Islam has two major sects: "Shiites" and "Sunnites". 
each of which has its believers. Members of one sect try to 
help each other. However when an outsider tries to threaten 
Islam as a religion. all muslims unite to face such a situation. 
(c) Ethnic characteristics: such as language, race, etc., which 
establish an additional basis for the operation of tribal loyalty. 
These bases of loyalty do not usually conflict with each other, but if 
they do, kinship comes first, then religion and finally language and 
13 
other ethnic characteristics. Indeed, from the bedouin's view, it is 
only through the blood tie that their loyalty toward the tribe can be 
sustained. 
4.3 Cohesiveness 
The motivating factor behind tribe cohesiveness is survival. In 
this respect, the individual member's rights are always subordinate to 
the good of the tribe as a whole. Two mechanisms provide feedback 
strongly reinforcing such a COhesiveness: 
(a) Material: that is individual's survival depends on the group's 
survival and this stems from the fact that without Joint self-
defence against the rigourous aridity of the desert, on the one 
hand, and against the invasion or raid of other tribe, on the other, 
individual will face many difficulties. 
68 
69 
(b) Spiritual: and this is related to a theory of blood kinship 
which is based on a blood tie between all members of the tribe 
through the male-line. 
4.4 Conformity 
Conformity in all the important matters that belong to the tribe 
1s insurance for the cohesiveness and survival of the tribe. The 
pressure of this concept extends to almost all areas of tribal life 
and even governs how much work a man must do. and indeed how hard he 
must work. He must do no more or less work than is expected of him 
within a very narrow permitted range. To give an example. one can 
imagine the situation of adult males inside the Majlis; they must not 
participate in tribe decision making unless the shiekh permits them to 
do so. of On the contrary. as we have seen earlier. some/them (particularly 
the young males) have to leave the Miglis if there are some serious 
problems. 
4.5 Shame 
Probably one of the most important concepts governing conformity 
is that of shame or "EAB". This is perhaps the most overused word 
inside the tribe. The slightest deviation from approved limits on the 
part of man. woman and child elicits the immediate warning "EAB" which 
in itself is censure. Thus. the permissible limits to behaviour of 
any person are defined by this word. Yet there is no question in the 
mind of any person as to what constitutes shame. The child. since his 
first years. hears this word. and this elastic concept never leaves 
him. for he is governed by it until he dies. 
4.6 Attitude toward Manual Work 
The bedouin places a very low value on manual work. Men are 
created to defend the tribe and raid others. The priority of the 
raid may be clearly explained by an early poet which expresses the 
guiding principle of such an attitude: 
"Our business is to make raids on the enemy. on our neighbour 
and on our own brother. in case we find none to raid but a 
brotherl H 14 
From the bedouin's standpoint. any manner of living other than that 
15 
of bearing arms is unworthy and shameful. They regard all people 
who do not bear arms and exercise raid as inferior and refuse to give 
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their daughters in marriage even to the leading families of their tribes. 16 
4.7 Attitude toward Time 
According to the bedouin's point of view. time is not fixed or 
measurable as we know it. It is what happens as the wheat matures or 
a camel grows up - a characteristic sequence of events. In his eyes. 
time is measured only in a macro sense by natural events such as birth. 
puberty and death. Almost all of life is governed by the regular 
unhurried flow of such events of nature. There is no sense of urgency 
or time pressure. Life goes along at its "natural" pace. The bedouin 
(and the villager. as will be seen later) understands time as a circle 
rather than as a straight line. The circle suggests repetition and 
17 
another chance to pass this way. 
The natural events which measure time - the movement of the sun. 
the phases of the moon. the seasons of the year - all are recurring. 
suggesting a circular pattern. If today is lost or wasted. there is 
no concern. for it will return tomorrow. According to the bedouin's 
view. life and time are endless repetition. 
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4.6 Generosity and Courtesy 
A ,guest for any bedouin is considered and treated as a sacred 
thing. To refuse a guest such a courtesy in a land where there are no 
inns or hotels. or to harm him after accepting him as a guest. is an 
offence not only against the established customs and honour. but against 
18 God Himself. the real protector. This hospitality has grown mostly 
out of human helplessness in the desert. Thus. there is a strong 
dependence on one another. Hospitality of the tent is granted to 
travellers and those who need protection from an avenger. No one 
dares to refuse such a request and remain respectable in the eyes of 
the bedouins community. The bedouin must take the responsibility for 
the protection of his guest (even if he is a murderer) and offer him 
food and a place to sleep at least for three days. During this period. 
and when the guest is an outlaw. the protector has the opportunity to 
visit the pursuer and try to settle the problem. When his efforts 
failed. the guest must leave the tent and seek protection elsewhere. 
Indeed, this kind of protection permits a third party (the host or the 
19 protector) to interfere, mediate and to seek honourable settlement. 
5. The Decline of Nomadism 
The bedouin's freedom to ignore the laws. taxes. boundaries and 
the purpose of the central government, to raid and wander is now being 
20 
curtailed or abolished in Iraq. The main reason for their decline 
is the growing application of new technology. Motorized transport has 
reduced and promises to eliminate the need for the camels; modern 
transportation has also weakened their capacity to escape from 
government control; new weapons monopolised by the government have 
dramatically reduced their power. Equally. the increase in education 
among this community has introduced the bedouin to new wants and is 
leading them to adopt new tastes and customs which can be satisfied 
only by cities. The reaction of the nomads to these changes can be 
noticed through two lines. first. some of them tried to retain their 
traditional life within some modification. Namely. they settled in 
21 
villages and combined cultivation and animal breeding. The second 
is that with the establishment of the Iraqi army. and as a result of 
the investments of international oil companies in Iraq. thousands of 
the bedouins have relinquished the desert and become either soldiers 
22 in the national army or taken jobs in the oil companies. 
The romantic past is left behind. though not forgotten; bedouin 
values continue to be prized but the bedouin himself has in fact 
become either a farmer or industrial worker. 23 
2.0 VILLAGE COMMUNITY. 
Iraq is the land of villages. and the villagers form the back-
bone of the country. Not so long ago. as early as 1950. 80% of the 
five million of people lived in villages, and 90% of the villagers 
were cultivators. Current statistics of the number of these villages 
and of the social life of the villagers are unavailable. However •. in 
24 1957. the number was in excess of 8.000 villages. The villages. 
between 
ranging in population/200 to 2.000 or more. are almost entirely 
agricultural. The typical village is a cluster of huts huddled 
together without any orderly design. The huts are so constructed as 
72 
to keep out heat. cold and sandstorms at the minimum expense. Consequently. 
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they consist of a single or two rooms. with thick walls and a doorway. 
which usually opens on a small enclosed yard that is used for cooking 
food and keeping animals. In order to avoid sand and sunlight. windows 
are either very small or totally lacking. Sanitary facilities. 
including latrines, are generally lacking. The villages are necessarily 
located near a source of water. by a canal or a river or a well. 
The villager considers himself as a settled nomad and claims 
25 that his origin is from a formerly nomad tribe. In his village. 
particularly if it is small. he believes that he is related to everyone 
else. just as the bedouin believes that he is kin to all members of 
his tribe. The theory of blood ties between all members of a village 
is the strongest factor in holding the group together. The villagers 
look to their village in the same way as the bedouins look to their 
tribes. To them. the village is a tightly bound community in which 
most of the members belong to each other and help one another in time 
of need. Finally. the Iraqi village is not just a cluster of houses 
made of stone and mud. but it is a frame which holds the clan or the 
fakhdh and it serves as a reference group and the villagers usually 
f th i °11 26 identify themselves by the name 0 e r v~ ages. 
1) Some related concepts and attitudes: 
The concepts. attitudes and the social values of the village 
community are almost similar to those of the bedouin community. The 
man is the most powerful and acts as superior authority in his house. 
Hospitality and display go together in the village as they do in the 
desert community. Each village has one or two guest houses known as 
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"Mudif". The larger the guest house is. the more respectable his owner 
i 27 s. The Mukhtar or the village manager likes the bedouin sheikh. has 
28 a Mudif wherein he receives the village's guests. 
The courtesy or mediation which was discussed earlier also exists 
in the village. Anyone seeking protection from another tribe or 
individual can find his needs in the Mudif. Once he enters it, nobody 
can harm or attack him. 29 Likewise, loyalty and cohesiveness as well 
as conformity have also appeared inside the village. Since the majority 
of the villagers belong to one class. they are more likely to be 
faithful to their relatives. The basic kinship system which prevails 
among the bedouin community is also found in the village. The villager 
Is bound to his kinship group by a network of mutual obligations which 
are strongest among the extended family, but which can also bring the 
whole lineage together in facing any outside threat. Every individual 
must help his relative when the latter faces a trouble or an argument 
in which blood has been shed arises between the relative and the others. 
He must. as Quint puts it, pick up the nearest weapon - dagger, club, 
rifle. etc., - and join the fray. 
fight nor with whom justice lies. 
He can ask neither the cause of the 
30 He can only help his relative. 
As regards manual work, indeed the villager's view towards this 
matter resembles the bedouin's view. That is, he also discriminates 
between the type of occupations and sees that different occupations have 
unequal degrees of social prestige. The prestige attaching to certain 
occupations such as "Imam", landowner, a farmer works in his own land, 
are more than that of carpenters, shepherd, craftsman, mason, gardener, 
barber and so forth. The landless villager is not necessarily the poorest 
person in the village, but, to be sure, he is the least respected. 
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Handcrafts and trade are not esteemed as highly as landownership despite 
the fact they are economically better off. 31 Up to date there are many 
local chants "Housa" still criticising the social statue of the weaver 
and describe him as liar, cowardly and dishonest. 32 On the other hand, 
the religious group - Moslem Mallah and Christian priests - are held in 
special social positions, irrespective of their financiai situation. 
Their prestige depends upon their piety and learning, not on the passion 
for land. Indeed, the religious man is the authority on traditions and 
customs and leads the villagers in prayer. 
As regards attitude towards time, indeed, the whole body of the 
villager thought is pre-eminently determined by agriculture. Every 
aspect of his life is penetrated by it. His experience is confined to 
it. Even his strictly non-agricultural activities, such as marriage 
(and hence childhood), are timed according to agricultural activity. 
Only death escapes it, and is itself the only escape. Geared to the 
agricultural cycle, the villager tends to regard things as recurrent: 
he knows that times cannot always be bad, nor can they always be good. 
No change from the established cycle is expected. The passage of the 
seasons, the sun and the rain, are mysteries and are incorporated in a 
large body of superstitious practices and beliefs almost approaching 
animism, binding the villager to the past. To sum up, the villager 
lives in the balance of nature, and neither seeks to control its forces 
nor those of his fellow man. 
2.) Social Structure: 
In contrast to the bedouin social structure, the extended family 
i1'l 
is the main social unit, not onlyithe village community, but, as will 
., 
be seen later, in the urban community as well. However, in some 
villages, particularly those situated far from the main cities. 
the clan and its sub-divisions are still prevailing. As such, and 
since the family is a mineature society and the values and beliefs 
and customs that exist in the family are largely similar to those of 
the society, the discussion of the family and its inner life is 
unavoidable in this study. 
The extended family: 
The extended family is the essence of social structure of 
contemporary Iraq. The Iraqi family has a different and wider connota-
tion than that which is customary existing in more developed countries. 
The term includes many more distant relatives and kinsmen than in, 
say, the United Kingdom. in the narrower sense. In most villages and 
cities, the family consists of the father and wife, their unmarried 
children, their married sons with their families. The trend towards 
the nuclear family (a married man and woman with their offspring) is 
something new in the main cities and when it exists, it does not mean 
that the new married couple have destroyed their social and economic 
relations with their families. 33 
In 1940, the ratio of the extended families among all population 
was 82%. Surely this ratio has decreased during the following decades, 
particularly among the townsmen, but still there are more than 50% of 
34 
all population living in extended families. Koranic injunction, 
economic motivation, and considerations of prestige and family strength 
all contribute to the traditional high value placed on large families. 
The greater the number of children, especially sons, the greater the 
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prestige of the father, and throug him, that of the family as a whole. 
Among the poor, children are still regarded as economic assets; the 
cost of their maintenance is small and they begin to contribute to the 
35 family income at an early age. 
The Iraqi family controls and shapes its members' behaviour 
in such a way that they must think twice before deciding any decision 
on such matters as the choice of a wife or a husband, or even the 
36 type of business. Marriage is a family rather than a personal affair. 
The mass media have introduced young people to the Western notion of 
37 
romantic love, but as yet it has had little influence on marriage. 
Because the sexes do not ordinarily mix socially, young men and women 
have few or no acquaintances among the opposite sex. Parents arrange 
marriages for their children, finding a mate either through their 
personal contacts or sometimes through a professional matchmaker. 
Though there are close relations between family and society in 
terms of integrity, the person is more associated with his family than 
with society as a whole. Many researches carried out in other Arab 
countries endorse such a behaviour and mention that it is easier for a 
person to respond to his family demands than to accept the demands and 
38 
obligations of society. Consequently, men have to pay close attention 
to their families' matters, particularly those relating to social 
interactions such as education and economic affairs. 39 
When we discuss the relationships that exist within a family 
we find that the father, or the senior male member, exercises almost 
undisputed authority, making the major decisions affecting the familY 
welfare, representing it in dealing with outsiders, and punishing its 
members for transgressions. Members' view him with a mixture of awe 
and fear. They have to gain his approval, prior to taking any important 
decision and this can only be achieved by their obedience to his different 
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orders. 
As regards men's attitude towards women. it is almost the same 
as what we have seen in the bedouin community. Women are weaker than 
men in mind and body. The honour of the family. easily damaged and 
nearly irreparable. depends on the conduct of its womenJ consequently 
they are expected to be decorous. modest and circumspect. The slightest 
implication of unavenged impropriety. especially if publicly acknowledged. 
can irreparably damage the family's honour. Female virginity before 
marriage and fidelity afterward are considered essential to its 
maintenance. If they discover a transgression. men are traditionally 
bound to punish the offending woman. The girl with a bad reputation 
may disappear suddenly from her house: everyone can guess what has 
happened, but no one speaks about it. Girls. whether in the village 
or in the city. are brought up to believe that they are inferior to 
men and must cater to them. and boys believe that they are entitled to 
the care and solicitude of women. 
On the other hand. the males are let loose in search of sexual 
experience with females in an attempt to prove their virility. If it 
happened and a man traps a girl, seldom does he marry her - he feels 
she will do the same thing with others. Since such anomalous conduct 
is common. it is easy to discover why females are brought up in a 
different way. Indeed, most women in Iraq refuse to work night-shifts, 
or to work away from their families. because of this behaviour. As will 
be seen later, many managers covered by this study are deeply depressed 
because of such behaviour. As a matter of fact. the upbringing of girls 
in all Arab countries is calculated to keep them away from men, and to 
warn them of the dangers and subterfuges to which they are liable to fall 
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victims at any moment. 
Although we shall cast another light on the problem of sexual 
discrimination in another chapter. it is worth noticing that. in some 
parts of Iraq. when a man mentions his wife in front of another man. 
he apologies because he uttered an unmentionable subject. 41 
Fortunately education. and in particular the education of an 
increasing number of girls. as well as the fact that more and more 
females are seeking paid work outside the home. are both contributing 
to relatively rapid changes in the social status of the Iraqi women 
particularly in the main cities. Women are thus moving towards a 
different understanding of their own role in society and feel they 
42 
are more entitled to the respect of others, and to self-respect also. 
3:0 THE CITY COMMUNITY 
Among the eighteen provinces, Baghdad, Basrah and Mosul are the 
most important onus. In 1977. 44% of the total population and 74% of 
all industrial establishments were located in these three provinces. 43 
3.1 Baghdad: 
Our discussion will be confined to the city of Baghdad and its 
community for the following reasons: 
1 - Baghdad is the capital of Iraq and is the seat of government, 
social institutions as well as foreign embassies and companies. 
2 - It is the country's biggest city whether in terms of population. 
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or the number of industrial establishments. In 1977, 27% of the 
twelve million people and 67% of all large industrial establishments 
were located in it.44 
3 - As a capital. Baghdad is more developed than any other 
city in Iraq. This is true whether in terms of medical 
facilities. or other social aspects. For example. in 
1977. 21% of all hospitals and 30% of all youth centres 
and 17% of all sport clubs as well as 16% of all post 
officers were located in Baghdad. 45 On the other hand. 
Baghdad has three universities. while the remainder of 
the country have another three spread among the other 
provinces. 
These points not only indicate that Baghdad is the most advanced 
city, but also confirm that its social situation. degree of urbanisa-
tion and modernisation are much more advanced than what currently 
exists in other cities. 
Baghdad was built by the second Abbasid Caliph. Abu Jafar 
AI-Mansur. in 770. 46 The city reached its golden age during the 
Abbasids era notably at the time of Harun AI-Rashid and his son 
AI-Mamun. It has attracted poets, musicians, philosophers. scientists 
and literary men from allover the Islamic World. The centre of its 
intellectual life was Dar AI-Hikmah "The Abode of Wisdom", founded 
by Al-Masmur as an academy, a museum. a library and a bureaJof 
translation. This was done at a time when no academies or universities 
ao 
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existed in Europe. However. the unrivalled glory of the city has given 
way to appalling administration, invasion, massacre, and a final decline 
through the four hundred years of stagnant Turkish rule until the early 
twentieth century. The year 1258 heralded centuries of disaster. After 
the five hundred years of Abbasid rule, the Mongols under the leadership 
of Halago raced down from Asia to destroy and pillage. In Baghdad, 
Hulago and then Tarmurlane slew poets. traders. scholars and divines. 
They destroyed the irrigation system which made the country rich. 
They destroyed schools. mosques and houses. Under the Persian empire 
and the Turkish Walais "Governors" Baghdad might be described as the 
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city of illiteracy. poverty and corruption. 
3.2 The People of Baghdad: 
At the outset. it is important to stress that in Iraq there 
are no clear-cut lines between the townsmen and the villagers in terms 
of social values. Many townsmen were of relatively recent tribal 
origin. Even today, a large number of the inhabitants of Baghdad, 
quite apart of the tribal immigrants of the last four decades, still 
remember the name of the tribe to which they once belong. 49 In the 
towns the influence of the old norms and traditions, if considerably 
reduced, nonetheless, persis~ The psychology and ways of the old 
order - the work of long years - as well as the bedouin and villager 
values, traditions and norms are still embedded in the life of a broad 
SO cross-section of the people, and will not easily wither away • 
. The city dweller, whether he is 'Baghdadi, or 'Basrawi', or 'Musulli', 
still admires the country values. Attitude towards manual work, 
hospitality and mediation, family loyalty and assisting relatives, 
the principles of shame and honour, are almost similar to those of the 
village and nomadic life. During the last two decades, the mind of 
the townsmen has changed considerably and this is mainly because of 
education, but the way of life, the way of dealing with people are, 
by and large, similar to what we have seen earlier in the bedouin and 
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village communities. The main reason causing this interlocked relation-
ship between the values of country and town is the continual rural-urban 
migration. A sizeable portion of the people of Baghdad were born in 
villages. Indirect but massive evidence of this exists in the fact that 
the population of this city is increasing at a higher rate than that 
of the country in which they are located. Baghdad, whose population 
was 3.1 million in 1977, had increased almost 683% since 1947. A high 
rate of natural increase has contributed to this growth pattern, but 
the primary factor responsible for the excess of urban growth over 
nationwide growth has been the migration of rural people to Baghdad. 51 
for example, in 1960 more than a quarter of the population of Baghdad 
consisted of people who had migrated from rural areas. 52 The volume 
of migration to Baghdad was 164.461 in the year 1947. This figure 
climbed to 335.464 migrants in 1957 and to 545.766 migrants in 1965. 53 
According to the projections of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning, the 
number of migrants to Baghdad will reach 35309 in 1980 and 38253 in 1983. 54 
The previous migration studies in Iraq found that the main factors 
that caused villagers' migration were the continual conflict between 
the peasants and the landlords; the lack of employment opportunities 
outside agriculture in the village; poverty and low level of living in 
the rural areas compared to urban centres and especially Baghdad; the 
55 lack of health care, education and social services in the rural areas. 
Indeed the impact on a country like Iraq of a movement on such a scale 
and at such a pace can be imagined. It unbalanced the economy, drained 
away the strength of many rural areas, and made the capital city top-
heavy with unskilled people, who brought many social problems, and 
exacerbated those social problems already existing in the city. 
3.3 Kinship 
Earlier we have mentioned that the~e a~e close relationships 
between the social organisations of the city and those of the village 
in Iraq. AI-Wa~di. in his w~iting about the Iraqi towns and cities 
of the recent past. refe~s to the "tribale" alliance between city 
56 dwellers and rural people. Ha~ris. on the othe~ hand. also confirms 
such a relationship and indicates that the SOcial o~ganisation of the 
Iraqi city shows a basic resemblance to those of the nomadic tribe 
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and village. While this resemblance has considerably disappeared 
among the educated townsmen. among the poorer classes the likeness is 
reinforced by the village~s who are still drifting to the town bringing 
their patterns with them. 
Within the city of Baghdad the extended families are g~ouped 
into lineages. Pate~nal descent and authority. family loyalty and 
co-operation within the lineage are still prevailing. although the 
cohesiveness of the extended kin group varies from the traditional 
closeness to the loose~ ties of the western-influenced family. For 
example. it is quite common to discover that the extended family has 
one or two (or even mo~e) nuclear families residing in one house 
(Oar) or living not far away from each other. but under the leadership 
of the father or the elder brother. The same extended family has 
close relationships with other relatives and some of these relatives 
are still living in rural areas or in other towns. Continuous visits 
between members of the kin groups are common and such a behaviour is 
largely based upon the fact that these kin groups represent. so to speak. 
the individual~ second line of defence. When a person is in danger or 
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in trouble, when he needs help in the performance of an economic task 
or a ceremonial obligation, whenever, in short, he requires a measure 
of assistance beyond what his own immediate family can provide, he 
turns to the members of his larger kin group for aid or succour. He 
in turn, of course, is under reciprocal obligations toward them. 
Summary: 
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The society of Iraq consists of three distinctive social communities: 
the bedouin, the village and city communities. These are highly 
interrelated and share common social values. Many of the practices, 
customs, institutions and instincts of the early bedouin life have 
developed over centuries to become the warp and woof of the modern 
personality in Iraq. The interrelationship between these communities 
is strong and is reinforced by the continuous rural-urban migration 
on the one hand, and by the extended family (with its kin groups) 
the most common social organisation in Iraq, on the other. 
Whether in the extended family or in the society as a whole, 
individual attitudes toward women, hospitality and courtesy, family 
loyalty and assisting relatives, attitude toward manual work and 
toward time, as well as the principles of honour and shame are almost 
identical. As regards social structure, the tribe in the bedouin 
community and, to some extent, in the village community, is the 
major social organisation. On the other hand, the extended family is 
the most prevailing social unit in almost all villages and cities. 
Individual behaviour. whether in the capital or in a village. is 
• 
largely directed by family tradition. The larger cities of Iraq 
are undergoing a transition involving both things and ideas, but the 
way of life, the way of treating material objects, are by and large, 
still under the impact of traditional life with all its social values. 
The Iraqi family, generally speaking, is highly authoritarian and 
conductive to dependent-type personalities. Ultimate authority in 
this social organisation rests with the head of the family. Matters 
of family policy, honour, relations with other families, and so forth, 
are determined by the head of the family. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 
IN IRAQ FROM 1921-1980 
INTRODUCTION 
The political and economic environments are closely interwined. 
Political environment - the attitudes and actions of political and 
government leaders and legislators - not only constitute an important· 
part of the external environment of a given enterprise. but it also 
constrains. promotes and regulates business and managers' behaviour. 
Every business enterprise is encircled with a web of laws and regula-
tions. Some are designed to protect workers, consumers. and 
communities. Others are designed to make contracts enforceable and 
to protect property rights. Many are designed to regulate the behaviour 
of managers and their subordinates in business and other enterprises. 
There is relatively little that a manager can do in any organisation 
that is not in some way concerned with, and often specifically controlled 
1 by, a law or regulation. 
In Iraq, many economic laws have been enacted to achieve political 
rather than economic ends. This situation was the dominant phenomenon 
particularly during the years 1921-1968. Such a fact will become more 
apparent in this chapter. The chapter is devoted to investigate the 
political and economic developments in Iraq during the period 1921-1980 • 
• 1.0 .. : POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
Iraq has passed through a very dark period during the last four 
hundred years. Its history is a vivid record of easily awakened 
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antagonisms. conflicting interests and political instability. The 
history of Iraq during the Turkish empire (1534-1917) can be summarised 
as that of a frontier province between the body of Turkish empire to 
the west and the Persian empire to the east. Numerous campaigns from 
2 both sides were fought on Iraqi soil. Under that empire. tribal life 
dominated the country and tribal chiefs were often at loggerheads with 
each other. and were more or less independent of effective Turkish 
control. Indeed, the Turkish Walies (Governors) were unable to 
maintain order. nor were they honest persons. They were preoccupied 
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with the task of extracting as much wealth as they could for themselves. 
Little was done to enrich the country and the popular demand for tax 
3 
reform and social justice was never seriously considered. 
On the other side. the health and other social services, such 
as transportation and communication systems and education, were very 
poor. What medical and health facilities that existed were concentrated 
4 in Baghdad - the capital. The inadequacy of transportation and 
communication systems can be illustrated by the fact that land-travel 
had to be either by foot or by donkeys. No rail road existed before 
5 
the first World War except one short line between Baghdad and Sammurra. 
The inadequacy of educational fucilities during thut time can be 
better understood by the fact that until 1950. 98% of the people were 
6 illiterate. 
Direct British Control was maintained in Ira~ from 1917 to 1920 
while its future status was decided by the peace-makers in Europe. 
This was followed by a monarchical regime which lasted from 1921 to 
1958. Since its establishment in 1921, the Iraqi government faced both 
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the political task of building up a national administration and the 
economic problems of developing the country's resources. Indeed, until 
1958, the dominant features of the regime were insecurity, corrupt admin-
istration, and flagrant abuse of authority. Talking specifically, during 
the years 1921 to 1931, expenditure on defence, justice and police 
7 
averaged 40% of all government expenditure. Between 1921 to 1951 there 
8 
were 47 cabinets. The same period has witnessed an intense internal 
struggle for power which absorbed time and attention and prevented 
effective consideration being given to developmental problems. 
On the other hand, and as a result of such political instabilities 
including the fact that the primary aim of each cabinet that came to 
power was to prepare its own development programme and to bring its own 
supporters, corruption increased in public life. The royal family 
itself seemed to have taken a large part in the spread of such a 
Phenomenon. 9 The existence of bribery and dishonesty for personal 
gain has been the most unsatisfactory feature of government machinery 
as most Iraqis freely admit. A British observer noted that: 
UEven the ministers have been known to take advantages of 
their positions for their personal profit." 10 
From 1950 onwards, however, attention was focussed on economic 
development largely because development funds became available from the 
increased oil royalties which Iraq begun to receive from then on. 
Indeed, the advent of oil revenues has increased political instability 
and corruption. Corruption was openly exercised and the government 
was not blind to such a phenomenon. For example, in 1955 King Faysal II 
mentioned: 
"The government is aware of the weak machinery of the 
government due to the presence of inefficient individ-
uals and persons of ill-repute in the government service." 11 
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The situation of political instability and corruption became even worse 
after the fall of the monarchical regime in 1958. Between 1958 and 
1968 there were four major changes of regime; seven major attempts to 
topple one or other of the government in power and at least double 
that number of more minor efforts. 12 During this period there were 
more than twenty four cabinets. The frequent cabinet changes brought 
more than 180 different Iraqis to ministerial positions. more than 28% 
of them were military officers. 13 Insecurity and political instability 
generally resulted in changes of managers at most levels. Such 
continuous changes created a situation of anxiety and apprehension and 
gave rise to apathy. irresponsibility and lack of motivation among the 
majority of the people including managers. 14 
Table 4.1 gives a summary of the kings and presidents who ruled 
Iraq between 1921 and 1979. It indicates that three of them werei 
murdered (two of them were kings). 
The political instability and frequent coups d'etat together 
with the frequent abuse of authority have adversely affected the 
economic and social programmes and split the Iraqi personality. The 
political welter of narrow interests prevented a well-directed economic 
policy. even though each new regime declared itself anxious to further 
economic development. No wonder. therefore. we discover that the Iraqis. 
under such chaotic circumstances. became more depressed. fearful of and 
aversive to responsibility and distrust neither government leader nor 
government institutions. 
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TABLE 4.1. THE KINGS AND PRESIDENTS WHO RULED IRAQ BETWEEN 1921 and 1979 
Year Name of the King or President 
1921-1933 King Faisal I (natural death) ) 
) Kingdom 
1933-1939 King Ghazi (killed) ) of 
) Iraq 
1939-1958 King Faisal II (killed) ) 
1958-1963 President Abd AI-Karim Gasim ) 
(killed) ) 
1963-1966 President Abd AI-Salam Aref ) 
(natural death) ) Republic ) of 
1963-1968 President Abd AI-Rahman Aref ) Iraq 
(dismissed) ) 
1968-1979 President Ahmad Hassan Al- l 
Baker (natural death)~ 
1979- President Saddam Hussein 1 ) 
2.0 ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT ---~~~~----~~~~--~ 
Having discussed the political situation and its instability. it 
is possible now to discuss the other side of the coin - the economic 
development. The initial discussion will focus on the agricultural 
situation. followed by an investigation of the industrial situation. 
The argument in favour of discussing the agricultural milieu stems 
from the fact that: 
1 - Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country with about a half 
of the population deriving their income from cultivation and animal 
husbandry. 
2 - During the last thirty years there was. as we have seen earlier. 
a continuous rural-urban migration such that two-thirds of the 
present industrial manpower is drawn from rural areas. This 
point will be discussed in greater detail later. 
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3 - About 50% of the managers sumpled in this research are of 
rural origin and had participated in agricultural activities 
in one way or another. Consequently, they lived within or 
under the agricultural environment and were largely governed 
by, or suffered from its influences including its feudal 
characteristics. 
Thus, by understanding the peasants' life we uncover an important 
part of the Iraqi environment and this will help in explaining why 
managers behave in a certain way. 
However, before discussing the economic development, two 
important points must be noticed: the first is the role of oil 
revenues in the economy of Iraq and the second is planning system 
under the leadership of the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. 
1) The role of oil revenues in Iraq economy: 
The Iraqi economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues. After 
the nationalization of oil industry in 1972. the share of oil sector 
in the national product jumped from 35% in 1970 to 60% in 1974. Its 
contribution to the total government revenues increased from 52% in 
1971 to 87% in 1976, and crude oil accounted for some 98% of the total 
15 
exports in 1975. 
The recent official statistics give no information either on 
production or exports of this product. Nevertheless. an examination 
of the gross domestic product of the public sector in Iraq during the 
years 1971-1978 reveals that the contribution of the commodity sector 
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has increased sharply after oil nationalisation. For example, the 
commodity sector's contribution in the gross domestic product was 
20% in 1971, and rose to 57% in 1973 and to 81% in 1978. Table 4.2 
gives more information about this fact and shows the contribution of 
the other sectors in gross domestic product. 
TABLE 4.2 GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR, 1971-1978, AT 
CURRENT PRICES (1.0. million) 
Sectors 1971 % 1972 % 1973 % 1978 % 
Commodity 74.5 2.0 169.6 35 464.6 57 4403.5 81 
Distribution 76.2 2.1 92.7 19 97.7 12 402.2 7 
Services 204.9 5.9 224.2 46 248.1 31 663.6 12 
G.D.P. 355.6 100 486.5 100 810.4 100 5469.3 100 
Source: Annual abstract of statistics 1978, op.cit., p. 135. 
2) Planning System under the Leadership of the Arab 8a'th Socialist. 
Party: 
The Arab Ba'th Socialist Parth (ABSP) who came into power since 
1968, is a socialist revolutionary party believing socialism to be a 
vital prerequisite for the liberation, unity and renaissance of the 
Arab nation. 16 Perhaps one of the most sophisticated ideological 
documents of the party in its present configuration is the Political 
Report of the Eighth Congress of January 1974. According to this 
report, planning is the basic need for laying the prerequisites of 
17 
the transition to socialism. 
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The economy of Iraq is a planned economy and firmly directed by 
the central government. whose objective is to expand the public sector 
(the socialist sector) to encompass eventually the entire economy. 
Centralised planning and decentralised execution are the basic ideals 
and principles which guide the planning system in Iraq.18 
Planning system consists of five levels as follows: 19 
(A) Planning Board: It is the higher planning authority. It 
consists of the president of the Republic or the vice-
president of the Revolutionary Command Council (chairman) 
and the membership of all ministers as well as the Governor 
of Iraqi Central Bank. The principal task of this board is 
to plan for the economy as a whole. 
(B) The Steering Committee: is comprised of the Minister of 
Planning (chairman) and the membership of the heads of 
technical departments in the Ministry of Planning and five 
part-time members. The task of this committee is to study 
the subjects and the projects related to the plan as an 
introductory for adopting an appropriate decision. After 
that. the corrrnittee submits the plan together with the 
adopted decisions to the planning board to authorise it. 
(C) The Ministereal level: Each Ministry must study its planned 
projects before submitting them to 'the Steering Committee. 
(D) State Organisation: A State organisation in Iraq consists 
of a number of production companies (state establishments). 
The common link between such companies is that they produce 
similar products or services. An example is the State 
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Organisation for Construction Industries which comprises all 
cement companies in Iraq. The task of the state organisation 
is to study each proposal or project submitted by anyone of 
its companies before submitting it to the Ministry. 
(El State Establishment: The state establishment or the state 
enterprise is the basic economic unit in the public sector. 
It is regarded as an entity in its own right. It is an 
autonomous legal person in question of legal transactions, 
and works on the profit-and-loss accounting principle. As 
regards planning. the state establishment puts forward its 
own proposals for consideration by higher bodies. which then 
ratify and/or modify it before returning to the enterprise. 
As can be seen from Figure 4.1. the state establishment is 
directly subordinate to a ministry; to its subdivision. It 
1s headed by a managing director who is formally obliged to 
take note of the various departments within the enterprise. 
however. when taking important decisions. 
FIGURE 4.1 PLANNING SYSTEM IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR IN IRAQ 
I PLANNING BOARD I 
1 '" STEERING COMMITTEE ( MINISTRY OF PLANNING) 
2.1 AGRICULTURE 
Though Iraq. since the dawn of history. has been known as an 
20 
agricultural region. the land outp~t is low. At present. only half 
of the cultivable land is actually farmed and that is only on an 
21 intermittent basis. In my previous study. I found five factors 
principally responsible for the backwardness of agriculture in Iraq: 
floods, primitive irrigation systems. feudal relationships. laws of 
agrarian reform and illiteracy of the peasants. 22 Some of these 
factors including floods and illiteracy, have been discussed earlier. 
The remaining factors are of particular interest in this chapter 
because they are largely responsible for other characteristics of 
the behaviour of the people. Take for example. the problem of 
irrigation and drainage system. It represents a major handicap for 
agriculture success. The peasants, due to their ignorance and 
poverty and. perhaps, because there are large tillable areas in 
comparison with their number. have been brought up on using the 
shifting-system of cultivation and practicing a haphazard and 
wasteful system of farming and their methods of soil preparation 
23 
are inadequate. These and other reasons have depleted the soil 
and combined to produce an increase in land salinization and decrease 
24 land productivity. 
As for the problem of feudalism. indeed the agricultural sector 
until 1970 was characterised by the control of feudalism over most of 
the fertile land. whereas the majority of the farmers were living in 
utter poverty and ignorance. smitten by disease. The system of land 
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tenure before 1970 brought grave economic defects and was (particularly 
before 1958) often socially vicious. especially in the south part of 
Iraq. It lies behind most of the social. economic and political problems 
25 
of the country. 
The 1958/59 agricultural census revealed that ownership of 
agricultural land was concentrated; only 2% of the land owners 
controlled 68% of the total agricultural land. whereas 86% of the 
landowners controlled 10.5% of the agricultural land. 26 Indeed, 
the big landowners were either the chiefs of the tribes or ministers 
and other government officers. or the royal family.27 It is 
therefore not surprising to find that the first priority of the 1958 
revolution was to redress the condition of agricultural landownership 
and to free the poor peasants from such a burdensome situation. Thus. 
in September of the same year a land reform law was enacted, which 
was modelled on that of Egypt in spite of the fact that agriculture 
28 in the two countries had little in common. According to that law, 
individual ownership was limited to (2,500 sq.km.) of irrigated 
land and (5,000 sq.km.) of rain-irrigated land. As a matter of fact. 
the law did not achieve its objectives for the following five major 
29 
reasons: 
1 - The government authorities did not clearly realise the scale 
and complexity of the problem nor had they a dlear under-
standing of the strength of the feudalists. nor did they have 
enough officials capable of effective farm management. 
2 - The poor situation of the peasants. given the fact that they 
were and still are illiterate, did not permit them to recognise 
the importance of such a progressive law. 
3 - Land was expropriated rapidly while distribution was extremely 
slow. For example. out of the total twelve million donums 
which were referred to the government by this law. only 6.94 
donums were sequesterated up to 1968; of these lands only 2.58 
million donums were distributed. The fundamental reason for 
the substantial delay in distribution was Iraq's under-
developed administrative infrastructure. This meant that not 
only were there insufficient trained administrators to super-
vise the actual process of distribution but. probably more 
indispensable, the government was unable to provide the 
important services such as irrigation. marketing and the pro-
vision of credit that had formerly been provided. albeit at a 
price, by the landlords. These services were supposed to have 
been provided by the co-operatives, but by 1968 only 443 co-
operatives had been established. just over half the estimated 
800 minimum needed to provide the necessary services for Iraq's 
30 
cultivable land. Furthermore, the supply of trained 
personnel (agronomists, engineers. supervisors and accountants) 
was totally inadequate to staff the co-operatives that had been 
31 
established. 
4 - Moreover. the Law No. 30 - 1958 gave the landlord whose 
property exceeded the maximum. the right to keep the best land 
with the highest. abundant water. close to communication net-
works and cities. Consequently. only the bad lands were 
distributed to the peasants. 
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During 1958-1968 many amendments were made to that law to strengthen 
the landlords' power against the poor peasants. To be free from such a 
situation there was little alternative for peasants but to abandon 
the land and migrate to the cities, especially to Baghdad where, 
according to Qasim's propaganda, the fellahin (peasants:sing:fellah) 
32 
would be able to live in palaces. Land productivity for the above 
reasons became low even by comparison with neighbouring countries 
which contend with similar problems. 33 
In May 1970 a new agrarian reform law was promulgated, which 
also reduced the size of land holding and paid special attention to 
the rights of co-cultivators and agricultural workers in the land they 
till. Furthermore, the new law treated the basic issues that were 
overlooked by the old law (Law No. 30 of 1958) and corrected the 
34 latter's flaws. It also eliminated feudal ownership and the semi-
feudal relationships in the rural areas, particularly in the middle 
and south of Iraq. As to the northern area, the kwid landlords and 
feudalists rem~ined in control of most of the cultivated areas 
supported by the insurgent agent. Up to 1975, neither the opportunity 
nor the appropriat~ condition were available to apply the agrarian 
reform law in this area. But after crushing the insurgency and the 
prevalence of peace and security in the area, the government issued 
Law No. 90 on May 1975, which was a complementary measure to the 
Agrarian Reform Law No. 117 of 1970. Extraordinary efforts were 
exerted by the government to execute the law in the shortest possible 
time. This led to sequestrating an area of 633.645 donumsJ and an 
area of 1.19 million donums of a total 4.95 million donums were 
distributed to farmers. The total numbers of beneficiaries amounted 
35 to 59.145 families in 1978. 
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2.2 INDUSTRY 
At the beginning of 1920 there was no industry worth mentioning. 
Consumer goods production, other than agricultural, used to come from 
abroad or industrialised by traditional vocational methods, such as 
the manufacture of metal and clay utensils, bricks, handwoven textile, 
carpentry, blacksmithing, and other, which basically depends on manual 
35 
skills. 
After the establishment of the royal regime in 1921, some 
foodstuff and consumption industries such as textiles, detergents 
(soap) cigarettes, printing and alcoholic drinks were established. 
During the thirties, when world crisis prevailed (1929-1933) the 
country was affected and suffered a recession in investments; no new 
industrial projects were initiated during the war period. But after 
the establishment of the industrial bank in 1947, some industrial 
projects such as cement, vegetable oils, spinning and weaving, bricKs, 
37 
were flourished in the private sector. Though oil revenues had 
occurred since 1950 and there was a "Development Board", the industrial 
sector was intentionally neglected during the fifties. This fact 
becomes more obvious in the following discussion. 
In 1954, Iraq had 22,460 industrial establishments, of which 
45% were one-man businesses; 93% employed less than five persons each. 
Many of these establishments were nothing but handicraft workshops. On 
the other hand, factories employing more than 20 persons formed just 
over 1% of the total but these "large units" gave employment to 43% 
38 
of all non-oil industrial workers. 
The poor situation of the agricultural sector. together with 
the miserable status of most of the peasants forced the government 
to intensify agricultural development and to pay little attention to 
industrial development. A closer examination of the pattern of 
investment allocations for the main economic sectors during 1951 to 
1959, as shown in the following table. endorses this fact. 
TABLE 4.3 TOTAL INVESTMENT ALLOCATIONS OF THE ECONOMIC SECTORS, 
1951-1959 (I.D. Million) 
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Sectors The first economic plan The second economic plan 
1951 - 1956 1955 - 1959 
Amount % Amount % 
Agriculture 66.1 42.5 114.4 37.6 
Industry 31.1 20.0 43.3 14.3 
Transport 29.0 18.7 74.2 24.4 
Building 20.6 13.3 60.7 20.0 
Others 8.6 5.5 11.4 3.7 
Total 115.4 100.0 304.1 100.0 
Source: Ferhang Jalal, op.cit., p. 33. 
As can be seen from tho table. the agricultural sector took the lion's 
share in terms of total allocation during the first and the second 
economic plans. whereas the industrial sector occupied the second 
position in tho first economic plan and the third place in the second 
plan. 
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During this period some new industrial projects such as 
bitumen refinery. sugar plant. cotton textiles and another two cement 
factories were founded. However. the country's capacity for industrial 
growth was limited primarily by the shortage of skilled labour and 
technical and managerial personnel: the small domestic market: an 
inability to compete with foreign products: and the timidity of private 
39 initiative. Perhaps it is useful to mention at this stage that 
until 1959 there was no ministry with responsibility for industry. 
Instead, what Iraq had during that time was only a Department of 
Industry in the Ministry of Economy and the Industrial Bank under 
the control of the Ministry of Development. The latter played a 
considerable role in promoting industry and still plays an influential 
role in industrial development of the private sector. 
Although the Development Board gave priority to agriculture 
and its bias towards this sector was correct at least during that 
time. it did not completely noglect industry. Its plans. as we 
observed above, allocated I.D. 74.5 million to this sector compared 
to just I,D. 4 millions total investments in modern industrial plans 
40 
up to 1951. This. however, did not satisfy Ouassim's government. 
Thus. after the 1958 Revolution more attention was given to industrial-
ization of the country. The Development Board was disbanded and 
replaced with a Planning Board and a Ministry of Planning (Law 74. 1959). 
At the same time. a Ministry of Industry was created to undertake 
activities concerned with the industrialization and to supervise the 
public and private sectors. Indeed. the industrial sector accomplished 
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some progress and occupied the leading position among the sectors which 
the government began to develop in accordance with the 1961 Detailed 
Economic Plan. From the 1.0. 556.2 million allocated to various 
sectors, the industrial sector received 1.0. 166.8 million (almost 30% 
of the total allocation) of which 1.0. 95 million was covered by the 
41 two agreements signed with the Soviet Union and Czechozlovakia. 
In addition, legislation was enacted to encourage the participation 
of the private sector and protect the national products. Two methods 
were adoptedJ first, restriction of imports, and secondly, facilities 
and assistances were given to industry as per the Industrial Projects 
Encouragement Law. This, in addition to the protection given to local 
industry, helped in the increase of industrial production in the post-
revolution period. 
Meanwhilo, the support accorded to the Industrial Bank and the 
increase of its capital to I.D.10 million have positively contributed 
to the estauliSMlont of new industries, encouraging those who possess 
funds to invest in some industrial projects. In 1962 the number of 
industrial licences amounted to 140, and the metal industries occupied 
42 position No. 1 among such industries. 
However, private sector investors and the Industrial Bank's 
contribution in industry were hampered due to the nationalization laws 
which promulgated in July 1964. By these laws, 30 industrial companies 
were nationalized. This led to a sudden expansion of the public sector's 
43 activity 1n industry. Apparently, the purpose behind such a movement 
was political but not economic. It was designed to align the economic 
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structure of Iraq more closely to that of Egypt as desired by the 
44 Nasserities. Similarly, nationalization was followed by the imposition 
of an unworkable bureaucracy, the inefficiency of which seems to have 
grown steadily more pronounced. In effect, the problem arises not 
because the displacement of private by public ownership. but because 
of the heavy and cumberous hand of bureaucracy which accompanied the 
latter. The industrial sector at that time was suffering from 
corruption. maladministration and inefficiency. It was draining 
the state's budget instead of contributing to the economic development 
45 
and did not provide the government with new resources. 
In 1965, another five-year plan was presented to run up to 1969. 
This plan, like the previous one. gave first priority to industry. 
Though almost two-thirds of its projects were exactly the same as the 
previous one, its novelty was the provision of I.D. 4.5 million for "new 
industrial projects" which included tractor and motor car assembly, 
46 
a project for salt production and a chip-board project. 
In 1968 the Ba'ath Party came to power and much effort has been 
devoted to industrialise the country. Special attention has been devoted 
to complete the unfinished projects and to expand some existing factories 
and new industries have been introduced. As for the private sector, 
legislation was enacted to encourage public participation in industry. 
The incentives applied by the government in this field were the exemption 
of income tax, tax-exemption on imports of new materials and machinery. 
The government also provided the necessary plots of land, services, loans 
47 
and other bank facilities. 
The present government is forging ahead with an industrialization 
programme at a speed unmatched by any of the previous regimes. It 
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believes that the backward Iraq society cannot be radically changed 
without giving to industrialization its due importance. since industry 
constitutes one of the basic pillars of progress in modern age. For 
the Arab Ba'th Socialist Party. it is only through industrialization 
th t th 'i d d b h' d 4/3 a e economIC n epen ence can e ac leve . The purty also 
realised that industrialization in Iruq is the basic means towards 
transforming it from an underdeveloped agrarian society to a developed 
agro-industrial society. In addition. industrialization will permit 
the industrial sector to play u greater part in national income formation. 49 
The industrial sector took the first place among the economic 
sectors in the years that followed 19G8. In the first plan (1970-1974) 
total allocation for industry was 1.0. 391 million. whereas the 
agricultural sector. for instance. too~ the second position with an 
allocation of 366.2 million. Me~nwhile. the total investments of the 
industrial sector durinl~ the first three ye.Jrs of tho second development 
plan (1975-19110) W,E; 1.0. 2123 million, repre!,enting about 47% of the 
, 50 
combined investments in all the economIC sectors. 
As for tho typo of modern industrios, tho emphasis is on the 
exploitation of locally available raw materials with export potential 
and diversification aWdY from dependence on oil, and a complete 
revitdlization of tho mostly !;fIliJlI-scale industries which have dominated 
51 the non-oil industry. Industries such ~s glass, paper, sulphur. 
extraction. steel rolling rnill Llnd rayon. fertilizer and petrocrlemiculs 
indw3tries (which hLld been pl.1nned for almost ten years but were nOW~lere 
near implementation) titarted their pr-oduction a few years ago. Others 
such as phosphates, tyro plLlnts, motor manufacturing complex are due 
to be opened in 19B3. On tho other h'1nd, Iraq's construction industry 
is expanding fast) cernent output in 197G WClS 2.8 million tons and 
rose to seven rnillion tons folluwin~ the o~ening of another seven 
new factories in 197B. 
2.3 The'Industrial Manpower: 
Before discussing the type and the quantitative side of the 
industrial manpower. it is important to know who is the industrial 
worker. The previous discussions of the Iraqi communities and that 
of the economic development revealed that: 
1 - Strong relationships exist among the nomad. the village and the 
city communities in terms of their social values and other 
traditional customs. The continual rural-urban migration is 
largely responsible for this situation. 
2 - Until lately. agriculture was the dominant occupation of the 
majority of the people. In addition, the feudalistic behaviour 
of tribal Sheik's and landlords was the prevailing feature in 
agriculture. 
3 - Modern industry is absolutely new and the year 1950 can be 
regarded as the real beginning of this new era. 
These points indicate that the industrial worker in Iraq is a peasant 
villager, and a member of the traditional society. This fact. combined 
with the novelty of industry in Iraq, keeps in the factory worker 
many of the attitudes of the non-industrial societYJ he remains a 
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villager and industrial employment, for him. is not yet a way of life. 
It is quite important to remember at this stage that the agri-
cultural environment has a very specific attribute which impresses 
itself on the mentality of the villager and is reflected in his social 
life. He Is not. like the urban factory worker, an employee working 
under immediate supervision at a task specifically assigned to him. 
Whether he is a tenant or a freeholder. even where he is a serf. his 
time and seasons. his varying tasks and his alternations of work and 
rest. are set for him not only by the commands of a master but also " 
by the exigencies of nature and the constraints of social structure. 
The factory workers are still a very minor group in the society. 
In 1977. the industrial workforce was 9.1% of the total workforce in 
Iraq.53 Different studies have been carried out during the last 
fifteen years (some of them were under the supervision of the 
International Labour Organisation) to evaluate and analyse the actual 
situation of manpower in Iraq and to estimate future manpower require-
mente All these studies have been indicated that the shortage of 
skilled manpower is acute in all economic sectors and the number of 
unskilled workers in the industrial sector is higher than that of 
54 
skilled workers. 
According to the 1977 census data. 55.9% of all industrial 
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manpower working in the large companies are unskilled. Table 4A shows 
this fact and indicates that the share of skilled workers in the total 
number employed in these companies is lower than 40%.55 
TABLE 4 A INDUSTRIAL MANPOWER IN THE LARGE COMPANIES CLASSIFIED BY 
OCCUPATIONAL CATEGORIES AND SECTORS: 1977. 
Occupational Categories Public Sector Private Sector Total 
No. % No. % No. 
Managers and high 
professionals ~014 1.9 569 1.3 2573 
Technicians 4,392 4.2 • 249 0.6 4641 
Skilled workers 4 .... 5,155 42.7 13,832 31.1 58987 
Semi-skilled and 
unskilled workers 5.~69 51.2 29.773 67.0 83942 
% 
1.7 
3.1 
39.3 
55.9 
Total 105.730 j 100.0 44.413 / 100.0 1 50. 143 ./ 100. a 
Source: Annual Jv~rt ~~R Abstract of Stati tics 1978. OPe ~ •• Table 4/4. p. 98. 
The shortage of skilled manpower in industry represents one of the 
principal obstacles in increasing productivity in this sector. As 
will be seen later. 64% of the managers surveyed in this study are 
disappointed by the shortage of skilled manpower. Yet the situation 
of these managers becomes more complicated if we understand that 
semi-skilled and unskilled workers are by and large of rural origin 
and. for reasons mentioned earlier in chapter three. dislike manual 
work. 
SUMMARY 
The chapter has tried to shed some light on the political and 
economic developments during the years 1921-1980. The political 
environment during this period was highly unstable and there were 
frequent coups d'etat. The different regimes that came to power 
before 1968. together with the flagrant abuse of authority. have 
adversely affected the economic and social transformations and split 
the Iraqi personality and. consequently. widened the gap between the 
successive governments and the people. 
The links between political and economic aims are unquestionable. 
Many of the economic laws and legislation which were enacted in 
agriculture and industry. were aimed at achieving political rather 
than economic ends. 
On the other hand. agriculture until the recent past was the main 
occupation and two-thirds of the people engaged in it. Meanwhile. the 
history of modern industry is quite new in Iraq and the year 1950 can 
be regarded as the real beginning of such a new era. 
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In addition, the problems of agriculture which imposed on the 
peasants by nature or by the feudalistic behaviour of the tribal shieks 
and landlords or by the government through its different agrarian reform 
laws have forced the peasants to abandon the land to search for work 
in the cities. Thousands of the peasants found their target inside 
the industrial sector which witnessed considerable expansion after 
the nationalisation of oil wealths. 
Today, the industrial sector faces acute· shortage in skilled man-
power. The majority of the industrial workers are of village origin. 
This fact, coupled with the novelty of modern industry, keeps in the 
factory worker many of the attitudes of the agricultural societYJ he 
remains a villager and unable to adapt himself to the requirements of 
the industrial context. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RELIGIOUS BELIEFS, PRACTICES AND EDUCATION OF THE PEOPLE IN IRAQ 
INTRODUCTION 
Religions have an important influence on human behaviour. Social 
interactions and social relations, e.g., the role of women, political 
organisations and education systems are all significantly affected by 
1 the religion of the society. 
Religions also have an impact at the practical or micro level of 
the business enterprise. In Iraq, for example, Islam plays a signifi-
cant part in the life of the people and their conduct, it is strictly 
prohibited to advertise for any type of alcohol' either on local radio 
or television, during the fasting month "RAMADAN" all factories and 
public institutions reduce their working hours and all restaurants and 
coffeehouses must be closed during this month from sunrise to sunset. 
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate four principal 
points: Islam and economic ~roeress of the Arab World, the ethnic 
composition of the Iraqi society, the Islamic beliefs and practices, 
and, education of the people in Iraq. 
1.0: ISLAM ANO ECONOMIC PROGRESS OF THE ARAB WORLD 
Since the publication of Max Weber's "The Protestant Sects and 
the Spirit of Capitalism" scholars of various theoretical persuasions 
have argued that Islam is the main impediment to the economic and 
2 industrial development of the Arab World. The point of departure 
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for many scholars of this genre has been to view the economic backwardness 
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in the Arab World in terms of a lack of those protestant ethic factors 
which accounts for the capitalistic-economic development of the indus-
trialized communities. 3 
According to Turner. Weber's thesis that secularization involves 
relegation of religion to purely private choice. on one hand, and that 
secularization was the social product of capitalism and protestantism 
on the other. has become the base line of much contemporary sociological 
4 
research. In the light of this argument. in which capitalism is 
equated with rationalisation. economic development becomes contingent 
upon a rational process characterized by an institutional differentiation 
5 in the areas of politics, economics and religion. 
The link between religion and social development is further 
elaborated on the basis of a mediation process affecting individual 
personality. Zureik, for example. sees that the basic premise under-
lying this psychological approach to modernism is that there are some 
personality traits associated with the protestant ethic which are 
conductive to modernization. These include: a high level of personal 
motivation, mastery of the environment, deducation to the work ethic, 
S 
orientation to the future and so forth. Weber's thesis, which 
provides the ba~is for this mode of reasoning, could be presented as 
follows: 7 
Figure 5.1 Weber's Thesis of the Protestant Ethic 
Protestant Spirit of modern 
Early independence 
and mastery train-
ing by parents 
Weber's The~1s 
capitalism 
High achievement 
motivation in sons 
As a matter of fact. Islam as a religion. does not hold direct 
responsibility for the present Arab World backwardness. nor does it 
stand against economic and industrial progress. Maxime ROdinson. 
for example. argues that Islam teachings and Koranic values are not 
antithical either to capitalism or socialism. 8 Another scholar. 
O.S. Robert, confirms that trade and business activities have always 
had a significant place in the minds of Muslims. 9 The language and 
ideas of the Koran reflect the fact that it was first addressed to 
10 the people engaged in commerce. The society in which Islam was 
born. the society of Mecca. was already a centre of capitalist trade 
and the prophet was a successful merchant. 11 The inhabitants of 
Mecca. the prophet's tribe, caused their capital to fructify through 
12 trade and loans at interest in a way that Weber would call rational. 
According to Rodinson, the merchants of the Muslims Empire conformed 
perfectly to Weber's criteria for capitalistic activity. He describes 
them as follows: 
HThey seized any and every opportunity for profit. and 
calculated their outlays. their encashments and their 
profits in money terms. H 13 
The great development of trade in the Muslim Middle Ages shows that 
at least part of production was directed towards the market, towards 
exchange values. Specialization in products both of the crafts and 
of agriculture was common. Some towns wove silk in various forms: 
damask, satin. etc •• while others worked with cotton. or made carpets 
or leather articles. There were even towns that specialised in the 
exporting of soap, rose-water, scent, wax, honey, ointments and 
14 
saffron. 
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Nevertheless. strict Islamic law and custom restricted an 
individual's right to hold property in certain basic respects. It is 
not permissible. for example. to make a charge for such primary 
products as water and grass. Certain commercial practices are 
forbidden by the Koran: those which are either fraudulent. involve 
trade of impure goods (wine. pigs. etc •• ). or in goods that are 
common to everyone (water. grass and fire). Speculation in food. 
especially with a view to cornering the market. is forbidden. In 
addition. the Muslim law strictly forbids the lending of money at 
15 interest-usury. 
While the religious ban on lending at interest played a part 
in hindering an important outlet for financial activity. the Muslim 
religion never raised any objection to economic and industrial 
development. As a matter of fact the economic and industrial 
backwardness of the Arab countries including Iraq has resulted not 
because the Islamic religion. but because these countries have long 
suffered from colonialism and imperialist plunderJ the majority of 
the people were and are still illiterate; authoritative and 
military governments; tribal relationships; the problem of extended 
16 family and method of child-rearing. Still there is the problem of 
traditional values which exercises a significant influence on economic 
and industrial development. 
,2.0: THE ETHNIC COMPOSITION OF THE SOCIETY 
The Iraqi society is very heterogeneous with respect to ethnic 
17 
or religious origins. more than other Arab countries. Aggravating 
the problem of this heterogeneity of the society is the high value 
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placed on group feelings. Each member of an ethnic or religious 
group feels a strong relationship toward his group and considers 
• 
those who belong to other groups as outsiders rather than as nationals 
of his country. Though this type of group feeling becomes less 
common among townsmen, nonetheless it still persists in the country-
side and small towns. The reason for this feeling. traditionally. 
may be the many cases in which a group had invaded and then dominated 
18 the area until it was defeated by another group. 
The major religions in today's Iraq are: Islam. which is 
divided into two major sects - "Shiites" and "Sunnites".; Christianity.; 
Sebacan and Yezidis. The population may also be divided into the 
following groups: Arabs- Kurds: Turkmans; Sarbiyas and Armenians. 
Each of which speaks different language and has different rituals and 
traditions. Other than the Muslim Arabs. who are the majority. 
minorities vary in their size from the Kurds, who comprise about 20% 
of the population. to the Sarbiyas and other minorities who are 
19 
only a few thousands each. 
Indeed. this situation. namely the existence of different 
religions and languaees provided that each ethnic group has different 
rituals and traditions. has put a lot of difficulties before the 
government and management. On the macro level. for example. most 
of the national plans issued during the sixties were unworkable in 
the north of Iraq because of tho interior war between the Kurds and 
the central government. As regarding the practical or micro level 
of the business firm. needless to say that such an in-group feeling is 
one of the main reasons behind the establishment of informal organisa-
tion which is largely work against the planned management objectives 
in Iraq. Each member of an ethnic group tries to assist his group 
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and render to its member all possible facilities, even if it was 
against the established policies of the organisation. 2D 
3.0 ISLAMIC BELIEFS AND PRACTICES 
About 90% of the population are Muslims and Islam is the state 
21 
religion. As such, the author believes that only through a 
comprehensive discussion of this religion one can understand a lot 
of people behaviour in Iraq including that of the managers who are 
the subject of this study. In addition, many of the traditional 
concepts that we discussed earlier have their roots in this religion. 
To start with, Islam is both belief and legislation, which 
22 
organises all the relationships of man. A Muslim is one who 
23 
accepts and submits to the will of God. The "Sharia" or Law of 
Islam embraces every detail of human life and this includes personal 
actions as well as social relations and community life, including 
the Government. 24 
The orthodox muslims are fatalists in the sense that they 
strongly believe that what the Lord has planned for them they have 
to face. God is able to do anything - from blessings to misfortune. 
The Iraqi , as a religious person, considers the recognition and 
worship of God through Islam the principal concern of his life. He 
views himself as a humble creature whose life, at any moment, becomes 
whatever the Lord wills it to become. By keeping on the right path, 
by performing religious obligation - the five pillars of Islam - one 
can merit the blessing of "Allah" and avoid misfortune. 
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Indeed. there are some holy places in the cities of Kerbala. 
Najaf and Baghdad. which rank next in importance only to those in 
Sudia Arabia. Many religious schools exist in these places, not 
only famous in the Islamic World. but they have an important impact 
on social life in Iraq. They continuously strengthen and reinforce 
the Islamic behaviour of the people. The muslim has a tendency to 
believe implicitly that his life has been worked out by the Lord 
before his birth. Nothing can be done to alter what has been 
destined for him. Indeed. such a belief causes the Arab personality 
to be passive towards his environment rather than to attempt to 
25 influence it. Whether in Iraq, or in other Arab countries. when 
a misfortune comes, people immediately start to find an explanation 
for it within the system of Islam. If such an explanation is found, 
the majority. and this is largely because of their illiteracy, 
would be inclined to consider it as a punishment sent by God for 
their sins: 
"Those that commit sin shall be punished for their sins" 26 
On the other hand, Islum is a brotherhood with no social distinction 
and no official priesthood. All men are equal under Islam. 
Unfortunately, for the female species of the mankind, this does 
not appear to include her. Kergan explains this point in the 
following way: 
"A principle of Islam teachings has been the inferior 
status of women, probably deriving from the hardships 
of desert and nomadic life." 27 
Though Kergan was successful in his explanation and reminded us of 
the importance of the desert in this respect, nevertheless. and 
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according to the Koran. women are inferior in their souls and bodies 
and men have to spend their wealth to maintain them. The principle 
of superiority of men over women. which we have discussed in Chapter 
three. repeats itself in the Koran as follows: 
"Men have authority over women because Allah has made the 
one superior to the other. and because they spend their 
wealth to maintain them. Good women are obedient." 28 
In fact. the Islamic World as a whole would probably have been more 
advanced socially and economically if customs and traditions had 
treated women as equal rather than as inferior. Inequality of sex 
will continue so long as illiteracy is the dominant feature among 
the masses. As will be seen later. the problem of superiority or 
inferiority and social restriction on women - especially their 
exclusion from the work arena. represents considerable constraint 
on manager's decisions and their organisational performance. 
Another important issue in Islam is the concept of alms or 
"Al-Zakat~ According to Islam an alms is a method of increasing 
people's cohesiveness. Alms are the properties which the rich 
voluntarily give for the sako of charity. They are supposed to be 
given in various ways: by supporting parents and relatives and 
helping the needy in general. It may also take the form of good deeds 
29 
or even kind words. Indeed, the misunderstanding of such an act. 
has affected individual behaviour to the degree that many people 
are inclined to help a needy person in order to gain good status 
1n the next life: 
"Whatever alms you give shall rebound to your own advantage. 
provided that you give them for the love of Allah. And 
whatever alms you give shall be paid back to you in full: 
you shall not be wronged." 30 
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The author believes that the misinterpreting of alms concepts 
among the people, who are by and large illiterate, is one of the 
principal reasons behind exercising "Wasta" or mediation in the Arab 
world. Mediation in this study means assisting another person to gain 
some personal advantages. While we shall investigate the problem of 
mediation in Iraq in more detail in the next chapters, it is important 
to discuss here other Islamic concepts: income, family size and 
individual success or failure. 
As far as income, size of the family (number of children), 
individual success or failure are concerned, the majority of the people 
believe that such things are in the hand of the Lord. Nobody can 
increase or decrease things like these without the will of God. They 
believe that even their most minute activities are planned by God 
and closely watched by Him: 
"He knows the visible and unseen. He is the Mighty one, 
the Merciful. who excelled in making of all things." 31 
In this view, God determines a person's fate even before his birth. 
Thus; the decline in economic conditions. the death of a person. the 
sickness, the number of children, the success or the failure in 
achieving certain objectives and such. are largely interpreted as 
due to the will of God. It follows that a human being, by his own 
efforts, cannot improve his condition - Allah alone can do that. 
Consequently what is the use of arduous efforts when they may fail 
because they are against the will of God? This probably explains 
why the people frequently use the word "Inshallah" - "God Willing" 
1n their dailY life. which is reflecting a basic Muslim attitude 
toward the world. Equally. the commonly quoted Koranic phrases "it is 
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written" and "it was willed by Allah" symbolize attitudes toward 
the value of human effort which many Muslim~ have held for centuries. 
Men exercise no ultimate control over events in a world in which 
all things are ordained by God. Success is the manifestation of 
God's benevolence) failure is simply God's withholding of bene-
volence. Such beliefs are largely existing among the illiterate 
people. 
Folk Belief and Superstition: 
Though the majority of the people believe in Islam. popular 
customs and beliefs are still persistent among uneducated townsmen 
and villagers. Transmitted orally from generation to generation. 
these customary beliefs work side by side with Islam. The Jinns 
and ghosts. the use of magic and the "evil eye" are quite common 
in the rural areas and still exist among uneducated people. 
The man who has lost God's blessing by violating such community 
moral canons as those pertaining to truthfulness. loyalty to family 
and relatives is at the mercy of these malignant spirits. who have 
power to bring sickness and misfortune. They are propitiated with 
charms. amulets, and prayers. The jinns and the evil spirits may 
also be propitiated by pt1rtaking of the "barak.a". the mystical power 
of someone who has "Wt1jh Khayr". a good face. The "baraka" of these 
lucky ones may be obtained by eating with them, being given some 
of their property, or receiving their good wishes. Most old men 
and women in Iraq are assumed to be possessed of a lucky face. either 
because they have succeeded in living a long time or because their 
approach to the grave in old age is thought to bring them nearer to 
supernatural. 32 
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As regards "evil eye" needless to say that such a belief is 
still in existence. The evil eye is a mysterious and hateful power 
carried by the glance of a certain person. is much feared in both 
the village and nomadic groups, and to lesser extent in larger 
cities. Objects of a sky-blue colour or sky-blue decorations around 
the windows or doors of dwellings are thought to be efficacious in 
warding off the "evil eye".33 
On the other hand. local cults and saints are numerous and 
one can see them almost in every village. Closer to God than his 
fellows. the saint is able to perform miracles by the grace of Allah, 
Practically almost every village has a grave shrine to some man or 
woman locally esteemed as a saint. The cults which have grown up 
around these saints give the villager a sense of security against 
the omnipresent evil spirits. Disease and childlessness are among 
the most frequent misfortunes against which the help of the saints 
is invoked. 
4;0: EDUCATIONAL STATUS OF THE PEOPLE 
Education plays a significant role in the economic and social 
development in every society. Nowadays. a society must be an 
34 
"educated society" in order to progress. to grow. even to survive. 
A lot of the traditional beliefs, values and customs that we have dis-
cussed above can be eradicated or. at least. minimized by education. 
Unfortunately, modern education is new in Iraq and this fact will 
become more obvious in the following discussion. 
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Until the advent of western influence in the nineteenth century. 
education in Iraq was dominated by the Islamic tradition of religious 
and classical learning. The curriculum of elementary schools was 
based on memorization of the Koran; reading and writing perceived 
secondary emphasis. With the establishment of the mandate in 1921. 
the public school system organised under Turkish rule began slowly 
to expand under British supervision. However. the establishment of 
the public school system did not displace the network of village 
NKuttabs H• the traditional religious school. Thanks to oil royalties 
and the spirit of the governments that followed the royal regime 
which are largely behind the increase of education among the people. 
Nevertheless. the steady increase in the number of students in all 
levels of study does not cover the fact that two shortcomings 
characterise the current system of education in Iraq. The first is 
that education. particularly in primary and secondary schools. 
represents an amalgam of the religiously oriented Islamic tradition. 
Though the HAl-Kutab School" has disappeared years ago. the old 
pattern of learning by rate persists in secular education. and it 
frequently conflicts with new teaching methods. Eloquence and the 
ability to quote from the Koran or to marshal proverbs in argument 
are still the ffidrks of an educated man in many parts of Iraq. 
The second point is that the concept of superiority of men 
over women. which we discussed earlier. also embodies itself in the 
field of education. Men are more educated than women and this is 
true whether among rural or urban dwellers. Table 5.1 reflects 
such a fact. 
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TABLE 5.1 PERCENTAGES OF ILLITERACY AMONG THE POPULATION 
CLASSIFIED BY SEX AND AREA. 1977 
Sex 
Area Men Women Total 
Urban 26 58 41.3 
Rural 56 93 74.8 
Total 36 71 53 
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Source: Ministry of Planning. Abstract of Statistics, op.cit., Table 2/8 
p. 35. 
As can be seen from this table, the proportion of illiterate 
people (amongst those aged ten years and more) was 53% in 1977. This 
proportion did not only differ between urban areas (41.3%) and rural 
areas (74.8%), but it also differs between men and women. Men, 
irrespective of their areas, have higher percentages of literacy than 
women. Indeed, such high rates of illiteracy are not surprising when 
one considers the density of population per sk.km. (27 persons), the 
problem of communication within the country. However, the difference 
between men and women in this respect has only one main explanationJ 
the majority of the families, notably the rural ones or those who 
have rural background,were/are against female education. Surely the 
number of educated women has sharply increased during the last two 
decades. nonetheless, the old generation still has the upper hand 
in determining female behaviour and the place of women in the 
social structure. 
On the other hand, levels of education, especially higher 
education. are deplorably low. Table 5.2 indicates that the majority 
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of the people are illiterate (53%). or only read and write (22.7%). 
or primary school certificate holders (13%) or intermediate school 
certificate holders (42%) or secondary school certificate holders (3.1%). 
Only 2.1% of the population hold baccalaureus certificates and just a 
small handful of the people (0.2%) have higher education. The table 
also shows that the urban dwellers have better chances in all levels 
of education when compared with the rural dwellers. 
TABLE 5.2: LEVELS OF EDUCATION IN IRAQ. BY AREA OF RESIDENCE, 
1977 
Level of Education Areas Total Urban Rural 
Ill! terate 41.31 74.80 53.0 
Read and write only 27.00 14.60 22.7 
Primary Sch. 16.40 6.46 13.0 
Intermediate Sch. 5.50 1.30 4.2 
Secondary Sch • 4.51 0.70 3.1 
E3accalaureus 3.00 0.60 2.1 
Higher Education 0.29 0.02 0.2 
Unknown 1. 81 1.52 1.7 
Total Percentage 100 100 100 
Total Population 4.923.407 2.631.845 7,555,257 
Source: Ministry of Planning. Abstract of Statistics. op.cit., Table 2/8, 
p. 35. 
To cope with the problem of illiteracy, the government adopted 
the following three policies during the last decade: 
First: Expansion of the right to education and its 
dissemination in accordance with the principle 
of equal opportunity among the citizens. 35 
Second: Making education free in all stages of study 
Third: 
since 1974. The aim of this measure was to 
assist students of limited income from lower 
income families to continue their education. 36 
Launching a comprehensive campaign to eradicate 
illiteracy for those aged between 15 to 45 
years in all parts of Iraq. The campaign was 
37 
started in May, 1978. 
As a result of these policies the number of students as well as the 
number of schools have increased considerably during this period. 
Table 5.3 shows this increase. 
Table 5.3. NUMBER OF SCHOOLS, STUDENTS IN IRAQ IN 1970/71, 74/75, 
AND 1978179. 
Year Primary Stage Secondary Stage 
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No. of Increase No. of Increase No. of Incr- No. of Incr-
Sch.s % Students % Sch.s ease % Students ease 
(000) (000) 
1970/71 5617 - 1.120 - 921 - 304 -
1974/75 6170 10 1.521 36 1099 19 452 49 
1978/79 10560 88 2.459 120 1579 71 782 157 
Source: Ministry of Planning, Abstract of Statistics 1978, op.cit., Tables 
11/3 and 11/7, pp. 237-41. 
% 
As can be seen from the table. the total number of the primary 
school students was 1.12 million in 1970/71. rose to 1.52 in 1974/75. 
and to 2.45 million in 1978/79. That is. there was a 120% increase 
in the number of primary school students. The number of primary 
schools has also increased from 5617 in 1970/71 to 10560 in 1978/79. 
registering an increase equal to 88%. On the other hand. the number 
of secondary school students also has changed positively to become 
782 thousand in 1978/79 after it was 304 thousand at the beginning 
of 1970. Again. secondary schools have also increased to match the 
increase in students number, (see table 5.3 ). 
The same is equally true in regard to the number of universities 
and students. While the number of students was 43 thousand in 1970. 
it rose to 91 thousand in 1979. The number of universities has also 
increased from four to seven during the said period. In addition. 
there is a plethora of institutions specialising in various aspects 
of post-secondary education. 
Problems of Education 
The steady expansion of education brought with it a substantial 
fall in the admission standards and eventually led to a decline in 
the quality of the students. Though there was a considerable increase 
in the number of students, the increase in the number of teachers (in 
38 
all stages of study) lagged behind. It is a well known fact. that 
it is much easier to increase the number of students than to i~prove 
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the quality of education. To improve and raise the quality of education 
in Iraq. far-reaching changes in the attitudes of both teachers and 
students are needed. For example. old-fashioned teaching methods are 
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still lingering in higher education. Dictation of lectures are common 
in all stages of study and passively received by students. committed to 
memory. On the other hand. examination questions require only the 
reproduction of dictated notes. often in the same words in which they 
were given out. The considerable number of old-fashioned Egyptian 
teachers in Iraq seems to have encouraged such practices. 39 
As for students, the majority are still cramming by heart 
lecture notes. the importance of which they often do not grasp. Indeed, 
such e travesty of learning produced baneful effects on the whole 
40 
education system. On the other hand, relations between university 
education and society as a whole are ill-defined and academic researchers 
are few. The graduate student has insufficient practical training back-
ground. Each year. thousands of students are graduated from universities 
and schools. Their training cannot be effectively used in industrial 
41 
or agricultural products, or in those of expanding public services. 
Finally, two crucial points need to be recognised at this stage. 
The first is that illiteracy has produced passive attitudes, particularly 
among the aged persons, towards education and its importance in today's 
world. Still there are those who are preventing children (largely the 
girls) from schools. Many do not believe in modern knowledge, neither 
are they impressed by the western man going to the moon. A considerable 
number of aged people believe that education is only fit for young 
people. If a man (aged 40 plus) goes to school, mdny would laugh at 
him. mock at him by saying: 
"Lookl The aged miln goes to school - "ALKUTTAB"? 
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Secondly. the government enacted in 1974 Law No. 103 and obliged 
herself to find employment for each graduate inside government machinery. 
Though the law brought many advantages for those who are from poor-
classes. it also jeopardised the national development plans and the 
proper functioning of production and services in Iraq. Again. it 
reduced competition among university students by eliminating the basic 
incentives for hardwork. by giving them equal opportunity irrespective 
of their marks. 
SUMMARY: 
The chapter has tried to shed light on four principal points. 
Islam and the economic progress of the Arab World, the ethnic compo-
sition of the Iraqi societYJ Islamic beliefs and practices and 
education of the people in Iraq. Many points can be picked up from 
the chapter, but the most important from the point of view of this 
study are: 
1 • Islam as a religion does not hold direct responsibility for the 
Arab backwardness, nor does it account for its economic stagnation. 
Colonialism and imperialist plunder, illiteracy, authoritative and 
milItary governments, tribal relationships, kinship and the problems 
of the extended family and methods of child-rearing. are all 
responsible for the economic backwardness of the Arab countries 
including Iraq. 
2 - The society of Iraq. is very heterogeneous with respect to ethnic 
and relieious origins. Each member of an ethnic group feels a 
strong relationship toward his group and largely considers those 
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who belong to other groups as outsiders. Such an in-group feeling 
is considerably reduced during the recent past. however. it still 
persists. The principal factor behind its existence is illiteracy. 
the author believes. 
3 - Islam is still powerfully holding its followers and is the state 
religion. Individuals must behave in the light of this religion 
and its Koranic teachings. It is so, because Islam is both 
belief and legislation which organises all the relationships of 
man. On the other hand, Islam strengthens such nomadic and village 
values as hospitality, family loyalty, assisting relatives and 
superiority of men over women. Because of illiteracy. there are 
many customury beliefs and traditional habits still working among 
the people. 
4 - As regards education. in fact modern education is new in Iraq. 
During the last thirty years. massive efforts have been spent 
by the successive governments .to eradicate illiteracy. Though 
these efforts have been successfully organised and their results 
were encouraging, yei still the majority of the people are illiterate. 
The link between society and education is too strong. It seems 
that the idea of men's superiority over women. which exists in 
the Iraqi society also works in the field of education; men 
are more educated than women irrespective of their place of living. 
Passive attitudes toward education exist among the aged personsJ 
many refuse to enrol their daughters in school. In addition. the 
present education systems suffer from the backwardness of teaching 
methods which are largely based on dictation of lectures. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER SIX 
BACKGROUNDS AND CAREER PATTERNS OF IRAQI MANAGERS 
WITH SOME INTERNATIONAL COMPARISONS 
The backgrounds and career patterns of managers have gained 
growing attention in recent years as a result of studies of management 
training on the one hand. and as a result of increasing prosperity and 
the growth of business firms. on the other. Yet the investigations 
that have been undertaken in this field have not always sought to 
explain to what extent a society can shape the personal and social 
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characteristics of managers nor have they examined the interrelationships 
that might be existing between the characteristics of a group of managers 
in a given society. 
This chapter sets out to investigate and shed light on the personal 
and social characteristics as well as the career patterns of forty four 
Iraqi senior managers. The chapter consists of three sections. The 
first ex'amines these managers from the point of view of their age. 
education, number of children. place of birth and iocia1 origins. The, 
second deals with such aspects of their careers as mobility between firms 
and the length of service. The third section presents a comparison of 
these characteristics and the size of companies studies. 
Below are the results with comparisons of the characteristics of 
some managers in a number of developed countries, such as the United 
Kingdom. the United States and Japan. 
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1.0 PERSONAL AND SOCIAL CHARACTERISTICS 
1. Age of Managers: 
The average (mean) age of the Iraqi managers is 46.7 years. Differ-
ent studies in the United Kingdom give almost the same average. For 
example, according to Clement's study the average of 646 managers 
1 studied is 46 years, although it is 49 years for senior managers. 
Another study. carried out by Clark. indicates that it is also 46 years 
for all managers studied. However. Clark goes further and demonstrates 
that the average varies according to the manager's sectorJ 50 years 
in the public sector as against 42 years in the private sector. 2 More 
recently, in 1978. Melrose-Woodman found the average age of 4525 
3 
managers ranging between 46 to 55 years. In other countries, the 
average age is even higher. For example. it is between 55 and 64 
years in the United States. 4 and 55 to 65 or more in Japan. 5 
Table 6.1 demonstrates the forty four managers by age and sectors 
and indicates that the dominant age group of the public sector managers 
ranges from 31 to 40 years and 41 to 50 years for those working in the 
private sector. 
TABLE 6.1 AGE OISTRIBUTION OF THE MANAGERS BY SECTORS 
Age Group Public Sector Managers Private Sector Managers Total 
N % N % N 
31-40 11 55 3 12 14 
41-50 8 40 10 42 18 
51-60 1 5 7 29 • 8 
61-70 - - 4 17 4 
Total 20 100 24 100 44 
x2 • 13.04 4df p ~ 0.01 
Cramer's V • 0.54. 
% 
32 
41 
18 
9 
100 
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While no manager (aged 62 years or above) works in the public sector. four 
private sector managers fall into this category. Thus. it can be seen 
that as age decreases the probability of the number of managers working 
in the private sector increases as opposed to those working in the other 
sector. Statistically. a significant relation exists between the age of 
managers and the type of sector. 
As pointed out previously. Clark's study of British managers 
indicates that the public sector manager is older than the private 
sector manager. It is interesting in this connection to note that the 
opposite exists in Iraq. The average age of the public sector manager 
is 41.9 years as against 50.8 yeurs in the private sector. Political 
instability. we believe. is largely responsible for this situation. As 
seen earlier. continuous political instability has become a feature of 
life in Iraq notably during the last few decades. In coming into power. 
the first action of these governments was to remove the previous 
government's appointees and replace them with their own. Senior managers 
6 
were not exempted from such a change. Statistically. there is a 
significant variance between the mean of each group of managers and its 
sector. (p ~O.OO). See the following two tables. 
TABLE 6.2 MEAN STANDARD DEVIATIONS AND VARIANCES OF MANAGERS~ AGES 
CLASSIFIED BY THEIR SECTORS 
Sector N Mean St. Dev. Variance 
Public 20 41.90 5.01 16.09 
Private 24 50.79 8.27 68.52 
Total 44 46.75 7.99 63.82 
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TABLE 6.2.A ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MANAGERS" AGES ACCORDING TO THEIR 
SECTORS 
Source of Variance Sum of Squares O.F. Mean Square F Sig 
Between Groups 862.49 1 862-49 19.25 0.0001 
Within Groups 1881.76 42 44.80 
2. Education: 
The increasing scale and complexity of business organisation. the 
proliferation of managerial techniques and the technical transformation 
of many branches of industry have caused more firms in the developed 
countries to regard education, particularly higher education. as a 
prerequisite for top-management positions. It is also acknowledged that 
without continuous education. a manager is more likely to be incapable of 
achieving sound equilibrium between the internal requirements of the 
organisation and the external demands. 
International comparisons of managers' education are notoriously 
difficult. because differing standards and traditions as well as periods. 
lie behind apparently comparable statistics. However. Table 6.3 showing 
data from three different developed countries. suggests that higher 
education, particularly in the United States and Japan. has become a 
prior criterion for top-management. 
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TABLE 6.3 COMPARISON OF EDUCATIONAL LEVEL OF MANAGERS IN THREE COUNTRIES 
UNITED KINGDOM, UNITED STATES AND JAPAN. 
Country/Researcher Size of % of Managers with Year of 
Sample higher education Study 
United Kin~dom 
C~ark1) 818 35.1 1966 
Woodman 2) 4525 28 1978 
United States 
Burck 3) 800 95 1976 
Japan 
Aonuma 4) 1500 90 1965 
Source: 1) D.G. ClarK, op.cit., p. 40 
2) M. Woodman, J., op.cit., Tables 49 and 50. 
3) C.G. Burck, op.cit., p. 174. 
4) Aonuma, Y. and Nichon no Keieiso, op.cit., p. 117. 
The same is also true in other developed countries. For example, 
in France. the percentage of executives with higher education is 91J 
in Belgium 85 and in Denmark 51. 7 Data of the managers sampled in this 
study reveal that the public sector managers have more formal education 
than the private sector managers. A comparison of the forty four 
managers classified by sectors is presented in Table 6.4 below. As 
can be seen. 95% of the public sector managers have university education 
compared to just 29% or 7 managers of the private sector. While there 
is no manager holding a primary school certificate in the public sector, 
46% or 11 out of 24 managers in the private sector have this degree or 
less. Ironically. four of the private sector managers are illiterate. 
The above results indicate that in the public sector. a person must have 
at least secondary school certificate in order to climb the managerial tree 
and become a senior manager. 
TABLE 6.4. COMPARISON OF MANAGERS' EDUCATION LEVELS CLASSIFIED BY 
SECTORS 
Level of Education 
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Sector Primary Less Secondary Total or University 
N 
Public -
Private 11 
Total 11 
x2 .. 19.91 
Cramer's V • 0.67 
% 
-
46 
2S 
2 O.F. 
or more 
N % N % 
1 5 19 9S 
6 25 7 29 
7 16 26 S9 
Sign = 0.0000 
Data also revealed that the managers' education level does not only 
N 
20 
24 
44 
significantly differ between sectors but also has significant association 
with his age. Table 6.S shows managers' educational level and their 
ages. It indicates that as manager's age decreases. his education level 
increases. For example. while 12 managers (aged between 31 and 40 years) 
have university education, only 4 managers (aged between 51 and 60 years) 
have this qualification but none amongst those aged 61 years or more. 
Indeed,as age increases. the level of education decreases. The principal 
reason for this situation is that the successive governments since 1958 
have paid special attention to education. 
TABLE 6.5 / 
% 
100 
100 
100 
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TABLE 6.5 MANAGERS' EDUCATION LEVELS ACCORDING TO THEIR AGES 
Education Level 
Age Group Total 
Primary or less Secondary University or more 
N % N % N % N % 
31-40 1 9.0 , 1 14.3 12 46.2 14 31.8 
41-50 5 45.5 3 42.9 10 38.5 18 40.9 
51-60 2 18.2 2 28.6 4 15.3 B 18.2 
61-70 3 27.3 1 14.2 - - 4 9.1 
Total 11 100.0 7 100.0 26 100.0 44 100.0 
Kendall TAU, C = 0.36 Sig. ,. 0.002 
Figures in Table 6.5 indicate that there are 26 managers (19 from 
the public sector) with university education. A detailed examination of 
their fields of study reveals that 11 managers have management and economic 
education (four of them working in the private sector), 5 have 
engineering education, 3 have legal education and 3 graduated from 
colleges of sciences, only 2 managers have arts education and the 
remainder hold university degrees in agriculture. Data also reveal 
that four out of the twenty six managers have master and doctorial degrees 
- one of them works in the private sector. 
As will be seen later, the educational level of the managers 
has a significant relationship with number of children. mobility, 
years of service, social class and size of company. 
3. Size of the family: 
In the preceding chapters we discovered that societal factors 
including education of the people, interrelationships that exist within 
family members, and the Islamic faith have a decisive impact on the working 
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structure of the Iraqi society. It must be appreciated at this stage 
that these factors still exert an important influence on the behaviour 
of men. In this respect. the family size of the managers might be 
regarded as a sound indicator of the impact of these factors. 
The managers were asked to number their children. Table 6.6 
shows the managers' children classified by sector. It indicates that 
75% of these managers have three children or more each. 
TABLE 6.6. MANAGERS' CHILDREN CLASSIFIED BY SECTORS~ 
Number of Children Public Manager Private Manager Total 
N % N % N % 
0 
- 2 6 30 5 21 11 25 
3 - 4 13 65 8 34 21 48 
5 - 6 1 5 3 12 4 9 
7 - a - - 3 12 3 7 
9 - 10 - - 5 21 5 11 
, -
Total 20 100 24 100 44 100 
~ N.S. Not all these families are completed. 
A detailed examination of this table reveals that a significant 
association exists between the number of children of managers and 
managers' sectors. Kendall's TAU.C a 0.386. sig = 0.009 B p (.0.01) • 
.... 
It also shows that public sector managers tend to have less children 
than those in the private sector. While 95% of the public managers 
have four or less children each, only 55% of the private managers fell 
into this category. The remainder in the private sector have between 
5 to 10 children each. Ironically. five out of the twenty four private 
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sector managers have ten children each but none amongst the public 
sector managers have more than six children. 
The evidence reveals that a significant relationship exists 
between numbers of children and age, education level, place of birth 
(to some extent) and the company size of these managers. While company 
size will be investigated later, the other features are our intention 
here. A comparison between number of children and manager's age is 
reflected in Table 6.7 below. 
TABLE 6.7 NUMBER OF CHILDREN CLASSIFIED BY THE AGE. OF THEIR FATHERS 
Number of Children 
Manager Age Total 
o - 2 3 - 4 5 - 6 7 - 10 N % 
N % N % N % N % 
31 - 40 4 36.4 9 43 - - 1 12.5 14 32 
41 - 50 4 36.4 9 43 2 50 3 ,37.5 18 41 
51 - 60 2 18.2 3 14 2 50 1 12.5 8 18 
61 - 70 1 9.0 - - - - 3 37.5 4 9 
Total 11 100 21 4 100 8 100 44 100 
The number of children has a positive relation with the age of the 
manager. The older managers have more children than the younger ones. 
As the age decreases, the number of children decreases as well (Kendall's 
TAU.B • 0.24) (Sig IE 0.036. P * 0.05). 
We believe that the level of education of the manager is largely 
accountable for such a situation. Table 6.8 showing the number of the 
children corresponding to the managers' education levels supports this 
image. Managers with primary school certificate (or less) or secondary 
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school degree have more children than managers with university education, 
(Kendall's TAU.C = 0.30 p < 0.01). 
TABLE 6.B MANAGERS' EDUCATION LEVEL AND NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
Manager's Education Level Total 
number of Primary less Secondary University children or N % N % N % N % 
0 - 2 4 36.4 3 42.9 14 53.8 21 47.7 
3 - 4 - - 3 42.9 12 46.2 15 34.1 
5 - 6 1 9.1 - - - - 1 2.3 
7 - 10 6 54.5 1 14.2 - - 7 15.9 
Total 11 100.0 7 100.0 26 100.0 44 100.0 
Despite the fact that managers who were born in rural areas (1.e. 
the village) have, to some extent. positive attitudes towards large 
families, the evidence suggests no significant variance exists between 
the mean of the children when classified by managers' place of birth. 
Consult Table 6.9 below. 
TABLE 6.9 CHILDREN CLASSIFIEO ACCORDING TO THEIR FATHERS' PLACE OF BIRTH 
Number of Children Rural Managers Urban Managers Total N % N % N % 
0 
-
2 5 10.8 6 30.0 11 25.0 
3 - 4 10 41.7 11 55.0 21 47.7 
5 - 6 3 12.5 1 S.O 4 9.1 
7 - 10 6 25.0 2 10.0 8 18.2 
Total 24 100.0 20 100.0 44 100.0 
Indeed this point augments our previous argument which indicates that 
the Iraqi manager, due to some societal factors outlined above, prefers 
many children irrespective of his place of birth. Consult the following 
two tables (6.10 and 6.10A). 
TABLE 6.10 MEAN. ST. OEV. AND VARIANCE OF THE CHILDREN CLASSIFIED 
BY THEIR FATHERS' PLACE OF BIRTH 
Place of Birth No. of Managers No. of Children Mean Std.Dev 
Rural 24 106 4.41 2.82 
Urban 20 68 3.40 2.16 
Total 44 174 ,3.95 2.57 
TABLE 6.10A ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MANAGERS' CHILDREN 
Source of Variance Sum of Sequares D.F. Mean Sequares F 
test 
Between Groups 11.28 1 11.28 1.74 
Within Groups 272.63 42 6.49 
Not significant at p < 0.01 
4. Social Origins 
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Var-
iance 
7.95 
4.67 
6.60 
Sig. 
0.195 
No official data of social classes exists in Iraq partly because 
the social communities (as we have seen earlier) are controlled by tribal 
and ethnic relationships and partly because the present government's 
ideology stands aeainst the idea of classifying people according to their 
wea1th. 9 However. in order to complete the comparison of the backgrounds 
of the managers, it is worth examining their social origins. 
Each manager was aSKed to mention the principal occupation of 
his father. These occupations were classified into the following three 
social classes: 
Lower class: includes unskilled and semi-skilled workers. 
Middle class: includes skilled manual and clerical occupations 
Upper class: includes professional occupation, senior officials 
in the government. 
The evidence indicates that the majority of, these managers belong 
to the lower class. Only four managers are from the middle class and 
the remainder (17 managers) are from the upper class. Although inter-
national comparison of managers' social classes is difficult because 
differing standards underline each study, studies in the United States 
and United Kingdom reveal that most managers studied are from upper and 
middle class backgrounds. For example, in the United States, according 
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to Fortune's study, 90.7% out of 800 managers are from these categOries. 10 
The same is true in the United Kingdom. Clark's study demonstrates 
that 85% of the managers' parents belong to Classes I, II and III. The 
remainder are from the lower class. 11 This suggests that there is still 
a hard core of determined and able individuals who can succeed regardless 
of the social structure around them. 
Turning to the Iraqi managers from the point of view of their 
social classes and sectors. no significant relation exists between the 
two dimensions. Nevertheless, investigation of the figures presented in 
Table 6.11 shows that most public managers (65%) are from middle and 
lower-class backgrounds. The same is equally true among the private 
sector managersJ 58% balong to the lower class. The Table also 
depicts that only 17 managers of the whole sample are from upper-class. 
In Iraq. while "money" is the key factor for a parson to become a 
manager in the private sector, even if he does not have formal education. 
the way to top-management positions in the public sector is open to 
men from different social classes once college education is obtained. 
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TABLE 6.11 MANAGERS' SOCIAL CLASSES, BY SECTORS 
Public Managers Private Managers 
Social Class Total 
N % N % N % 
Lower class 9 45 14 58 23 52 
Middle class 4 20 - - 4 9 
Upper class 7 35 10 42 17 39 
Total 20 100 24 100 44 100 
2 X • 5.29 2 df. Not significant at p ~ 0.05. 
Cramer's V • 0.34. 
The matter of the social status of managers raises two important 
questions - one, which class is the most dominant among the younger 
managers and the other whether there is a significant relation between 
the social class of managers and their education level. Top-management 
positions are filled by managers drawn from all social classes and 
age groups. Table 6.12 below shows that no significant relation exists 
between the managers' age and their social classes. This would appear to 
mean that whatever the age a person is, he can become a manuger provided 
he has the necessary qualifications. 
TABLE 6.12 SOCIAL CLASSES OF THE MANAGERS CLASSIFIED BY AGE 
Age Groups 
Lower 
N % N 
31 - 40 6 26 1 
41 - 50 8 35 3 
S1 - 60 6 26 -
61 - 70 3 13 -
Total 23 100 4 
Kendall's TAU. C =-0.20 
Social Class Total 
Middle Upper 
% N % N % 
25 7 41 14 32 
75 7 41 18 41 
- 2 12 8 18 
- 1 6 4 2 
100 17 100 44 100 
Not significant at p ~ 0.05 
~ 
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On the other hand, a significant relation has been discovered between 
the educational level of the manager and his social class. Table 6.13 
below demonstrates that 70% of the managers from the upper-class and 
all those belonging to the middle class have university education 
while only 44% of the managers in lower-class have such a qualification. 
TABLE 6.13 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SOCIAL CLASS ANO MANAGER'S EOUCATION 
Education level Social Class Total Lower Middle Upper 
N % N % N % N % 
Primary or less 9 39 - - 2 12 11 25 
Secondary 4 17 - - 3 18 7 16 
University 10 44 4 100 12 70 26 59 
Total 23 100 4 100 17 100 44 100 
Kendall, TAU,S = 0.286 Sig. at p ~ 0.05 
Indeed, whether in Iraq or elsewhere, the financial situation of 
a family plays a decisive role in children's education) the richer 
the family. the more it is financially able to spend on the children's 
education. Studies in the ather countries corroborate such findings. 
for example, in the United States, Newcomer's Study reveals that 60% 
of managers from lower-class background do not have university education) 
50% of middle class managers have college education; 74% of wealthy 
12 
managers have university education. In the United Kingdom. Clark's 
study leads to the same conclusion. Out of 119 top managers there 
were 53 managers from classes I and II of whom only one had a primary 
school certificate) the remainder either have secondary school (7 
managers) or gra~nar (25 managers) or private education (20 managers). 
Only 5 managers out of those from the lower classes have private 
13 
education. 
Evidence in Iraq also shows that no significant association exists 
between the social classes of managers and the number of children they 
have. According to Table 6.14, 59% (or 10) of upper class managers 
and 43% (or 10) of lower class managers have three or more children 
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each. Indeed, this point also strengthens our previous argument that Iraqi 
families, for reasons mentioned earlier, prefer many children or large 
families managers are no exception. 
TABLE 6.14: THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN MANAGERS' SOCIAL CLASSES AND THE 
NUMBER OF CHILDREN 
Number of children Social Class Total Lower Middle Upper 
N .. N .. N ~ N % 
0 
- 2 13 57 1 25 7 41 21 48 
3 - 4 5 22 3 75 7 41 15 34 
5 - 6 1 4 - - - - 1 2 
7 - 10 4 17 - - 3 18 7 16 
Total 23 100 4 100 17 100 44 100 
Kendall's TAU,C = 0.085 Not significant p ~ 0.05 
..j 2. a _-.;;.C_AR.....;E;;.;E.;..R_P.;...A_TT_E_R_N_S 
1. length of Service: 
In terms of the length of service, the managers taken in the 
sample show significant differences. While all the public sector 
managers have twenty years service or less. 58% of the private sector 
managers have between 21 and 55 years of service. 14 having 30 years 
or mora. Out of the 14 managers only five were born in towns and the 
remainder were born 1n villages. Needless to say, tha age of the 
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manager has a significant relation with the length of service14 • 
However, the over-all picture of the length of service of these managers 
is modified by many factors. such as the place of birth. educational 
level, the type of the sector and the size of the company of the 
manager. While the size of the company will be discussed later, the 
others are our intention now. 
Findings also indicate that the place of birth of these managers 
has a significant relation with the length of service. 75% of all 
the managers who have more than 30 years service were born in villages, 
the average years of service of rural managers is 29.5 years as 
against 23.1 years for those who were born in towns. 15 
The influence of the educational level is very much according 
to expectationJ the managers who have secondary school certificates 
or less have more than twenty years service. while 45% of all university-
15 graduated managers have less than this period. 
The type of sector in which a manager works is no exception. 
All the public sector managers have less than 31 years service. While 
42% of private sector managers fall into this category. the remainder 
17 have more than this period (between 31 to 55 years). 
2. Length of Service in the Current Companies: 
Data reveal that 75% of public sector managers have ten years 
or less in their current companies. Only four managers have between 
11 to 20 years and only one has 25 years experience in his current 
company. As for the private sector managers. 11 have ten years or lessJ 
12 have between 11 to 20 years, and only one manager has 28 years in his 
present company. Statistically. no significant relation exists 
between the length of the service in the current company and the type 
of the sector in which a manager works. See the following two tables 
(6.15 and 6.15A): 
TABLE 6.15 MEANS. ST.DEV. AND VARIANCES OF MANAGER'S YEARS OF SERVICE 
IN HIS CURRENT COMPANY. BY SECTOR 
Sector & No. of Total Years in Mean St. Dev. Variance 
Managers this Company 
Public (20) 26 1.30 0.75 0.32 
Private (24) 38 1.58 0.58 0.34 
Total (44) 64 1.45 0.59 0.35 
TABLE 6.15A ANALYSIS OF VARIANCE OF MANAGERS' YEARS OF SERVICE IN HIE 
CURRENT COMPANY 
Source of Variance Sum of O.F. Mean F Sig. 
Sequares Sequares 
Between groups 0.876 1 0.876 2.621 0.113* 
Within groups 14.033 42 0.334 
• not significant at p 0.01 
Analysis by age reveals that 57.1% of the managers aged (31 to 40) 
and 55.6% of the managers aged (41 to 50) and 75% of, ,all managers aged 
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51 and more. have been in their present companies for less than ten years. 
It 1s also true that the higher the educational level of a manager. the 
less the length of service in his current companYJ 63.6% of the 
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managers who have primary school certificates or less have more than 
ten years service; 57.1% of those with secondary education have ten 
years or less, while 69.2% of all university graduated managers have 
less than ten years service. 
3. Length of Time Se~ved in Cu~rent Post: 
The length of time these managers have served in their current 
posts vary between and within groups. In the public sector. 90% of 
managers have served 5 years or less while the remainder have served 
between 6 to 10 years. In the private sector, 50% of managers have 
served between 11 to 25 years; 21% between 6 to 10 years and the 
remainder either have 5 years or less in their current posts. A 
significant relation exists between the years of service of managers 
in their current posts and the type of sector in which they are employed. 
Private sector managers have more years of experience in their current 
18 posts when compared with those in the public sector. 
4. Inter-Firm Mobility: 
The previous analysis of the lengths of se~vice of these managers 
suggests that public sector managers are more mobile than private sector 
managers. Table 6.16 below confirms this finding: 75% of the private 
sector managers have spent their entire career either in one or two 
companies whereas 55% of the publiC sector managers have moved between 
three to six companies. 
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TABLE 6.16: MANAGERS' INTER-FIRM MOBILITY. BY SECTOR 
I No. of Firms Public Managers Private Managers Total N % N % N % 
1 - 2 9 45.0 18 75.0 27 61.4 
3 - 4 9 45.0 6 25.0 15 34.1 
5 - 5 2 2.0 - - 2 4.5 
Total 10 100.0 24 100.0 44 100.0 
Kendall's TAU.C = -32 p < 0.01 
Studies in other developed countries (except Japan) present the 
same conclusions. viz •• public managers are more mobile than their 
counterparts in the private sector. In the United States. Warner et al. 
indicate that 30% of all private sector munQEers studied have worked 
19 in four to seven companies compared to 56% in the public sector. 
Clark's study of British managers led to the same result) 43% of all 
private sector managers in the sample have been employed by their present 
companies for less than 15 years compared to just 24% of public sector 
20 
managers. 
The picture given in the previous table must be considered with 
the differing age structure and type of education of these managers. 
Ironically, no significant relation exists between the age of the managers 
or their educational levels and the number of mobilities. 93% of managers 
aged 31 to 40 years and 89% of managers aged 41 to 50. as well as all 
those aged 51 and more, have moved between one to three companies. 
Just nine out of the forty four managers have spent their entire career 
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in one company - all private sector managers and aged less than 51 
years. The evidence also reveals that the type of education of a 
manager does not influence his mobility in Iraq. All managers who have 
elementary school (or less) or secondary education have moved between 
one to three companies. while only 15% of all those who have university 
qualifications have changed their employers between four to six times 
- all from the public sector. 
It is common knowledge that-mobility inside the public sector is 
largely outwith the control of managers. In Iraq as in other developing 
countries. a public sector manager is like a soldier at the mercy of 
the government and does not know when he will be transferred or retired 
nor what his destination will be. 
Reasons behind manager mobility: 
The sudden expansion of industry in the public sector. coupled 
with the fact that the country suffers severely from the shortage of 
skilled management cadyb. are largely responsible for managers mobility 
in the public sector. Likewise. the problem of political instability must 
not be overlooked. 
As regards private sector. the author believes that the principal 
reason for manager mobility is imitation. Once a private enterprise 
succeeds in selling a certain product. many of the remaining enterprises 
try to imitate or copy its product. Some managers. due to their poor 
education and industrial experience. endeavour to change their companies 
or their products and start another new business or produce other 
articles similar to that of their successful competitors. On the other 
hand, the shortage of skilled workers. coupled with the fact that the 
majority of the private sector enterprises are small in terms of size 
and capital, are among the reasons that stimulate managers to change 
their companies. Yet the problems of importing raw ma terials 
represent another reason for manager mobility in the private sector. 
As we have seen earlier, family and relatives obligations are 
strong among the Iraqi communities. Many managers lOOK at this 
relationship as a pressure works against their success. The evidence 
suggests that some of the managers sampled in this study had asked 
their superiors to transfer them into another area (province) in 
order to avoid such a social pressure. 
3.0 MANAGERS' BACKGROUNDS AND CAREER PATTERNS IN THE 
LIGHT OF SIZE OF COMPANIES 
So far we have discussed the characteristics of the managers 
sampled regardless of the size of their companies. The aim of this 
section is to recompare these characteristics in the light ~f such a 
criterion. 
The forty four companies have been ordered into three groups 
according to the size of the workforce as follows: 
Small Companies: 
Medium Companies: 
Large Companies: 
100 workers or less 
101 to 500 workers, and 
501 workers and more. 
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The smallest company was 48 employees and the largest one in the sample 
was 5,005 employees. 
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The data confirms that the age of managers has a negative relation 
with the size of company. The older the manager is. the more likely 
he is to run a small or medium sized company; as the size increases. 
the number of young managers increases. Table 6.17 shows the age of 
managers according to the size of companies. It confirms such a 
direction. Just 11 out of 14 managers (aged 31 to 40) run large 
companies, the remainder either have medium or small companies. The 
same is also true when we reconsider the older managers (aged 51 years 
or more), eight managers have small companies; three have medium 
companies and only one has large company. 
TABLE 6.17: MANAGERS' AGES CLASSIFIEO BY THE SIZE OF COMPANIES 
Managers' Ages Size of Company Total Small Medium Large 
N % N % N % N % 
31 - 40 2 12 1 14 11 55 14 32 
41 - 50 7 41 3 43 8 40 16 41 
51 - 60 5 29 2 29 1 5 8 18 
61 - 70 3 16 1 14 - - 4 9 
Total 17 100 7 100 20 100 44 100 
Kendall's TAU C =-0.45 Significant at p <. 0.01 
The evidence also shows that the managers working in large companies 
have a higher level of education. less children and less years of 
service than those who are working inside medium or small companies. 
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The picture given in Table 6.18 shows the number of children of 
managers in the light of the size of the companies. It indicates that 
95% of all the managers working in the large companies have four children 
or less each_ while 57% of all the managers working in the medium 
companies and 53% of all those working in the small companies have the 
same qualifications. 
On the other hand, while 47% of all the managers working in the 
small companies and almost 43% of all those working in the medium 
companies have between 5 to 10 children each, only 5% (one manager) 
of those working in the large companies have more than four children. 
can safely 
Thus, in this respect one/conclude that as the size of the company 
increases, the number of manager's children is likely to decrease. 
TABLE 6.1S: MANAGERS' NUMBER OF CHILDREN, BY SIZE OF COMPANY 
Size of Company 
No. of children Total 
Small Medium Large 
N % N % N % N % 
0 - 2 3 18 2 28.5 6 30 11 25 
3 - 4 6 35 2 28.5 13 65 21 48 
5 - 6 2 12 1 14.3 1 5 4 9 
7 - 10 6 35 2 28.5 - - 8 18 
Total 17 100 7 100 20 100 44 '00 
Kendall's TAU, C =-0.31 p ~ 0.0001 
Type of education also significantly differs across the forty four 
companies. All managers with primary school education or less have small 
companies - except one who works in a medium company. Two out of seven 
managers with secondary education are working in medium and large 
companies. And just seven out of twenty six managers who have university 
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qualifications either have medium companies (5 managers) or small ones. 
Table 6.19 below reflects such a picture. 
TABLE 6.19: MANAGERS' EDUCATION. BY THE SIZE OF THE COMPANY 
Size of Company 
Managers' Small Medium Large Total 
education N % N % N % N % 
Primary or less 10 58.8 1 14.3 - - 11 25.0 
[Secondary 5 29.4 1 14.3 1 5.0 7 15.9 
IUniversity 2 11. B 5 71.4 19 95.0 26 59.1 
Total 17 100.0 7 100.0 20 100.0 44 100.0 
Kendall, TAU. B = 0.71 Significant at p <. 0.0001 
Our evidence also suggests that the relation between manager's 
years of service and the size of the company is great. As can be seen 
from Table 6.20. the managers who have small or medium companies have 
longer service than those in the larger companies. The main reason is 
their educational level. As we have seen in Table 6.19. 95% of all 
managers working in the large companies have university education 
compared with 71.4% in the medium size companies and 11.8% in the small 
companies. It is also true that all the large companies surveyed belong 
to the public sector and. generally speaking. one must have university 
education to become a managing director in the public sector. 
Tabla 6.20 / 
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TABLE 6.20: MANAGERS' YEARS OF SERVICE, BY SIZE OF THE COMPANY 
Managers' Years Size of the Company Total of Service Small Medium Large 
N % N % N % N % 
Less than 20 1 5.9 2 28.6 9 45.0 12 27.3 
21 - 30 3 17.6 4 57.1 11 55.0 18 40.9 
31 - 40 9 52.9 1 14.3 - - 10 22.7 
41 - 55 4 23.6 - - - - 4 9.1 
Total 17 100.0 7 100.0 20 100.0 44 100.0 
Kendall's TAU,C = -0.60 p <. 0.0001 
Background details of a more personal nature about the managers 
in the light of the size of the company also reveal major differences 
between these managers. The managers were reclassified according to 
this criterion and their mobility, social origins as well as place of 
birth. Table 6.21 showing managers mobility by the size of the company 
indicates that the manager in the large companies have more mobility, 
than those in the medium or small companies. Those who have changed 
their employers more than four times belong to large companies. 55% 
of all the managers working in the large companies have moved between 
3 to 6 employers compared with 28.6% of all the middle companies' 
managers, and 23.5% of all the small companies' managers have just 
moved between 3 to 4 employers. 
Table 6.21 / 
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TABLE 6.21: MANAGERS' MOBILITY, BY SIZE OF COMPANY 
Managers' Size of Company 
Total Mobili ty Small Medium Large 
N % N % N % N % 
1 - 2 13 76.5 5 71.4 5 45.0 27 61.4 
3 - 4 4 23.5 2 28.6 9 45.0 15 34.1 
5 - 6 - - - - 2 10.0 2 4.5 
Total 17 100.0 7 100.0 20 100.0 44 100.0 
Kendall's TAU, C = 0.30 p ~ 0.05 
On the other hund, no significant relation exists between managers' 
social backgrounds and the size of the companies. Table 6.22 showing 
a redistribution of the managers in light of their social origins and 
the size of the companies discloses that top management posts, irrespective 
of the size of the company, are filled by men drawn from different social 
backgrounds. It follows, therefore, that the top rank positions in the 
majority, if not all, of the industrial organisations in Iraq, are not 
restricted to a particular social class. 
TABLE 6.22: MANAGERS' SOCIAL CLASSES, BY SIZE OF COMPANIES 
Social background Size of Company Total 
Small Medium Large 
N % N % N % N % 
Lower 12 70.6 2 28.6 9 23 52.3 
Middle - - - - 4 9.1 4 9.1 
Upper 5 29.4 5 71.4 7 17 38.6 
Total 17 100.0 7 100.0 20 100.0 44 100.0 
Kendall's TAU,B ~ 0.13 Not significant at p < 0.01 or p < 0.05 
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What about the managers' place of birth and the size of the companies? 
Are the urban managers dominating in top management positions or their 
peers - and if so. where? 
The forty four managers were resorted according to their place of 
birth and the size of the companies. Table 6.23 represents a summary 
of such a classification. As can be seen from the table. no significant 
association exists between the two variables despite the fact that 55% 
of all the managers working in the large companies have been born in 
urban areas (i.e. the towns). the remainder from rural areas. Yet. 
the table also shows that the rural managers are the dominant ones 
in the small and middle size companies largely because. as we have seen 
earlier. they have lower levels of education than those working in the 
large companies: A level which does not entitle them to take the risks 
of the large scale companies. 
TABLE 6.23: MANAGERS' PLACE OF BIRTH. BY SIZE OF THE COMPANY 
Place of Birth 
Rural 
Urban 
Total 
x2 • 3.50 
Cramer's V • 0.28 
Small 
N 
9 
8 
17 
2.df 
Size of the Company 
Middle Laq~e 
% N % N % 
52.9 6 85.7 9 45.0 
47.1 1 14.3 11 55.0 
100.0 7 100.0 20 100.0 
Not significant 
Contingency coefficient = 0.27. 
Total 
N % 
24 54.5 
20 45.5 
44 100.0 
SUMMARY: 
The chapter has examined the background and career 'patterns of 
forty four senior managers. The managers were compared according to 
their age. education. number of children. place of birth and social 
origins. Comparisons also have been made between these managers in 
the light of their career patterns. including inter-firm mobility and 
length of service. In addition. the chapter has tried to compare 
these managers in the light of the size of their companies. 
Data indicated that the managers who are working in the private 
sector tend to be older. have more children, more years of service 
and less mobility than those working in the public sector. It is also 
indicated that the managers working in large companies are younger 
than those working in medium and small companies; they are more 
educated, more mobile and have less service years than those working 
in medium and small companies. 
As regards the social classes. it seems that though the majority 
belong to lower and middle social classes. there are some managers 
who belong to the upper-classes. That is, the way to top-management 
positions is open to men from different social strata rather than 
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being limited to certain social classes. However, data indicates that 
the size of family of these managers is not significantly associated 
with a certain social class. Rather, it is a matter of other social 
and personal factors including (managers) level of education. On the 
other hand, the social class does possess direct impact on managers 
educationJ 70% of the managers from the upper-class and all those drawn 
from the middle class have university education, while only 44% of all 
those from the lower-class have such a qualification. 
This result clarifies that whether in Iraq or in other 
countries, the financial situation of a family plays an important 
role in children's education. The richer the family, the more it 
1s financially able to spend on the children's education. 
As regards managers mobility, among the principal reasons 
that are responsible for the public sector's mobility, are the 
sudden expansion of industry; the shortage of skilled management 
cadre and the problem of political instability. As regards 
private sector managers' mobility, we blame the problems of 
imitation and illiteracy to be among the main factors that are 
responsible for their mobility. Once a private enterprise 
succeeds in selling a product, many other private enterprises 
change or modify their enterprises to produce products similar to 
that of the successful competitors. 
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INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER SEVEN 
HOW MANAGERS SPEND THEIR TIME 
AND WHAT ACTIVITIES DO THEY PERFORM 
'If we do not know what managers do, how can 
we claim to teach management to students in 
Business School? How can we expect manage-
ment development programs to improve the 
performance of practicing managers?" 
Henry Mintzberg 1 
Though the managerial literature is rich in general discussions 
of the manager's job in the organisation, unfortunately these 
writings rest upon a very meagre empirical research of systematically 
recorded data and they are heavily polemical in character. Such 
simple facts as how managers spend their time at work day and what 
activities they engage in, have only been touched on in a few 
studies. 2 
On the other hand, it is quite acceptable among management 
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scholars that managers need different skills, such as technical, human, 
3 
and conceptual to perform their work effectively. It is also agreed 
that while these skills are interrelated, the importance of each one 
is relative, viz. each skill seems to vary with the level of 
management responsibility. Nevertheless, one cannot refute the fact 
that in an industrial enterprise, at its lower levels, the major 
need is for technical and human skills. At the middle levels, 
management effectiveness depends largely on human and conceptual 
talents whereas at the top, conceptual skills, such as planning and 
organizing, become the most important for successful management. 
In 1977, Keith Davis presented this idea in terms of percentage as 
follows: 4 
FIGURE 7.1 RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF MANAGERIAL SKILLS 
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The figure indicates thut as the level of a manager goes up in 
an organisation hierarchy, his conceptual skill increases as well. 
In other words he pays more attention, more time, to such conceptual 
skills as planning and organizing than what he pays to technical 
Sk111s. 5 However, data in hand does reveal that reality does not 
always concur with theory. 
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The aim of this chapter is to cast light on managers' activities 
in Iraq and to explain how long do the managers studied spend on each 
one of these activities and why. 
Before presenting the results. it is important to explain how 
the author obtained the data. 
In this respect. seven activities were chosen to cover the bulk 
of the manager's work. 6 They are. paperwork. planning. organising. 
communications. research. personal activity and complex activity.7 
Each manager was asked to estimate how he divides his daily time 
between these activities. The definition of an activity was left 
to the discretion of the manager. When a manager failed to dis-
tinguish a certain episode from others. he was asked to put his 
estimate in "complex activity". Thus. the complex activity represents 
any combination of two or more activities. 8 
This method (i.e •• asking the manager to estimate the time 
he spends on his activities) is widely used. partly due to its 
simplicity and partly because it needs less time and effort in 
comparison with other methods such as to ask a manager to ~S8 a 
diary or to let others observe and record his activities. However. 
the method has one great disadvantage because managers, for different 
reasons, try either to overestimate or underestimate certain 
activities or functions. To avoid such a bias. the researcher used 
his own observation to supplement managers' estimates and asked the 
manager what he was doing on a particular activity. 
In order to make our findings more useful, the working day of 
the managers was divided into two periodsJ the morning period which 
ends at noon, and the evening period. 
1.0: MANAGERS' ACTIVITIES 
What activities do the forty four managers perform? Which 
activity is the dominant one and why do managers give little time 
to certain activities? Are there differences between public 
managers' activities and those exercised by private managers and 
if so. why? 
The aim of this section. and the next one. is to attempt to 
answer such questions. Figure 7.2 shows the average time alloca-
tions of managers for the seven activities in terms of percentages 
in a working day. According to this table. the main activities 
of the public sector managers are communications, paperwork. 
complex and personal activities, while the private managers' 
main activities are concentrated on communications. personal and 
complex activities. 
Activities such as planning. organising and research consume 
less time when compured with the time given to paperwork, communica-
tions, complex and personal activities. The figure also shows 
that managers spend most of their time in communications activities. 
While this result supports Mintzberg's and Stewart's studies (i.e., 
they both found that communications activity taKe up the bulk of 
9 
managers' job) , it does not mean that the manager (as can be seen 
from the table) has to devote little time to planning or organising 
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activities or to give importance to personal and paperwork activities. 
FIGURE 7.2 AVERAGE WORK TIME ALLOCATION OF MANAGERS 
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1.1 How Long Do They Work 
The average working hours for the forty four managers is 10~ 
hours a day. It is 10~ for the public sector manager. and 10 hours 
for the private sector manager. This includes time spent in personal 
activities and working at home. When we remember that the working 
days are six a week (Friday is a holiday) then the weekly average 
hours is 63 hours for the public sector managers and 60 hours for 
the private sector managers. Totally they are working 61~ hours a 
week which is longer in comparison with Stewart's study of 160 
British managers (43 to 44 hoursl. 11 
2.0 ': HOW LONG 00 THEY SPENO ON EACH ACTIVITY AND WHY? 
Having found out the main activities of the managers and how 
long do they work. on average. per day. it is now possible to discuss 
how long do they spend on each activity and why. 
2.1 Paperwork Activity 
Tha avidence indicates that whilst the public sector manager 
spends on paperwork activities about 16% of his daily time. on 
average, the private sector manager allocates about 5% of his daily 
time for this purpose. While the time-ranee of this activity in 
the public sector is between 60 and 180 minutes. it only takes 5 
to 70 minutes of private sector manager's time. 
On the ather hand. the public sector manager gives more time 
for paperwork activity in the evening period (almost one hour on 
average) than that in the morning (40 minutes). However. the same 
Is not true in the private sector because the manager gives more time 
for this activity in the morning than that in the evening. 
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Though all public sector managers studied exercise paperwork 
activity during both periods# six out of the twenty four private 
sector managers avoided doing so in the afternoon period partly 
because their companies are small (25 to 50 employees) and# partly 
because they mainly give oral instructions for most internal matters. 
One of the principal reasons that make the public sector 
managers devote more time to paperwork activity in comparison with 
the private sector's situation is that they are working in larger 
companies. As we have seen earlier in chapter six. all the public 
managers studied have large companies (501 - 5005 employees) whereas 
the private sector managers have either medium companies (101 - 500 
employees) or small companies (100 employees or less). The evidence 
indicates that 60% of the public sector managers take a lot of 
their paperwork to their home after working hours to finish it in d4B 
time. Yet some of them prefer to come early in the morning for the 
same purpose. an the other hand. all the private sector managers 
perform their paperwork activity inside the company and during working 
hours. 
This result must not surprise us. While the Iraqi public sector 
manager at work. he cannot control his own time. His daytime is 
for inter-personal work. interaction with other managers# clients. 
customers# meetings and such. Thus paperwork has to be taken home 
because only at home he can be protected from outside interruption 
and he controls the use of his own time. 
2.2 Planning Activity: 
It 15 a common fact that managers plan for four reasons: 12 
(a) planning leads to organisational success; 
(b) planning leads to feelings of success and satisfaction 
by employees; 
(c) planning helps a manager cope with change, and 
Cd) planning is necessary for effective performance. 
Planning is a mental managerial activity involving the 
arrangement of multiple linked decisions on ends and on means to 
13 
accomplish a long-range. or major objective. Furthermore. 
planning is the first function a manager has to exercise if he 
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wants to perform other functions. On the other hand. poor planning 
does not only produce poor results but it also threatens organisation 
survival and its growth regardless of how effectively the other 
management functions ara carried out. Accepting such a perspective 
indicates that managers. irrespective of their place (i.e., the 
country) or their sector, must focus on planning and give it due 
weight if they want to succeed and achieve considerable growth 
14 for their organisation. 
However. it seems that management in Iraq leaves much to be 
desired compared to this criterion (i.e •• of western management 
theory). 
Each manager in the sample was asked to estimate. on average, 
how long he spends on Planning activities during the morning and 
the evening periods per day. Table 7.1 summarises their answers. 
As can be seen from the table, the public sector manager gives 36 
minutes (or 7.3%) on average of his daily work for this activity, 
while the private sector manager devotes just 22 minutes (or 3.7%10f 
his daily work for this activity. 
TABLE 7.1 TIME SPENT ON PLANNING ACTIVITY BY MANAGERS PER 
WORKING DAY (in minutes) 
Sectors Morning Period Evening Period 
Public 
Weighted Average 27 25 
Range 15 - 60 15 - 60 15 
Private 
Weighted Average 14 16 
Range 5 - 30 5 - 30 15 
Total 
38 
- 60 
22 
- 45 
Time range also differs across sectors; it is between 15 to 60 
minutes among public sector managers and 5 to 45 minutes in the 
private sector. 
On the other hand, no large variances exist, between the 
average times across the two periods in each sector. As can be 
seen from the table, the difference is two minutes in each sector. 
However, the public sector manager devotes more time for planning 
activities in the morning (28 minutes) than that in the evening 
period (25 minutes). The opposite is true in the private sector 
where the manager devotes less time in the morning (14 minutes) 
than that in the evening (16 minutes). 
Evidence also reveals that six managers from the public 
sector avoid exercising planning activity in the morning period. 
Only fifteen managers from the private sector exercise this activity 
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in the morning period. On the other hand~ eleven managers (six 
of them from the public sector) avoid practising planning activities 
in the evening. Finally. the evidence also indicates that while 
all public sector managers sampled practise this activity in their 
working days. two managers from the private sector do not exercise 
it at all. 
Why this little time for planning activity? 
Having reached this stage. it is quite important to understand 
why managers devote little time to such a principal activity. 
Different factors are responsible for this situation. Chief among 
them are: 
First: As we have explained earlier in Chapter Four Iraq is 
a socialist country. The government actively and directly controls 
the economy through a predetermined comprehensive economic plan. 
Once the plan is approved. public sector managers are bound to attain 
its objectives. Failure to achieve such objectives by an organisation 
15 brings undesirable consequences to its managing director. It is 
quite common that central planning in most underdeveloped countries. 
including Iraq. is still immature and rational flexibility for 
economic plans is rare. On the other hand. the government. according 
to its comprehensive predetermined plans. determines the future of 
public sector's companies including their expansion or liquidation. 
It controls companies' production and protects their goods from 
foreign competitors. Thus. under such circumstances the role of a 
public sector manager is very restricted in exercising planning 
activities. Take for example. why must he invest a large proportion 
of his time on planning and engage himself in such problems as growth 
or expansion when he largely depends on government-financial 
assistance rather than on his internal resources? Why should he 
direct his effort to planning activity. when planning and its 
objectives are largely out of his hand? Again. why should he 
actively exercise such an important function while the government 
protects his company's products and local as well as foreign 
competitors are rare? 
Data also indicates that the private sector manager devotes 
less time to planning activity compared with that of the public 
sector manager. In addition. some of these private sector managers 
avoid doing such an activity in their working day. However. when 
we reconsider their level of education. we find most of them are 
16 
either illiterate or at the edge of illiteracy. 
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Second: in the preceding chapters we have discovered how the 
Iraqi personality looks at the future and how it deals with physical 
subjects. We have also discovered that political instability has 
been a feature of life during a very long period of time. These 
and other factors. such as the type of interrelationships that exist 
within family members. the type of interrelationships that exists 
between the government and the people. which is largely based on 
suspicion and distrust. must all be considered here for they play 
an important role in management behaviour and the attitude of 
managers toward planning. 
2.3 Organising Activity 
When a manager spends little time on such an essential activity 
as planning, it would be more likely he will allocate more time for 
other management activities. As a result of different reasons out-
lined earlier. managers in Iraq are less future-oriented than those 
working in a developed country. This fact becomes more obvious if 
we realise that they are allocated more time for organising activity 
than that of planning. Around 7% of their daily time is assigned 
to this purpose on average. Table 7.2 below shows that the public 
sector manager spends more time of his working day (46 minutes) on 
this activity than that given by the private sector manager (42 
minutes). mainly because the farmer has larger company than that of 
the private sector manager. 
While the public sector managers accord an identical time to 
organising activity (15 to 60 minutes) during the two periods. the 
private sector managers leave more time in the morning (5 to 60 
minutes) than that of the evening period (5 - 30 minutes) to carry 
out this activity. 
TABLE 7.2 TIME SPENT ON ORGANISING ACTIVITY BY MANAGERS PER WORKING 
DAY ( in minutes ) 
Sector Morning Period Evening Period Total 
Public 
Weighted Average 27 24 46 
Range 15 - 60 15 - 60 15 -
Private 
Weighted Average 26 21 43 
Range 5 - 60 5 - 30 15 -
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Indeed, such differences are also reflected in the average timesJ 
in the morning, the public sector manager grants 27 minutes compared 
with 25 minutes of the afternoon period, to organising activity. 
The private sector manager also does the same, but with slight 
difference in terms of a few minutes. 
Ironically, eight managers (four from the public sector) openly 
admitted they are giving no time for this activity during the afternoon 
period. Here, it is interesting to remember what George wrote about 
the importance of organising to a manager: 
"A manager •••• is a constant organiser. Organisation is 
involved in his every communication. Organisation is 
part of his every planJ and organisation is a vital part 17 
of any attempt on his part to check or control activities." 
2.4 Communication Activity 
In an organisation - which is a miniature society - communication 
• 
serves the same fundamental purposes as it does in the larger society. 
Without communication no organisation could long exist. Communication 
is not only essential for integrating management activities but it 
also integrates a given organisation with its external environment. 18 
It is through this mechanism a manager becomes aware of the need of 
his subordinates, customers, the availability of suppliers, the 
different regulations of governments and the concerns of a society. 
On the other hand, the importance of communication in organisation 
was pointed out by Barnard who said: 
" •••• in an exhaustive theory of organisation, communication 
would occupy a central place, because the structure, 
extensiveness, and scope of organisation are almost entirely 
detennined by communication techniques." 19 
In carrying out their planning. organizing. directing and control 
responsibilities, managers communicate. As a matter of fact, they 
often spend the majority of their time communicating. 20 In a study 
of 28 managers in a single company, Caroll found communication 
took up four-fifths of the manager's time. He also discovered 
that the average manager spends on average nearly 43% of his time 
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on conversing with others; 20% preparing and writing reports and 
memos and about 18% for reading and reviewing written corrrnunication •. 21 
Stewart brought into the light that managers spend on average two-
thirds of their time in communication. 22 While Mintzberg confirmed 
this fact,23 Hinrichs stressed that this is especially the case of 
24 
senior managers. 
Henry Mintzberg, whose work we discussed in chapter one, has 
25 described the manager's job in terms of three types of roles. 
Communication plays a vital role in each: 
Ca) In their "interpersonal roles" managers act as the figurehead 
and leader of their organisational unit, 1nteracting with 
subordinates, customers, suppliers, and with peers in the 
organisation. Mintzberg cites studies that indicate managers 
spend about 45% of their contact time with peers, about 45% with 
people outside their units. and only 10% with supervisors. 
(b) In their "informational roles" managers seek information from 
peers, subordinates. and other personal contacts about anything 
that may affect their job and responsibilities. They also 
disseminate interesting or important information in return. In 
addition, they provide suppliers, peers, and relevant groups 
outside the organisation with information about their unit as 
a whole. 
(el In their "decisional roles" managers implement new projects. 
handle disturbances. and allocate resources to their unit's 
members and departments. Some of the decisions that managers 
make will be reached in private. but they will be based on 
information that has been communicated to the managers. The 
managers. in turn, will have to communicate these decisions 
to others. 
As for the Iraqi managers. communication also possesses an 
exceptional importance. In Figure 7.2 we have seen that verbal 
interactions take up 42% of the public sector manager's time. and 
around 48% of the private sector manager's time. A detailed examina-
tion of managers' contacts are summarised in Figure 7.3. 
As can be seen. the public sector manager spends on average 
less time on face-to-face contacts with subordinates. customers 
and superiors when compared with the private sector manager. However. 
he spends more time on telephone contacts with subordinates and 
superiors, but less time with customers, than that of the private 
sector managers. 
In order to make these comparisons more meaningful. each 
manager was asked to estimate, on average. how long he spends on 
each type of these verbal communications during the morning and the 
evening periods. Figura 7.4 summarises their answers. 
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FIGURE 7 . 3: TIME SPENT IN ORAL COMMUNICATION BY MANAGERS WITH 
SUBORDINATES , CUSTOMERS , SUPERIORS . 
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2.4.1 Managers interactions with subordinates 
On average, face-to-face contacts with subordinates taKe up 
more of the manager's time than any other type of communication. 
The managers spend almost two hours a day on this activity with 
a range of time from one to four hours a day. Neither the average 
time nor the range is identical between these sectors. 
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While on average the public manager spends 113 minutes, ranging 
between 50 to 180 minutes a day, his counterpart's average time is 
slightly more than two hours with a fairly wide range of time of one 
to four hours. Variation also exists within the morning and the 
evening periods despite the fact that the forty four managers devote 
more time for this activity in the morning than in the evening. On 
average. the public sector manager spends about one hour in the 
morning and 50 minutes in the evening, whereas his counterpart gives 
70 minutes in the morning and 54 minutes in the evening to face-to-
face contacts with subordinates. 
On the other hand, telephoning subordinates consumes 30 minutes, 
on average, of the public manager's time and around 25 minutes of 
the private manager's time. Time-range between sectors differs as 
wellJ 15 to S5 minutes in the public sector and 1S to 40 minutes 
in the private sector. Though the public sector manager does allocate 
almost 15 minutes, on average, for telephoning in each period, the 
private manager spends more time in the morning (16 minutes) than 
in the evening period (12 minutes) on average for the same purpose. 
The aforesaid figures indicate that the public sector manager 
allocates less time for interviews with subordinates, but more 
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time on the telephone, in comparison with the manager in the private 
sector. The variation in the amount of time can be explained by 
two factors. The first is the size of company, while the second 
is the location of manager's office. The public sector managers have 
large companies (500 employees or more each)_ all of which have 
two factories or more located in different areas (or provinces) through-
out the country_ whereas the private sector managers have small or 
medium companies located within a small area. None of them run a 
factory in another province. Consequently subordinates of the 
public sector manager are employed over a larger area and the distance 
between the two requires telephone contacts rather than face-to-face 
interviews. On the other hand. the matter is quite different with 
the private sector manager. for he and his subordinates work in one 
place and face-to-face contacts are convenient. 
2.4.2 Manager's contacts with Superiors: 
Manager's contacts with those who control the policy of the 
company are vital. Through such. a manager receives. discusses 
new objectives and policies. Meanwhile. it is by this mechanism 
a manager gives information about the current situation of the 
organisation. Data reveals that such communications with superiors 
take around 53 minutes on average. of the public sector manager's 
time each day. of which 20 minutes are spent on the telephone. In 
the private sector, an average of 55 minutes of the manager's time 
to communicate with their superiors, of which only 15 minutes are 
spent on the telephone. The time range between the sectors also 
differs. 
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In the public sector it is between 10 to 60 minutes for inter-
views and 5 to 60 minutes for telephones, whereas in the private 
sector it is between 10 to 80 minutes for interviews and 5 to 15 
minutes for telephone contacts. While all the public sector managers 
contact their superiors,only ten out of all the private sector managers 
do the same. The remainder are factory-owners. How do the managers 
divide their time between the periods to achieve such activities? 
It seems that while public sector managers estimate an identical 
time between the periods. their counterparts spend mare time in the 
evening (28 minutes on average) for interviews with their superiors, 
than in the morning (22 minutes on average). 
Furthermore, while the public sector manager devotes 14 minutes, 
on average, to communicate with his superiors on the telephone (as 
against 13 minutes in the morning an average), his peer spends the 
same. time in each period (10 minutes on average). 
2.4.3 Manager's External Contacts: 
The importance of management's communications with customers, 
26 
suppliers and other groups in a society is unquestionable. In 
addition, an effective functioning of management activities is 
impassible without good reciprocal information between these partners. 
Managers must concentrate on such an important "linking-pin" if 
they are seeking survival and prosperity for their organisations. 
Indeed, it is only through such communications that a manager can mesh 
internal operations with external demands. With this idea in mind, 
it is quite surprising, therefore, to discover that in practice a 
managing dlcector avoids communication with the customers and 
suppliers. Unfortunately. the data in hand leads to this conclusion. 
Nine managers (two from private sector) deny practising such an 
activity. "It is the responsibility of our department is manager". 
one public sector m.:lnager said. or. "our customers seldom come and 
discuss", the two private sector managers assured-the researcher. 
As for those practising this activity, indeed, the private 
sector manager grants more time to contacting outside people through 
interviews (63 minutes on average) and telephones (23 minutes on 
average) than the public sector manager. The latter spends, on 
average, 51 minutes in such interviews with some 16 minutes, on 
average, for telephones. 
Positive attitude towards the importance of such communications 
is clearly recognised among the private sector managers in comparison 
with the other ones. The variation in time spent in contacting 
outsiders might strengthen this argument. Face-to-face contacts 
range from 15 to 90 minutes in the public sector and 15 to 120 minutes 
in the private sector. The same is equally true in respect of the 
telephone; 10 to 30 minutes in the public sector as against 10 to 
45 minutes in the private sector. 
How long do they spend on these contacts between the two periods? 
It seems that the manager, irrespective of his sector, spends more 
time on interviewing customers and suppliers in the morning than in 
the evening. While on average the public sector manager devotes 38 
minutes in the morning to meeting such people (as against 21 minutes in 
the evening), his counterpart gives an average of 43 minutes in the 
morning and an average of half an hour in the evening. Both spend 
more time on telephones in the evening then ~n the morning. While the 
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average sticks to 10 minutes in the morning and to 12 minutes in 
the evening in the public sector, in the private sector it is 12 
and 13 minutes respectively. 
2.5 Research Activity: 
Generally speaking, when little time is paid to planning and 
external communications (customers, suppliers and others) the gap 
between the organisation and its environment becomes larger. Today's 
world is full of continuous changes - rapid changes in technology, 
changes in the workforce, consumers and suppliers demands and changes 
in social values and society demands. Only through continuous 
systematic research can an organisation retain its dynamic equilibrium 
and keep up to date. In other words, a business organisation will 
continue in a healthy and lively existence only as long as its 
managers give due regard to research activity in their daily work. 
While such a fact has become quite obvious in the developed countries 
where managers consider themselves as managers of change rather than 
27 stagnant ones, it is common to find managers of developing countries 
giving little attention to this activity. This is borne out in this 
28 
study as well as in findings reported in literature on the subject. 
While all the public sector managers spend an average of 36 minutes 
(approx. 5.8% of their daily working hours), nine out of all the 
private sector manaEers exercise this activity and give it an average 
of 24 minutes (approx. 4.1% of their daily working hours). Further 
evidence reveals that most of the public sector managers who allocate 
30 minutes or more for planning and give 20 to 30 minutes to 
external contacts are more likely to get involved in research activity 
(spending between 15 to 30 minutes a day) than those who give little 
time for planning and external contacts. On the other hand. the 
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private sector managers, who negate exercising this activity are of 
low level education - the best one among them is of secondary school 
level. Considerable relation exists between the size of company and 
the time that the manager invests in this activity. While all the 
public sector managers work in large companies, the private sector 
managers are responsible for either medium or small companies. The 
smaller the size the lesser the time the manager devotes to research 
activity. The same is equally true with planning. However. this 
trend does not work with the time that a manager spends on external 
communications. Earlier. we discovered that the private managers 
spend more time in external contacts than the public sector manager. 
Three possible explanations might help in understanding this 
contradiction. First. while it is difficult to interview a public 
sector manager (due to some chronic problems including routine 
procedures), the private manager has a lot of time for interviewing 
outsiders. Seldom he refuses or lets others hinder such a policy. 
Secondly. while the public sector manager's work covers the whole 
country. the private sector manager works in a local area of a certain 
province and largely deals with relatives. Thirdly, it is necessary 
to remember that in the public sector organisations there are always 
specialists who work besides the manager and the outsiders can consult 
them. However. it is the private sector manager who grips everything 
and one has no choice but to interview him. 
Finally, evidence indicates that the public sector manager 
devotes more time in the morning to research activity (27 minutes on 
average) than in the evening (22 minutes). His peer, on the other 
hand. stands in the opposite side. More time in the evening (19 
minutes) as against (12 minutes) in the morning. Indeed the private 
manager uses most of his morning time in observing employees 
performance. 
2.6 Personal Activity: 
What time the manager devotes to his personal activity is 
indeed more than that devoted to planning. organising and research 
activities. It is believed that organisations could achieve more 
success if the managers devoted some of their personal time to 
management activities. Of course some of their personal affairs 
are unavoidable. However. it must be understood that the time 
required to manage an industrial organisation should not be taken 
lightly. 
The findings indicate that this activity takes up around 
94 minutes of the manager's daily time on average. While the 
government has restricted the public sector manager's personal 
affairs, the private sector manager has unlimited time for such 
activities. Data demonstrates that the public sector manager spends 
66 minutes on average to these activities (approx. 10.5% of his 
daily time) whereas his counterpart grants almost two hours or 
19.6% of his daily time to personal activities. Variation between 
the time range is obvious. For example. in the public sector. the 
time range is between 40 to 100 minutes whereas in the private sector 
it is between 60 to 240 minutes a day. 
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2.7 Complex Activity: 
In reality. management activities are not easy to classify 
according to theory. partly because they are strongly webbed with 
each other and partly because some day-to-day episodes are ambiguous 
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and controvertible. Yet. the thing that deserves keeping in mind 
is that when planning activity is unclear in a manager's mind. other 
managerial activities will be vague and pending between "black" and 
"white". It is believed that the more episodes a manager fails to 
diagnose. the more likely he is either suffering from inadequate 
managerial education or the current managerial circumstances are 
~yond his control. 
For all the reasons mentioned above. the "complex activity" was 
adopted. It is a combination of two or more activities used in this 
research when the manager was unable to diagnose a certain event. 
Data in hand reveals that these managers spend large proportions of 
their time in such an activity. Ironically. the time the manager 
devotes to this group of activities is more than that devoted to 
planning, or organising, or even to research activities. Yet. the 
public sector manager spends even more time on this activity than the 
7 d 6 i t t · 1 30 private sector manager. 8 an 9 m nu es respec ~ve y. While 
the former leaves more time in the evening for this activity (43 
minutes as against 3S minutes in the morning) the private sector 
manager does the same, but gives less time in each period; 36 minutes 
in the evening and 32 minutes in the morning. The time range also 
differs between the sectors. In the public sector it is between 45 
to 120 minutes as against 45 to 150 minutes in the other sector. 
Findings also indicate that the majority of the private sector managers 
have not only low educationaal level but have also no management 
education at all. 
Summary: 
The chapter has tried to uncover how the Iraqi managers spend 
their time and what activities do they exercise inside the organisa-
tion. To achieve that. seven activities were chosen to cover the 
bulk of the manager's work. They are, paperwork. planning. 
organising. communication. research. personal and complex activities. 
Each manager was asked to estimate how he divides his daily time 
between such activities. The definition of an activity was left 
to the manager himself. When a manager failed to distinguish a 
certain episode from others. he was asked to put it in "complex 
activity". 
Scholars of management and organisation theories agreed that. 
at the top of an organisation structure, conceptual skills such as 
planning and organising activities are the most important skills 
a manager has to perform. In other words, a senior manager must 
pay exceptional attention to the conceptual skills and devote more 
time to them compared to what he devotes to technical and human skills 
if he seeks growth and success for his organisation. 
The evidence of the Iraqi managers shows: 
1. The average working hours for the forty four managers is 
10! hours. It is 101 hours for the public sector manager and 
10 hours for the private sector manager. Total average hours 
per week is 63 hours for the public sector manager as against 
60 hours in the private sector. 
2. In the public sector. if we exclude communication activity. 
the paperwork activity takes up more of the manager's time 
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than any other type of activities. He spends on paperwork 
activity around 16% of his daily time. on average. while the 
private sector manager devotes about 5% of his time for this 
purpose. 
3. The evidence also shows that planning and organising activities 
take up less than what the managers devote to personal activity. 
The author believes that the industrial organisations in Iraq 
would achieve more success if the managers devote some of their 
personal time to the real management activities. The author 
also believes that central planning in the public sector, 
together with the negative attitude of the Iraqi personality 
are by and large responsible for this meagre time the managers 
give to planning activity. The type of interrelationships 
that exist between the government and the people. which is 
largely based on suspicion. must also be considered here. be-
cause it plays an important influence on management behaviour 
and the attitude of managers toward planning. 
4. As regards organising activity, the evidence shows that these 
managers devote more time for this activity compared to what 
they accord to planning activity. The public sector manager 
spends more time of his working day (46 minutes) on this 
activity than that given by his peer (42 minutes) mainly 
because the former has larger enterprise. 
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5. All managers studied confirm that communication activity 
takes the bulk of their daily time. While this confirmation 
gives support to Mintzberg and other scholars in the western 
countries. the type of communication must be regarded here. 
In this study. communication activities have been divided into 
three types: manager-subordinate communication; manager-
superiors communications and manager-customers communications. 
The evidence indicates that the first type "manager-subordinates 
communications" takes up more of the manager's time than any 
other type of communications. The public sector manager spends, 
on average, less time an face-to-face contacts with subordinates, 
customers and superiors when compared with the private sector 
manager. However, he spends more time on telephone contacts 
with subordinates and superiors, but less time with customers, 
than that of the private sector manager. The variation in the 
amount of time can be explained by two factors. The first 1s 
the size of the company while the second is the location of 
manager's office. While the public sector managers have large 
companies and all of which have two factories or more, the 
private sector managers have either medium or small companies. 
Consequently. subordinates of the public sector managers are 
working over a large area and the distance between them and 
their senior managers' office permits telephone contacts rather 
than face-to-face contacts. 
On the ather hand, the public sector manager devotes less 
time for superiors contacts in comparison with the situation 
of the private sector manager. 
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The importance of management's communications with the 
outsiders (customers, suppliers and so forth) in today's 
society is unquestionable. Unfortunately, our evidence 
shows that these managers devote very little time for such 
communications. Nine managers (two from private sector) 
deny practicing this vital activity. The private sector 
manager devotes more time to contacting outside people 
compared with the public sector manager's situation. 
6. As regards research activity, needless to remind. 
that when little time is devoted to planning and other 
principal activities including organising and external 
communications, the importance of research activity will 
be minimised and takes little attention from the manager. 
While the author believes that only through continuous 
systematic research can an organisation retain its dynamic 
equilibrium and keep up to date, fifteen managers in the 
sample (all from private sector) do not devote any time for 
research activity. Further evidence also reveals that most 
of the public sector managers who allocate 30 minutes or 
more for planning, and give 20 to 30 minutes to external 
communication, are more likely to get involved in research 
activity. 
7. As regards their personal activities, the evidence shows 
that the public sector manager devotes. on average, less 
time for this activity (66 minutes) when compared to that 
of the private sector manager (120 minutes). 
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8. The data also indicates that the time the managers devote 
to Hcomplex activity" is more than that devoted to planning. 
or organising. or even to research activity. Yet. the 
public sector manager allocates even more time on this 
activity. compared to the private sector manager. If we 
understand that this activity is a combination of two or 
more activities and the manager can use it only when he 
fails to diagnose a certain event. we can imagine how 
vague are the managerial activities in the minds of these 
managers. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
SOCIAL PRESSURES ON MANAGERS 
"The Arab executive lives in a society 
where family and friendship remain 
important and prevalent factors even 
in the functioning of formal instit-
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utions and groups" 
. 1 
Farid A. Muna (1980) 
INTRODUCTION 
As we have seen earlier. the Iraqi society consists of three 
communities (bedouin. village and city). They co-exist and interact 
with each other and share common social values and traditional 
customs. The three communities have a strong kinship structure as 
a base for their social organisation. Thus. the clan remains the 
basis of bedouin community. while the extended family in village and 
city communities plays the important role that the clan does play 
in the tribe. 2 
We have seen also that Iraq. as a developing country. suffers 
from four principal handicaps: (a) political instabilitYI (b) massive 
illiteracy among the people; (c) backward economy and (d) novelty 
3 
of industry. 
In view of these facts. the present chapter attempts to 
discover what are the principal social pressures (namely social 
constraints) these managers face in their daily work. 
To achieve this. the managers were asked to answer the following 
question: 
In your society. what are the major social 
interfere with your work as a manager such 
unable to exercise full control over them. 
us some examples? 
pressures that 
that you are 
Will you give 
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A large number of social pressures were mentioned by the forty four 
managers. However. only those mentioned by six or more managers 
are summarised in Table 8.1. Although closely interrelated, these 
pressures are divided into those that emerge from the wider society 
(socia-cultural) and those pressures or constraints from the managers' 
immediate business and social communities. 
TABLE 8.1: SOCIAL PRESSURES AS REPORTED BY THE IRAQI MANAGERS 
(N = 44). 
Type 
First: Socia-cultural pressures 
1 - Strong family and tribal relationships 
2 - Dislike of manual work 
3 - Low level of industrial consciousness 
and literacy 
4 - Low value of time 
5 - Inequality of sex 
Second: Business and social community 
1 - Patronage and nepotism 
2 - Shortage of skilled manpower 
3 - Low level of productivity 
4 - Private visits at the office 
5 - Marketing constraints 
p - Workers are of agricultural and rural origin 
Frequency 
28 
26 
25 
18 
17 
27 
23 
20 
18 
14 
6 
Percentage 
63 
59 
57 
41 
39 
61 
52 
45 
41 
32 
13 
1.0 SOCIO-CULTURAL PRESSURES 
1.1 Strong family and tribal relationships 
In a group-oriented society such as Iraq. individual behaviour 
is largely determined by family and tribal relationships. Though 
educated city-dwellers are. to some extent. free from such pressures. 
they remain significant in the lives of the majority of the peoPle. 4 
As we have seen earlier in Chapter three. Iraq is mainly a 
patriarchal society. arranged marriages are common and the extended 
family (with its concomitant responsibilities appertaining to the 
breadwinner) is the norm. It is no surprise. therefore. to find 
twenty eight managers (64% of those sampled) stating that family and 
tribal ties are the major constraint on their performance. Ten of 
these managers regard family and kinship as a principal obstacle 
to the efficient functioning of industry. Four managers. from the 
public sector. felt these pressures to be so intense that they 
obtained transfers to areas away from their original cities to free 
themselves from such restraints. 
As there are few divisions between family affairs and business 
affairs in Iraq. fourteen managers (32%) were of the opinion that 
the maximum "Business 15 Business" is not really applicable to 
Iraqi society. According to them. there are many links between 
family and business - most of them illegal. They are illegal because 
of inequality of sex. lack of industrial mentality and other social 
constraints including nepotism. 
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1.2 Dislike of manual work 
The problem of the negative attitude toward manual work is deeply 
rooted among the bedouin community. As we have seen earlier. from 
the bedouin's standpoint. any manner of living other than that of 
bearing arms is unworthy and shameful. It seems that this problem 
still occurs among the people. Twenty six managers (59%) mentioned 
that some of their workers still dislike mannual work and demand only 
clerical and administrative work. "The workers: one manager explained. 
"feel that clerical and administrative work is more respectful in 
this society than manual work." 
1.3 Low level of industrial consciousness and literacy 
Iraq. as seen earlier in chapter five. suffers from a high 
illiteracy rate in excess of 50%. However. according to twenty five 
managers (57%) people not only suffer from such an attitude. they 
have a low level of industrial consciousness as well. They lack 
, 
regard for physical objects including machines. products and materials. 
"They are". as three managers put it. "devaluing company assets. 
acting as if their company belongs to an enemy." Ten managers 
mentioned that people lack regard of industrial discipline in such 
things as aversion to systems and formal regulations. lack of organi-
satton mentality. and non-professional attitudes toward business and 
industrial management. 
In industrial societies. behaviour tends to be rigidly prescribed. 
either by written rules. or by unwritten social codes. The presence 
of these rules satisfied peoples emotional need for order and predict-
ability in society. Even if people break these rules by their own 
behaviour. they will feel that it is right that the rules exist. 
"Law and Order" are important simbols,within a school. a factory 
or in the society as a whole: 
5 in people. 
they satisfy deep emotional needs 
In the underdeveloped societies, including Iraq, there are 
also written and unwritten rules, but they are more considered as 
a matter of convenience and less sacrosanct. People are able to 
live comfortably in situations where there are no rules and where 
6 they are free to invent their own behaviour. 
1.4 Low value of time: 
In traditional societies, time is generally not a scarce 
resource. Life in such societies is relatively unhurried and time 
is conceived as circular (returning into itself) rather than linear. 
In fact, the same situation exists in Iraq.7 There is generally 
little weight given to the value of time. Penrose discussed the 
problem of time in Iraq and concluded: 
"This is characteristic of any bureaucracy which is nat under 
some sort of external pressure, and is notoriously common in 
states bureaucracies: it 1s especially damaging when extended 
to "business~ enterprise." 8 
Indeed. the problem is even mare acute because either managers or 
workers respect time. 9 . As we have seen earlier.in Chapter seven, the 
managers studied pay more time for their personal affairs compared to 
what they accord to management activities. including planning and 
organising. 
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Turning to the Iraqi workers and how these managers look at them 
from the time's point of view. we find that eighteen managers (41%) 
expressed displeasure regarding the negative attitude toward the 
value of time that exists among the workers as well as other people. 
Ten managers dogmatized that: 
"Workers do not work properly during the assigned working 
hours and this. in turn. compels close supervision to 
ensure that they are working properly" 
Another eight managers (all from the private sector) were irritated 
because their workers seldom work. According to these managers. 
the workers are: 
"either chatting on social matters or. some of them. leave 
their workplace to visit another friend in another depart-
ment for a chat or at least drink a cup of tea." 
As a matter of fact. the problem of time is quite common in most 
Arab countries. According to Muna's study. for example. one of the 
Arab executives gravest problems is the low placed value on time 
by many of his countrymen. Executives were deeply concerned and 
irritated by the lack of appreciation towards time shown by people 
10 
with whom they come into contact. Lack of punctuality in time 
schedules and appointments. procrastination and "tomorrow" attitUde, 
11 
are quite common among the people. 
Inequality of Sex 
Though the situation of woman has changed, if only slowly. 
by the introduction of modern education and a few progressive laws 
(particularly the last twenty years). the conception of their position 
in society still presents many handicaps in practical life, as it 
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still leaves them inferior and unequal in a male-dominated soclety.12 
In the previous chapters we observed that men. whether in the 
bedouin community or the Islamic culture are superior to women. For 
example, women. according to the bedouin and village norms. are 
prepared to hold house responsibility and stay at home away from the 
business area. As a matter of fact, such a discrimination between 
men and women is also obvious in industry to the degree that seventeen 
managers (39%) looked at this problem as an outstanding constraint on 
their behaviour. "We don't want women in management posts. their 
absence avoids us many problems". seven managers from the private 
sector confirmed. Another six managers considered social restrictions 
on women. especially their exclusion from the work arena. as a 
constraint on their organisational performance} they admitted that 
they are unable to let women work at night shifts partly because such 
a decision includes a moral problem. and partly because women's 
fathers. husbands and brothers. prevent them from working at night. 
A further four managers mentioned that their workers do stand against 
women participation in management work. putting various impediments 
before their progress in management hierarchy. They also blamed 
traditions for restricting·women's participation in industrial work. 
13 
namely. to work side by side with men on production lines •. 
. 2.q: BUSINESS AND SOCIAL COMMUNITY 
2.1 Patronage and nepotism 
In industrial societies. it is felt to be "right" that in 
business. all people should be treated alike: friendships and enmities 
should not affect business deals. Business considerations should have 
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precedence over personal friendships and preferences. In other 
words. business behaviour should be "universalist". Of course. 
this norm is often violated. but such violations are considered 
14 
obj ectionabl e. 
In underdeveloped societies. even in business. people think in 
terms of "we" (our family. friends. tribe) and "they" (the others). 
Relations. friends. tribesmen. get better deals than strangers and. 
15 
according to Hofstede. it is normal and "right". The sociological 
term for such a behaviour is "particularist". 16 
Clearly. in the world of business. a manager cannot function 
properly if he/she is expected to play the part of patron or "be 
nepotic". exercising favouritism to facilitate the advancement of 
others (relatives. friends and so forth) irrespective of their 
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qualifications or business requirements. In a developing country like 
Iraq. patronage as well as nepotism are a widespread phenomenon 
in most spheres of life. both public and private. It permeates all 
17 
sectors of the economy and social life. 
In fact. the problem of patronage and nepotism must be 
considered in the light of other social factors. We have seen. for 
example. in the previous chapters that Iraq has passed through a 
very dark period during the last four hundred years. We have also 
observed that during the last fifty' years or so. at least six 
principal features characterised the societYJ political instability. 
illiteracy. rural-urban migration. nomadism. family and tribal 
relationships. Each one of these features promotes and reinforces 
such behaviour. 
It is difficult for managers to resist placement and promotion 
claims particularly if the patron pressing these claims on behalf of 
parents, brothers or friends, holds a prominent position in government 
or industry. What irritates managers is that these patrons show 
little understanding of management's duty to ensure that only people 
18 capable of doing particular jobs are given these jobs. 
Similarly, while business contracts should be properly allocated 
according to sound business principles, instead, in Iraq, we find 
that these are largely done through the influences of patrons and 
relatives. 
While twenty seven managers (61%) confirmed that patronage and 
nepotism remain a major problem today, hampering their work, only 
eleven of them believe that it is less of a problem than five years 
ago. The other sixteen managers stated that in their opinion the level 
of this problem is either the same (20% of the sample) or greater 
than before (16%). 
TABLE 8.2: LEVEL OF PATRONAGE AND NEPOTISM DURING THE LAST FIVE 
YEARS AS REPORTED BY MANAGERS 
Level of Nepotism Frequency Percentage 
Less than five years ago 11 25 
Same as before 9 20 
More than before 7 16 
No answer 17 39 
Total 44 100 
In fact, the phenomenon appear~ to be so endemic to the extent that 
one could be justified in saying that it is the national way of life 
rather than a temporary aberration. 
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Having reached this stage. let us look at the main reasons 
of this phenomenon. 
Reasons of mediation: 
The forty four managers were asked to mention what are the 
main reasons responsible for practicing mediation and for nepotism 
in Iraq. Table 8.3 summarizes their answers. 
TABLE 8.3 REASONS OF MEDIATION AS REPORTED BY THE MANAGERS (N=44) 
Reason Frequency Percentage 
1. Family. kinship and friendship 
ties 34 77 
2. Illiteracy 22 50 
3. Shortage of products 17 37 
4. Mistrust between employers. 
workers and customers 10 23 
5. Others 8 18 
As can be seen from the Table. thirty four managers (77%) regard 
family ties. kinship and friendship relations as the principal factor 
for exercising mediation and nepotism. Twenty two managers (50%) 
looked at illiteracy as an important factor for practicing mediation. 
They felt that people who are educated and possess a knowledge of the 
working of society are less likely to be involved in such practices. 
Seventeen managers (37%) pointed to the shortages (resulting from 
. 
either inefficient or poor distribution) as having significance when 
there is a limited supply of goods allied to high levels of demand -
there is large scope for systematic nepotism. Also. ten managers (23%). 
are of the opinion that mutual distrust between government agencies. 
private enterprises and individual people is another important factor in 
this respect. 
Other reasons behind the spread of mediation were noted by 
eight managers (18%). These range from bureaucratic inefficiency 
and procrastination to lack of incentives (financial and promotional) 
as well as little encouragement of worker mobility. These managers 
also felt that comprehensive central planning increased their 
problems on the one hand. and also increased the problems of the 
public. particularly those seeking jobs in a certain government 
institution. As managers. they felt that central planning increased 
their problems by restricting freedom and flexibility in decision-
making while curtailing their ability to select suitable personnel 
for whichever position requires filling. 
2.2 Shortage of skilled manpower 
One of the most important resources available to any organisation. 
19 
many would say the most important. is its employees. However. it 
is the author's point of view that the quality of these employees 
must be considered so long as it plays an important part in any 
organisation's success. In Iraq. as we observed earlier. the scarcity 
20 
of skilled manpower is very acute. This could be endorsed by the 
fact that twenty three managers (52%) stressed that the lack of 
skilled workers is a major Obstacle to progress and development. of 
whom ten stressed thut they could not replace old machines with 
modern ones due to such problems. A further five managers said that 
while it is easy to bring in advanced machinery. it is difficult to 
find trained staff capable of running it properly. 
Furthermore. many of the public sector managers surveyed were 
irritated because recruitment procedures are outwith their hands and 
this has decreased managers' ability to choose the right person for 
the right job. Indeed. what is clear is that industrial development 
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cannot be achieved without an adequate number of properly skilled 
workers available at the right place and time. 21 
2.3 Low Level of productivity: 
"There should be no increase in wages if there is 
no increase in productivity. The quantity and 
quality of Iraqi productivity needed to be improved 
in industry. agriculture. and services." 
Saddam Hussein. 1976. 
The proceeding discussions lead to the inference that the Iraqi 
workers' productivity. whether in industry. agriculture or service 
sectors. is deplorably low. Despite the presence of such a fact 
under one's nose. unfortunately only twenty managers (45%) were 
able to confirm such a truth. As for the rest. (i.e. 24 managers) 
they refrained from any answer possibly because they felt that 
answering one way or the other would put them in trouble. More 
than ten managers were of the opinion that the productivity of the 
Iraqi worker does not exceed 30% of those who are working in 
developed countries. 
Here it is worth mentioning that the problem of productivity 
has been discussed on the national level in the autumn of 1976. 
Though the working paper of these discussions has showed 
different factors which adversely affected productivity. such as 
inflexibility of labour laws. lack of specialisation inside management 
machinery, and the "Umbrellas" of the state organisations which 
22 
were used to protect senior managers and union leaders. none had 
been given to such crucial factors as the pressure on managers 
exercised by ministers. heads of institutions and union leaders} 
214 
215 
the problem of agricultural background of the majority of the workers 
and its impact on productivity. So are the problems of inadequate 
23 or inefficient utilisation of labour "under utilisation of the workers; 
the problem of the Law No. 103 which was legislated in 1974. by which 
the government has oblig~d herself to find employment for each 
, 1 
graduate in government organisation. All those who have participated 
in the discussions and "seminars" had avoided discussing senior 
managers' qualifications and to what extent it fits management 
standards and their enterprises. 
According to the researchers view. to raise productivity. one 
must take into account the scarcity of "human capital". the quality 
of workers and managersJ the problems of bad planning in production 
and purchasing as well as storage systems; the problems of inadequate 
provision for training and human development; ineffective incentive 
systems and the problem of promotion which is largely based on 
seniority. or perhaps on favouritism; the differences between wages 
of private and public sectors; bad administrative control; badly 
designed administrative structure I the problems of patronage and 
nepotism as well as the problems of underemployment and upon-unemployment. 
Those and other economic and non-economic inputs into the social 
production function must be taken into account if strategies, to 
raise productivity are to succeed in Iraq., 
2.4 Private visits at the office 
Managers' time is high-priced and important for their decisions 
affect company survival. growth. as well as those who are connected 
with its implementation. As such. therefore. it seems profitable to 
schedule "capitalize" managers' time in such a way that very few 
friends or relatives are permitted to drop into their office during 
working hours for non-business chats over coffee. Though many 
would accept such a policy. (59%) of the managers sampled are of 
the opposite view. Only eighteen managers (41%) indicated that 
they were annoyed by their visitors. Six managers said: 
"It is easier to organise. or even to restrict. workers' 
visitings than to control that of outsiders. H 
In their opinion. restricting friends or relatives visits would 
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make them angry with you. In their eyes. you' "ai"e a discourteous and 
dishonoured person. The others, twelve managers, were irritated 
because their workers come from any level of the company without 
going through hierarchy. 
On the other hand, most of those who prefer an unconditioned 
open-door policy, believe that 
such a policy lets them know what is going around, and it minimizes 
the gulf between them and their subordinates. 
What has been said above indicates that the problem of visiting 
does not only concern workers within an establishmentJ it extends 
to outsiders as well. 
At this point, it seems reasonable to . ask the following question: 
Why do such visitings take place? To answer this, we need to remember 
the strength of the relationships between an organisation and its 
external environment. Indeed, the external environment has a major 
impact on what the organisation does and the way it goes about 
24 
achieving its major objective. As regards visiting habits. in 
fact. this social phenomenon is fairly common in Iraq and other Arab 
countries. In the previous chapters we have discovered that each 
sheikh. each family has a "Majlis" (assembly or guest room or simply 
visiting room) where the visitor can either pay his respects. or request 
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a favour. or submit a grievance. 25 As an Arab. you have to respect 
your visitors irrespective of their visiting times. Indeed. social 
pressure on this matter is profound. On the other hand, the people 
of Iraq are still living in a pre-industrial era. Not very far back. 
only three decades ago, all the Iraqi cities were suffering from 
backwardness and dramatic political instability. It is true that 
Iraq has made considerable economic and social progress within the 
last thirty years; however. it is believed that the country needs 
massive efforts and time to change and modify people's behaviour 
to grasp the new concepts that entailed industrialization. At this 
point. it will. perhaps, be helpful if we remember that in 1977. 
around 70% of all the houses in Iraq were built either in mud (hut) 
or sari fa. 26 Many of which were nothing but tents. Thus. one could 
be justified in saying that the majority of the people are still living 
in an atmosphere characterized by tribal relations and other traditional 
customs and values. 
Thus far we are examining tribal and family life in terms of 
social visitings and social relations. We need to consider further 
why such behaviour exists inside institutions. To understand this 
situation. let us recall what Leavitt. Dill and Eyring have said 
in 1973: 
"You cannot hire a piece of man. You cannot hire just 
the machinist's skill. You must hire the whole machinist. 
with all the accessories attached - his ethnic background, 
his education. his political activitism and all the rest 
of him. You cannot hire a hand." 27 
Another scholar. 80as, sheds some light on this situation as follows: 
"From our earliest days we imitate the behaviour of 
our environment and our behaviour in later years 
is determined by what we learn as infants and children. 
The response to any stimulus depends upon these early 
days." 26 
2.5 Marketing constraints 
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Fourteen managers (32%) singled out different marketing problems 
including the shortage of raw material and the absence of efficient 
distribution systems as major constraints on their business. So too. 
they protested despairingly. that some societal values and norms 
still restrict certain types of advertising and marketing. For 
example, six managers indicated that they cannot advertise their 
wares (cosmetics, garments, spirits, etc.) neither on television or 
radio, mainly because the society is conservative. Three managers 
said: 
"In Iraq, we cannot apply the same marketing and 
advertising methods which are now fairly common in 
the West. Take for example. door-to-door selling, 
selling through magazines or catalogues, mail adver-
tising. They are completely absent in Iraq. In 
fact we need many years to use them successfully." 
Another manager mentioned that the use of modern marketing and 
advertising methods is fruitless mainly because the current supply 
of any industrial product is less than the actual local demand. 
Indeed, businessmen in Iraq are not yet used to the idea of 
the mass consumer market that is slowly but surely developing. They 
want to get the sale over and done with as quickly as possible, 
and in only very few cases or places is the customer allowed to 
return or exchange an item that he has purchased. In many enter-
prises and shops, signs are displayed cautioning customers that 
once the goods leave the premises. the sale is final and no exchange 
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is allowed. Until quite recently, and even now in most cases. 
very few enterprises extend credit to their customers. or allow 
them to buy on an instalment plan. Many of the private managers 
covered by this study have signs placed in their office. stating 
that this enterprise does not allow any business on credit. The 
sign may run something like this: 
"Please forgive us •••• please do not blame us, but 
we cannot extend credit." 
The private managers still depend on their personal acquaintances 
and knowledge in advertising their business. Even in the medium of 
public enterprises. the personal touch is still maintained. and 
indeed expected. 
1.6 Workers are of agricultural and rural origin 
At this point, the reader is quite aware that the people of 
Iraq practiced agricultural activities since the dawn of history. 
Until today. the majority are involved in such matters. Indeed. 
agricultural activities in pre-developed countries are still a 
process which only partially are controllable. Namely it still 
controls by the whims of nature and people are still far away from 
applying systematic and scientific methods. For example, in Iraq. 
not very long ago. the peasants were raising their hands into the 
sky - the home of God - and asking God to give them rain. Such a 
faith. and many others, in an invisible supernatural power has led 
them to be more dependent rather than independent on themselvesJ 
their innovations. initiatives, and ability are nothing but inferior 
and unpretentious. On the other hand, if we remember that within the 
last three decades there were many immigration waves from villages 
into the main cities. it becomes obvious that the majority of the 
workers have agricultural backgrounds. Six managers were of the 
opinion that the agricultural background of the workers represented 
another set of pressures. Firstly, because those workers were more 
illiterate than those born in towns and consequently they have little 
ambition to change or adapt their agricultural behaviour to match 
industrial requirements. Secondly. they lack initiative power whether 
in terms of systematic thinking or of applying new work methods. 
SUMMARY: 
The chapter has attempted to uncover and discuss the principal 
social pressures or constraints that interfere with managers' work 
and to what extent the managers studied are able to exercise full 
control over such constraints. 
Two groups of social pressures were presented by the managers. 
The first group was "socia-cultural pressures" while the second group 
of pressures was "business and social community". 
The first group indicated that managers cannot work in a 
completely inconstrained way. Moreover, they are not able to exercise 
the same degree of freedom over their own organisation of work as 
their Western counterparts. They have to pay special attention to 
their families, relatives and friends. mainly because the society is 
a group-society and largely based on the theory of blood relationship. 
Because Iraq is a developing country. and because the people still 
admire the bedouin and village values and customs. these managers 
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face different sorts of social pressures. Chief among them are a 
dislike of manual work: low level of industrial mentality and 
literacy; low value of time and sex discrimination. 
Under the second group of pressures. "Business and social 
community" we discovered that the managers were irritated because 
of patronage and nepotism among the people who deal with them: un-
skilled workers; low level of productivity: unscheduled private 
visits to their office during the working hours; marketing constraints. 
Some of their workers are of rural origin and this reinforces 
the web of social constraint surrounding the managers' job. 
What is obvious from the chapter is that the Iraqi managers. 
like other Arab managers, are under strong social pressures. 
Pressures from their families. relatives and friends. Pressures 
from their workers and finally. pressures from the wider society 
as a whole. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE MANAGER'S DECISION-MAKING STYLES 
INTRODUCTION: 
The last two chapters concluded with the findings that while 
the Iraqi managers devote little time to management activities. 
compared with what they accord to paperwork and personal activities. 
they are under strong social pressures: pressures from their 
families. relatives and friends; pressures from their workers and 
from the wider society as a whole. 
The intention in this chapter is to explore how these managers 
employ power in decision-making and to what extent they permit 
their subordinates in such a process. The term "power" in 
this chapter means the manager's ability to exert influence over 
1 the act of his subordinates. 
1.0 DECISION-MAKING STYLES 
Much of human behaviour is a reflection of the decisions people 
make. and the process that regulates and controls these choices or 
decisions are central to any scientific discipline that purports to 
understand and predict human behaviour. 
Many theorists. including Simon, Cyert and March believe that, 
since managing is characterised by decision making. the central focus 
of management theory can be decision making and the rest of management 
2 thought can be built around it. Yet. according to Vroom and Yetton, 
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understanding the process of the decision making is critical, not 
only for the explanation of individual behaviour, but also for the 
behaviour of complex organisations. 3 
During the last thirty years an immense literature on leader-
ship and/or management styles has developed. Most of this literature, 
as we observed in chapter one, has discussed the decision-making 
process. One facet of this highly complex phenomenon is the manager~s 
choice of how much he involves subordinates in the decision-making 
4 process. 
In chapter one of this study we have also observed that one of the 
most important features of the cultural school of management is that 
management style in the developing countries is authoritarian-
paternalistic and that this style is the result of their socio-
cultural environment. It is among the aims of this chapter to dis-
cover the validity of such a thesis in Iraq. 
We are also interested in providing support to scholars of 
organisational behaviour who emphasise that there is no one best 
management style and leadership is a contingent variable - depending 
5 
on the situation in which a manager works. 
We are also interested in examining Muna's results which confirms 
that the Arab executive uses consultation in his decision making more 
than any other style. 
The conceptual framework and the methods used in this study of 
decision making styles have been gathered from seven taxonomies 
published during the last forty years. Table 9.1 summarises these 
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resources and from which the reader can Observe that the last three 
studies (Heller. 1971: Vroom and Yetton. 1973: Muna. 1980) had a 
substantial impact on the current study. 
The various decision making styles used by a manager have been 
defined and ordered by a four point equal interval scale reflecting 
the various degrees of power-sharing between the manager and his 
subordinate(s). Figure 9.1 demonstrates this continuum. 
FIGURE 9.1: THE POWER SHARING CONTINUUM 
Style 
(1) 
Style 
(2) 
Style 
(3) 
Style 
(4) 
own 
decision 
consultation jOint decision delegatioJ 
Participation 
+ 
) 
Subordinate~ influence on decision-making 
The current continuum is almost sim~lar to the continua used in 
Heller's and Muna's studies with one main difference: we enlarged 
Style 3 (Joint decision making) to include the idea that when a manager 
makes joint decisions with subordinate(s) he may consult his superiors, 
6 partners or outsiders. 
The only difference between Heller's and Muna's continua is that. 
Muna regards Heller's Style 2 (own decision with explanation) as an 
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TABLE 9.1 COMPARISON BETWEEN DECISION STYLES EMPLOYED IN THIS RESEARCH AND THOSE OF PREVIOUS INVESTIGATORS (ADAPTED 
FROM VROOM AND YETTON, 1973 AND MUNA. 1980) 
Lewin, Maler Tannenbaum and Schmidt Likert Heller Vroom & Yetton Muna Sul1eman 
Lippit (1955) (1958 ) (196]) (1971) (1973 ) (1980 (present study) 
& 
White 
( 1939) 
I\uto- Auto- Manager Manager Manager Explo- Bene- Own Own Manager Manager Manager Manager makes 
:::ratic cratic makes sells present~ tive va lmt deci- deci- makes makes makes decision with-
L eader- Manage decision de- ideas & autho- autho- sian sian decision decision decision out consulting 
ship ment and cision invites rita- itat- with with himself obtaining without subordinate(s) 
announ- quest- tive ive det- deta- (A1) necessary consult- but may consult 
ces it ions systems (systems ailed iled information ing sub- superior. 
1 ) 2) expl- expl- from sub- ordinates partners or 
ana- ana- ordinate but may outsiders 
tion tion (A 11 ) consult (Style 1) 
Style1 9;yle 2 superior. 
partners 
or out-
siders 
(Style 1) 
Consul- Manager Manager pre- Consultat- Prior con- Manager Manager Prior con- Prior consulta-
tative presents sents problem. ive sultation shares shares suI tation tion with sub-
Manage- tentative gets suggest- (System 3) with sub- problem problem with sub- ordinates 
ment decisions ions. makes ordinates with s.1:l- with ordinates Style 2) 
subj ect 10 decisions (Style 3) ordinate. group. (Style 2) 
changes makes aNn makes o,.m 
decision decision 
(Cn (C11) 
Demo- Group Manager Manager perm- Participa- Joint deci- Manager & Manager Joint dec- Joint decision-ratic dis- defines its group to tive sian making subordina (acting like ision- making with sub-leader- cuss- limi ts. asks make decision group with sub- te toge- chairman) & making witt ordinate(s). Man-ship ion group to within pre- (System 4) ordinates ther arr- group dis- subordinatE ager may consult 
make deci- scribed limits (Style 4) ive at cuss, eval- (Style 3) superior. partner sion ! mutually uate & make or outsider 
c 
agreeable a group (Style 3) 
decision Idecision 
(G1) (G11) 
Laissez Delegation ot Delegation of decis- Delegation Delegation oT dec 
faire decisions to ions to subordinate of decis- isions to sub-
:"fi9der- subordinates (0) ion iO sub o)dinate (Style 4 l.p I( Style 5) ord. Style 4 s 
N 
N 
co 
) 
I 
elaboration on Style 1 (own decision without explanation). Indeed 
we share Muna's view which says: 
"To explain or to 'sell' the decision to subordinates 
is not likely to change either the power wielded by 
the executive or the influence exerted by his sub-
ordinates on the outcome of a decision he had already 
made." 7 
The other thing which forced the present researcher to avoid Heller's 
classification of Style 1 and Style 2 is that the majority of the 
managers interviewed were unable to distinguish between these two 
styles. 
On the other hand. the current study shares Heller's and other 
scholars' inclusion of delegation as an extension to the conventional 
decision-making styles. It highlights an essential managerial 
responsibility with potentially great benefits to the manager. the 
subordinate. and the organisation as a whole. 8 When used properly. 
delegation has several important advantages. The first and most 
obvious is that the more tasks managers are able to delegate. the more 
opportunity they have to seek and accept increased responsibilities 
from higher level managers. Thus. as managers we will try to delegate 
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not only routine matters but also tasks requiring thought and initiative. 
so that we can be free to function with maximum effectiveness for our 
organisations. 
Another advantage of delegation is that it frequently leads to 
better decisions. since subordinates closest to the "firing line" are 
likely to have a clearerview of the facts. 9 In addition. effective 
delegation speeds up decision making. Valuable time is lost when 
subordinates must check with their superiors (who then may have to check 
with their superiors) before making a decision. This delay is eliminated 
when subordinates are authorised to make the necessary decision on the 
spot. Finally, delegation causes subordinates to accept responsibility 
and exercise judgement. This not only helps train subordinates -
an important advantage of delegation - but also improves their self-
confidence and willingness to take initiative. 10 
2.0. A DECISION-MAKING PROFILE OF THE IRAQI MANAGERS 
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A semi-structured interview method was used to obtain information 
about the managers styles in decision making. Each manager was presented 
with a description of four alternative decision styles as follows: 
(A) You make the decision, no previous consultation with your 
subordinate(s). You may tell your subordinate(s) what the 
problem is in getting the information from 'him/them but his/ 
their role is to provide you the necessary information rath~r 
than generating or evaluating alternutive solution. Sometimes 
you may discuss the problem with your superiors, partners or 
with outsiders. 
(8) You share the problem with your subordinate(s), getting his/ 
their ideas and suggestions, then you make your decision which 
mayor may not reflect his/their influence. 
(e) You share the problem with your subordinate(s), and together 
you analyse the problem and arrive at a mutually agreeable 
solution. You may consult and discuss the problem with your 
superiors, partners or with outsiders. 
(D) You delegate the problem to your subordinate. providing him 
with any relevant information that you possess. but giving 
him responsibility for solving the problem by himself. You 
mayor may not ask him to report his discussion to you. 
You seldom veto his decision. 
Each manager. then. was given ten'decisions and requested to 
specify which of the alternatives he would normally use. The ten 
decisions were as follows: 
1 - The decision to increase the salary of one of your direct 
subordinates. 
2 - The decision to increase the number of the workforce in a 
certain department. 
3 - The decision to hire one of several applicants to work in 
your subordinates' departments. 
4 - The decision to promote or to increase the salary of one of 
your subordinate's workers. 
5 - The decision to terminate one of your subordinate's'workers. 
6 - The decision to introduce a new product(s). 
7 - The decision to enter a new market. 
8 - The decision to expand the total current production capacity 
of your company. 
9 - The decision to change or modify the formal organisation 
chart of the company. 
10 - The decision to change responsibilities and authorities of 
the head of a certain department. 
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To avoid response bias. two methods were used. The first was to 
ask each manager to give some documents which supported his argument in 
a certain alternative while the second was to ask his direct subordinate(s) 
about the same decision. For example. when a manager says: I normally 
use the second alternative when I take the decision to introduce a new 
product or to enter a new market. the researcher. after the meeting. 
usually makes another interview with manager's direct subordinate(s) 
to see to what extent the manager was true. 
Coding procedures were taken after long discussions and usually 
when the researcher left the company. 
Two methods were used to analyse the data. The first was to use 
frequency distribution of responses to each of the ten decisions in the 
light of these four alternative decision-making styles. The second 
method used the concept of the power-sharing continuum. Let us examine 
each one. 
1 - The frequency distribution: 
The frequency distribution helps us examine today's argument 
which confirms that different managers use different decision-making 
styles for one common problem and that managers rarely employ one 
11 decision-making style across different types of problems. 
Table 9.2 shows the results of the frequency distribution of 
responses to each of the ten decisions classified according to the 
four alternatives of decision making. 
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TABLE 9.2: DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION STYLES FOR EACH DECISION BY MANAGERS (N = 44) (EXPRESSED AS %) 
DECISIONS STYLES 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4) 
Own Decision Consultation Joint Dec- Delegation 
icion 
I 1. To increase the salary of one of your 
direct subordinates 86 7 7 -
2. To increase the number of the workforce 
in a certain department 52 25 23 -
3. To hire one of several applicants to work 
in your subordinates' departments 43 34 16 7 
4. To promote or to increase the salary of 
one·of your subordinate's workers 34 41 20 5 
5. To terminate one of your subordinate's 
workers 68 27 5 -
6. To introduce a new product(s) 25 11 63 -
7. To enter a new market 30 16 54 -
8. To expand the total production capacity 
of the company 27 14 59 -
9. To change/modify the formal organisation 
chart of the company 41 18 41 -
~O. To change the responsibilities and 
authorities of the head of a certain 
department. 68 23 9 -
ALL DECISIONS 47 22 30 1 
- --------- - - ------- --- --- --- ~- ~ ---- ~--
TOTAL 
100 
100 
i 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
As can be seen from the Table. the manugers studied have 
employed different styles for each one of the ten problems or 
decisions and no one has one specific style across different 
types of decisions. 
Oddly enough. almost all the managers avoid employing 
Style 4 (delegation). The same is equally true. that Style 1 
(own decision) is predominantly preferred by the managers for 
this specific set of decisions. 
Though the results give support to the cultural school of 
management in that the authoritutive management style is fairly 
common in the developing countries. the author suspects the 
argument of Haribson and Myers which we discussed in Chapter One. 
According to these theorists. authoritative or participative 
management style depends on the level of industrialisation of a 
12 given country. Level of technology alone. in my opinion. is 
not a decisive factor in changing management decision-making 
philosophy. The social community. family structure. the relation-
ships that exist within a family as well as the different social 
pressures that surround managers must all be considered when we 
talk about management style in a given country. 
It is also possible that a different set of problems (decisio~) 
lead to different styles. Nevertheless, when we reconsider the type 
of relationship that exists between fathers and sons on one hand 
and the different social pressures or constraints that surround the 
Iraqi managers on the other. we can conclude that the authoritative 
deciSion-making style will continue to be the salient feature 
irrespective of what the type of the problems or level of technology 
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are. Levinson endorses such a view and mentions: 
"Management practices vary according to the more 
obvious aspects of the family structure in a par-
ticular culture or sub-culture •••• Each person 
has a posture toward authority. derived from 
relationships with the only figures known as a 
child - parents and surrogates." 13 
The current results. differ from what Muna has found in six 
Arab countries in 1980. 14 Figure 9.2 represents a comparison 
between Muna's study of S2 Arab managers and the present study. 
It shows that Muna's style 2 (consultation) is the dominant one 
while in this study. it is style 1 (own decision). Though the 
comparison is difficult. largely because Iraq was not included in 
Muna's study. the number of non-industrial managers must be 
considered. While there were 28 trade and service managers in 
Muna's study. nothing like that exists in the current study 
all are industrial managers. As an Arab. the author believes 
that managers of trade and service organisations are more flexible 
and tolerant on such matters as time. formalities. and other 
regulations including decision-making than managers of industrial 
organisations. In other words. managers in such trade and service 
organisations tend to use less centralised decision procedures than 
their colleagues in the industrial organisations. 
Figure 9.2 also indicates that managers in these two stUdies 
pay meagre attention to style 4 (delegation). Indeed. whether 
in Muna's study or the present study. style 1 and style 2 are the 
prevailing ones. This indicates that the Arab managers. regardless 
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of their countries. type of business. are inclined to use author-
itative styles over subordinates. Concerning that delegation is 
important to the organisation. the refusal of managers to delegate 
and let subordinate(s) actively participate in decision making 
process has the effect of stifling initiative and/or eliminating 
valuable training experience as well as contributing to sub-
15 
ordinates' dissatisfaction. However. when we re-examine the 
situation of the Iraqi managers in the light of their sectors. we 
discover that the private sector managers are more inclined to use 
style 1 (own decision) irrespective of the type of the problem. 
whereas in the public sector. the managers are more inclined to use 
style 3 (joint decision) almost in all situations (see Table 9.3 
and Figure 9.3). 
The principal reason of such a difference is that the public 
sector manager does not have a free hand. or more precisely, free 
enterprise. In addition. and as we have observed in chapter four 
of this study, the economy of Iraq is run according to a national 
comprehensive centralised economic plan. A public sector manager 
must fulfil the objective of his company which is already specified 
by his ministry in the light of the national comprehensive plan. 
A failure to fulfil such objectives will put the manager in a 
15 problem. 
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TABLE 9.3: DISTRIBUTION OF DECISION STYLES FOR EACH DECISION. BY MANAGERS AND SECTORS (N = 44) (expressed as %) 
DECISIONS STYLES AND SECTORS 
(1 ) \ (2) (3) (4) TOTAL 
Own Decision Consul tation Joint Decision Delegation 
Public privat, PUbli1 Pri- Public Private Public PrivatE 
vate 
I I To increase the salary of one of your 
\ 
1. 
direct subordinates 90 83 I 10 4 - 13 . - - 100 I I 
2. To increase the number of the work- I I 
force in a certain department 20 79 35 \ 17 45 4 - - 100 
3. To hire one of several applicants to I I 
work in your subordinate departments 20 63 35 1 33 35 I 4 10 - 100 I I I \ 
i 
4. To promote or to increase the salary of 
\ 37 
I 
one of your subordinates' workers 20 46 45 30 , 13 5 4 \ 100 I 
5. To terminate one of your subordinate's I I 
125 workers 70 67 30 - I 8 - - 100 , 
\ 46 6. To introduce a new product(s) 10 37 5 I 17 85 - - 100 
I i 33 7. To enter a new market 5 50 15 \17 80 100 - -
\ 
I 
8. To expand the total production capacity 
, 
i 
of the company 5 46 15 \ 13 80 I 41 - I - 100 I 
9. To change/modify the formal organisation 
chart of the company 20 58 30 B 50 34 - - 100 
10. To change the responsibilities and 
authorities of the head of a certain 
department 60 75 30 17 10 8 f - - 1100 
120.6 • ALL DECISIONS 32 60 25 19 41 1.5 0.4 .100 
-
i 
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2 - The power-sharing continuum: 
The second method of analysing the data presented in this 
chapter was to make use of the power-sharing continuum and the ass-
umption that its four styles are separated by equal intervals (see 
Figure 9.1). This assumption allows using the main scores of all 
the managers or each group of managers according to their sectors. 
This method enables us to analyse the variances among these scores. 
The same method was used by other scholars in analysing decision-
17 
making styles. 
The following values were assigned to components of the power-
sharing continuum (see Fig. 9.1), style 1 (own decision) = 10J 
style 2 (consultation) = 20J style 3 (joint decision) = 30J and 
style 4 (delegation) 40. Thus, a high score implies that a 
manager allows his subordinate large influence in decision making. 
Conversely, a low score indicates that the manager allows little 
influence in decision making or simply. the manager has more control 
over the outcome of the decision. 
Let us, at this stage. investigate the mean score of all the 
managers and compare it with the mean score of each sub-group of 
managers according to their sectors. While the mean score is 19 for 
all the managers. it is 21 in the public sector and 16 in the private 
sector. This indicates that subordinates participation in decision-
making in the public sector is more than those who are working in 
the private sector. In other words. the public sector manager is 
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more participative (or democratic) in decision making than the 
private sector manager. In effect. such a difference between mean 
scores suggests that it will be fruitful to extend the analysis in 
two ways: 
First: Breakdown the decisions according to their importance: 
The fact that some decisions are more important to the business than 
others. or have particular importance to subordinate(s) or to a 
certain department but not to the company as a whole. leads us to 
breakdown the previous ten decisions into three levels or groups.18 
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a: Personnel deciSions; deal with personnel matters of subordinate(s). 
such as promotion. termination. salary increase. hiring a new 
employee and so forth. Decisions 1. 3. 4 and 5 are of this type. 
b: Departmental decisions; include those dealing with a certain 
department such as increasing the total number of workforce of 
one department. or to change the responsibilities and authorities 
of a certain department. and the like. Decision 2 and 10 are 
of such types. 
c: Organisational decisions: represent those decisions which are 
of critical importance to the company because they involve 
potential serious consequences such as long-term planning. 
financial risks. large outlays and other issues relevant to the 
organisation. Decisions 6.7. 8 and 9 represent this category. 
In the light of these three. groups of decisions. let us examine 
the responses of the managers for these groups of decisions to see 
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whether they can differentiate these categories (situations) of 
decisions in the power-sharing styles they use. Table 9.4 summarises 
this distribution. 
TABLE 9.4: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES BY STYLE FOR THREE DECISION 
GROUPS (N = 44) (percentages)-
Decision Group Styles 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4 ) 
Own de- Consulta- Joint Delega-
cision tion decision tion 
Personnel 
(Decision 1,3.4.5) 58 27 12 3 
Departmental 
(Decisions 2 and 3) 60 24 16 -
Organisational 
(Decisions 6.7,8,9) 31 15 54 -
Weighted average 47 22 30 1 
(-The table is a reduction of table 9.2). 
The above table highlights two important points: 
a personnel and departmental decisions are largely carried 
out by the managers themselves. This behaviour increases 
as we move from Style 1 to Style 4. That is. the manager 
becomes more autocratic. 
b on the contrary. organisational decisions stand on the 
other side of the power-sharing continuum where managers 
permit subordinates participation in such decisions. In 
other words. they are more participative. 
However. such a conclusion should not be taken on its face value. 
As it can be seen from the table. this is not always true 
because subordinates participation sharply fluctuates along the 
continuum. This matter will become clearer in the second method 
of our analysis. 
Second: Managers situation according to his sector. ' 
The responses of the managers for these groups of decisions 
have been broken down according to managers' sectors. Table 9.5 
summarises this redistribution and indicates that in the private 
sector. StYle 1 (own decision) is the prevailing one irrespective 
of the type of the decision. Whereas in the public sector. although 
Style 3 (joint decision) is the dominant one. the manager uses it 
only with organisational decisions on issues such as purchasing a 
new capital equipment. entering a new market or producing a new 
product. 
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TABLE 9.5: DISTRIBUTION OF RESPONSES BY STYLE AND SECTOR 
FOR THREE DECISION GROUPS (N = 44) (percentages) 
Decision Group Styles 
(1 ) (2) (3) (4 ) 
Own dec- Consu1ta- Joint dec- Oe1e- Total 
ision tion ieion gat10n 
Personnel: A· 50 30 16 4 100 
B** 65 25 9 1 100 
Departmental J A 40 32 28 - 100 
B 77 17 6 - 100 
, 
Organisational J A 10 16 74 - 100 
B 48 14 38 - 100 
Weighted average, A 32 25 41 2 100 
B 60 19.2 20.4 0.4 100 
• 
i 
, 
• A = Public sector managers 
··B · Private sector managers 
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Having reached this paint. let us first look at the mean 
score of each group of decisions in the light of managers' 
sectors. as shown in Table 9.6. From the table it is clear that 
the forty four managers involve their subordinates more in 
organisational decisions than in the personnel and departmental 
decisions. 
TABLE 9.6 MEAN SCORE OF MANAGERS FOR THREE CATEGORIES OF DECISIONS. 
BY SECTOR. 
Sector Personnel Departmental Organizational decisions decisions decisions N 
Public 17.4 18.8 26.4 20 
Private 14.8 12.9 17.3 24 
All managers 16.0 17.1 23.2 44 
Closer examination of the table reveals that all the mean 
scores of public sector managers are consistently increasing as we 
move from personnel to departmental to organisational decisions. 
In the private sector the situation slightly differs despite the 
fact that managers are more participative (according to these 
mean scores) in organisational decisions when compared with other 
categories. They involve their subordinates more in personnel 
decisions than in departmental decisions. 
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Ironically, such findings are inconsistent with both Heller's 
and Muna's results. Both have concluded that managers tend to be 
less autocratic when dealing with problems related to subordinates, 
and more autocratic when f~cing organisational decisions. 19 
From Table 9.5 and Table 9.6 emerge two important questions: 
First: Why do public sector managers apply Style 3 (joint decision) 
when dealing with organisational decisions and use Style 1 
(own decision) and Style 2 (consultation) with personnel 
and departmental problems? 
Second: Why do private sector managers tend to be less autocratic 
when dealing with personnel problems and more autocratic 
with departmental problems? 
Chapters four and six discussed many things, including: 
First: that the economy is directed by central planning. .Central 
planning and decentralised execution of the economic plan are the 
basic principles which guide each economic unit in the public 
sector. We have also discovered that there are several levels of 
authority over the public industrial enterprises (see Figure 4.1). 
The difficulties that face the process of decision-making in 
the public industrial enterprises have been described in a United 
Nation report and discussed at a conference in Beirut in October 
1973. According to Edith and E.F. Penrose. this report showed: 
" that industrial enterprises were, in effect, 
organised as part of the state bureaucracy and 
were given very little autonomous power of decision. 
There were several levels of authority over the 
enterprise, including not only the state organisa-
tion to which it belonged but also up to at least 
four ministries (Industry. Planning, Economy, 
Finance) and a variety of sub-ministerial agencies. 
Nearly all decisions had to go through layers, 
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many of them had to go high up in the relevant 
ministries. The planning. evaluation and implementa-
tion of investment decisions required approval from 
a number of sources. and even the implementation 
might be undertaken by an agency outside the 
enterprise. Pricing decisions were made by the 
state organisation. and were subject to ministerial 
approval. giving the enterprise very little 
flexibility to meet market conditions. Even to 
sell off obsolete inventories, surplus raw materials, 
etc., managers of enterprises had to obtain 
authorization from higher authority and then sell 
at public auctions according to procedures laid 
down." 20 
These difficulties show that the public sector manager does 
not have enough power to make radical changes (organisational 
decisions) in his enterprise when compared with the power of his 
counterpart in the private sector enterprise. These difficulties 
also indicate that not only are there many levels of decision-
making in the public sector, but the process is highly centralised. 
To achieve radical changes in his enterprise, the public 
sector manager must have prior approval from his superiors, including 
the minister. 
On the other hand, the public sector industrial manager, 
according to the Iraqi labour laws, must let workers participate 
in organisational decisions. This, coupled with the fact that the 
majority of the public sector managers are young and highly mobile 
have forced them to apply Style 3 (Joint decision).21 Yet, in 
day-to-day matters, their behaviour is almost similar to that of 
their peers in the private sector both are more autocratic. 
Second: the shortage mskilled manpower in Iraq is very acute. 
as discussed earlier. Indeed, while the public sector managers 
pay little attention to this matter (partly because there are 
other governmental bodies responsible for supporting manpower and 
because he is working in the government and such matters as profit 
or losses do not affect him directly). the private sector manager 
keenly regards such issues for they have a direct effect on his 
financial position. This coupled with the fact that the majority 
of these managers have good experience in their current companies 
have made them less autocratic when dealing with subordinates' 
problems. As a matter of fact, the findings, together with the 
reasons mentioned above, lend some support to Vroom's suggestion 
that "it makes more sense to talK about participative and auto-
cratic situations than it does to talk about participative and 
22 
autocratic managers. 
SUMMARY: 
Much of human behaviour is a reflection of the decisions 
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people make. The processes that regulate and control these decisions 
are central to any scientific discipline that endeavours to under-
stand and predict human behaviour. During the last thirty years or 
so, an immense literature on leadership and/or decision making styles 
has been carried out. Most of this literature has discussed the 
ways and the problems of manager-subordinates participation in 
decision making. On the other hand. the reader of this literature 
finds that there are many cross-cultural studies that have 
concluded that the managers of the developing countries are more 
authoritative in decision making when compared with their peers 
in developed countries. 
This chapter has attempted to discover to what extent the 
Iraqi managers let subordinates participate in decision making 
and what leadership style is the most common among these managers. 
The chapter has also tried to examine the thesis of the cross-
cultural management scholars which indicates that authoritative 
management style or simply authoritative decision making style is 
the prevailing style in the developing countries. In addition. 
the chapter has tried to investigate Muna's results of the Arab 
executive on one hand. and to examine the argument which insists 
that there is no universal management or leadership style that is 
"best" in all situations (or different problenrJ and that leader-
ship is a contingent variable 
which a manager works. 
depending on the situation in 
The conceptual framework and the methods used in this chapter 
have been gathered from seven taxonomies published during the last 
four decades. The various decision-making styles used by managers 
have been defined and ordered by four point equal interval scale. 
reflecting the various degrees of power-sharing between the manager 
and subordinates. 
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A semi-structured interview method was used to obtain the 
information about the manager styles in decision making. Each 
manager was presented with a description of four alternative 
decision styles. The alternative styles were Style 1 (own 
decision): Style 2 (consultation): Style 3 (joint decision) 
and Style 4 (delegation). Each manager then was given ten 
decisions and requested to specify which of the alternatives he 
would normally use. 
Two methods were used to analyse the data obtained. The 
first was to use frequency distribution of responses to each of 
the ten decisions in the light of the four alternatives of 
decision-making styles. The second method of analysing the 
data was to make use of the power-sharing continuum and the 
assumption that its four styles are supported by equal intervals. 
While this assumption allowed the use of main scores of all the 
managers studied. it also enabled us to analyse the variances 
among these scores. 
Among the results the chapter has achieved are: 
first: The managers studied have employed different styles 
for each one of the ten decisions and none of the 
managers has one specific universal style across 
these different types of decisions. 
Second: Almost all the managers have avoided employing Style 
4 (delegation). 
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Third: Style 1 (own decision) was predominantly preferred by 
the managers for this specific set of decisions. This 
result differs from what Muna has discovered in the 
other Arab countries. He found that Style 2 (consultation) 
is the prevailing one among his subjects. The only 
reason for such a difference. according to the author's 
opinion. is that Muna's study has included 28 managers 
(54% of all the sample) working in trade and service 
organisations whereas the managers covered by the present 
study are all industrial managers. As an Arab. the 
author believes that managers of trade and service 
organisations are more flexible and tolerant on such 
matters as time. regulations and other managerial 
aspects including decision making than the industrial 
managers. 
Fourth: Subordinates participation in decision making in the 
public sector was more than their counterparts in the 
private sector. More precisely. the public sector 
managers were more inclined to let subordinates 
participate in decisi?n making than the private sector 
managers. This result forced us to extend the analysis 
in two ways: 
a) breakdown the ten decisions according to their 
content or importance into three groups as fallows: 
decisions bear direct importance to the subordinatesJ 
decisions have specific importance to a department. and 
decisions have special importance to the company as a 
whale. The aim was to see whether the managers can 
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differentiate these categories (situations) 
of decisions in the power-sharing styles they 
use, on one hand, and to discover on which 
group these managers are authoritative, on the 
other. 
b) analyse these groups of decisions in the light 
of the managers' sectors. 
The first method indicated that the managers used Style 1 
(own decision) in handling personnel and department matters and 
used Style 3 (jOint decision) in organisational decisions. 
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As regards the second method of analysis, the evidence indicated 
that Style 1 was the prevailing one in the private sector 
irrespective of the type of the decision. Whereas, in the public 
sector, although Style 3 was the dominant one. the managers used 
it only with organisational decisions. 
These findings are inconsistent with both Heller's and 
Muna's results. Both have concluded that managers tend to be less 
autocratic when dealing with problems related to subordinates 
and more autocratic when facing organisational decisions. While 
it is difficult to compare between managers from different 
, countries on the one hand, and because the Iraqi manage~s were 
absent in these studies on the other, the present findings lend 
some support to Vroom's suggestion that "it makes more sense to 
talk about participative and autocratic situations than it does 
to talk about participative and autocratic managers. 
Fifth: The findings presented in this chapter also indicate 
that it is misleading to generalise about management 
style, even when using a situational approach such 
as that of Vroom and Yetton, in a vacuum, or with 
superficial cross-cultural effort. It is essential 
to refer to the prevailing culture and situational 
factors of the environment to understand the meaning 
of the specific behaviours involved in "Style" and 
"situation". 
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CHAPTER TEN 
SUMMARY 
The present study is an exploratory study. It has attempted 
to explore the following principal aspects of the Iraqi managers: 
1. Their personal-social and career patterns and characteristics. 
2. The type of interrelationships that exist between these 
characteristics. and whether these characteristics differ 
according to: 
a: the size of the organisations in which these managers 
are working 
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b: the ownership of the organisations - public and private. and 
c: the managers' place of birth - rural and urban. 
3. The study has also tried to discover and document the decision-
making styles of the Iraqi managers and which style is most 
common among them. Likewise. to discover whether their styles 
differ across different decisions (problems) or across different 
sectors (organisation ownership). 
4. To show how these managers spend their time and what activities 
they perform in their work and to find out how long they spend 
in each activity and to what extent the length of each activity 
differs across the periods (the morning and the evening periods) 
and across the sectors and what are the principal reasons that 
are responsible for such differences. 
5. A comparison of the principal characteristics of the Iraqi 
managers with the characteristics of some of those working in 
some developed countries was also among the objectives of thi's 
study. 
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6. It was also among the objectives of this study to investigate 
the argument of the cross-cultural management theorists which 
confirms that management style in the developing countries is 
authoritative and managers in such countries minimize subordinate's 
participation in the decision-making process to the lowest degree. 
To achieve these and other objectives mentioned through the nine 
chapters of this study. several different methods have been used. In 
the first place. a careful review of the relevant literature in 
leadership theories and crosscultural management stUdies was undertaKen. 
The work of other researchers who had made studies on managers and 
their jobs. whether in the Western or in the Eastern countries. has 
also been carefully investigated. This method helped us to discover 
the following points: 
1 - There are almost as many different definitions of leadership 
as there are persons who have attempted to define the concept. 
There is little agreement as to the meaning of the concept 
and there is little in the way of unifying theory of leader-
ship. 
2 - There are different theories of leadership. The traits 
theories. the behavioural theories. the situational theories 
and the contingency theories. The situational and contingency 
theories are more accurate in dealing with leadership because 
they looK at leadership as an interacting process which differs 
from what we have seen in the traits and behavioural theories 
they both looked at leadership as an independent variable 
and the leader or the manager can work the way he likes. 
3. Leadership is a means - it is not an end in itself. This 
means can be used by managers and non-managers. Accepting 
such a criterion indicates that not all leadership behaviour 
of a certain leader or manager is directed towards achieving 
organisational objectives. 
4. From the field of the crosscultural management studies we 
have discovered the following points: 
a: there are two schools of management. the universal 
school and the cultural school. The first believes 
that no appreciable difference exists in managerial 
behaviour across countries while the second school. 
"the cultural school" believes that culture is the 
independent variable in explaining managerial behaviour. 
b: One of the most important features of the cultural 
school of manage'ment is that management style in 
developing countries is authoritative and managers 
in such countries avoid subordinate participation 
in the decision-making process. Many studies in this 
school have shown that the level of industrialisation 
is the major factor in determining manager-subordinate 
relationship. 
c: The current literature of crosscultural management 
studies covers only a small part of the world. It 
needs to be extended to cover such countries 'as China, 
Spain, Turkey. Iran. Iraq and the rest of the other 
Arab countries, in order to be more representative on 
the one hand. and to make better judgement in the field 
of management. on the other. 
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Another review of what has been written in the Western and 
the Eastern countries about the Arab society and its culture. 
including that of Iraq was also undertaken. This was so important 
from the point of view of this study. mainly because without such 
a prior understanding of the Iraqi society and its culture across 
long periods of time. the analysis of the Iraqi managers (in terms 
of their backgrounds. characteristics and decision-making styles) 
would have been incomplete. 
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In addition to these methods. 44 managing directors have been 
interviewed in Iraq. These managers are working in industrial 
organisations. 20 managers from the public sector and the remainder 
are working in the private sector. The organisations in which 
these managers work differ in sizes - the biggest one has 5.005 
employees and the smallest one has 48 employees. These organisations 
are located in different provinces - Baghdad, Ninevah. Arbile and 
Sulaimaniyah provinces. The forty four organisations produce 
different types of products ranging from foodstuff, beverage and 
tobacco to textiles, ready-made clothes, leathers industries, 
manufactured industries and cement industries. 
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FINDINGS OF THE STUDY 
In this part. a summary of the principal findings of this 
study 1s presented. These findings are classified into two groups. 
The first group of the findings cover the country as a whole - its 
geographical characteristics. its society. its political and economic 
environment. Thus. the findings of this group cover four chapters 
in this studYJ the second. third. fourth and the fifth chapters. 
The second group of the findings are concerned with the Iraqi 
managers. their backgrounds, characteristics and career patterns. 
How they spend their time and what activities do they perform. 
What are the principal social pressures "constraints" they perform 
and their decision-making styles. The findings of this second group 
cover the last four chapters. 
1.0 MODERN IRAQ: GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT, SOCIAL 
ENVIRONMENT, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT 
1. GEOGRAPHICAL ENVIRONMENT: 
Iraq has an area of approximately 438,000 sq.km. The country 
can be divided into three regions: the mountains in the north and 
north-east. the alluvial plain in the middle and south. the desert. 
The desert covers 60% of the whole country and is situated in the 
west. Except in the mountains. the desert climate is the prevailing 
one in all parts of Iraq. It is characterised by a great temperature 
variation between day and night, summer and winter. the maximum of 
o 
which reaches 40-45 C. 
Tigris and Euphrates: A Continuous Challenge 
Until very recently the people were victims rather than the 
beneficiaries of the main two rivers - Tigris and Euphrates. They 
have posed a challenge to the riparian agricultural population 
since earliest times and still play tantalizing tricKs on them. In 
the Spring, the surging rivers pour out an over-abundance of water, 
whereas during the summer, when the sun parches the land, they 
provide barely enough water for irrigation. Equally, the water of 
these rivers contains a heavy proportion of salt and silt, and due 
to their bifurcating nature, which allows only a small amount to be 
dammed, the more the water supply is increased, the worse the salt 
problem becomes. 
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The continual challenge of these rivers together with the 
continuous challenge of the desert environment are among the principal 
pushing factors that are responsible for people migrating toward 
towns and cities. 
2. SOCIAL ENVIRONMENT 
Population: Heterogeneous 
The people were 8 million in 1965. 9 million in 1970 and 12 million 
in 1977. Iraq does not suffer from the spectre of over-population. 
Age-group distribution of the population, as given in the 1977 census. 
indicates that almost two-thirds of the population are under 30 years 
of age. Different races and religions exist - Arabs. Kurds, Turkmans 
and Syriac. The majority are muslims and the second religion is 
Christianity. About 90% of the population are Muslims and Islam is 
the state religion. 
The orthodox muslims are fatalists in the sense that they 
strongly believe that what the Lord has planned for them they have 
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to face. The Iraqi, as a religious person, considers the recognition 
and worship of God through Islam the principal concern of his life. 
He views himself as a humble creature, whose life at any moment, 
becomes whatever the Lord wills it to become. 
As far as income, size of family (number of children) individual 
success or failure are concerned, the majority of the people believe 
that these things are in the hands of GOd. It follows that a human 
being, by his own efforts cannot improve his condition - Allah alone 
can do that. Consequently what is the use of arduous efforts when 
they may fail because they are against the will of God? 
Social Communities: The Bedouin. the Village and the City 
Communities 
In Iraq there are three communities, the bedouin, the village 
and the city communities. In terms of social values and customs, 
they are closely interrelated and the desert is the principal reservoir 
for the village and city communities. The bedouin community has 
declined but many of its practices, customs, institutions and instincts 
of the early bedouin life have developed over centuries to become 
the warp and woof of modern society in Iraq. Most beduins have moved 
from desert and settled in villages and towns. The romantic past is 
left behind, though not forgotten, bedouin values, customs and attitudes 
(superiority of man over women. generosity, attitude toward time and 
manual work) continue to be prized butthe bedouin himself has in fact 
become either a farmer or industrial worker. 
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The village communi~y is the backbone of the country and Iraq is 
the land of villages. Not so long ago, as early as 1950, 80% of the 
five million people lived in villages, and 90% of the villagers at that 
time were cultivators. In 1957 the number of villages was in excess 
of 8.000 villages. The villager considered himself as a settled nomad 
and claims that his origin is from a formerly nomad tribe. The same 
values of the bedouin community also exist in the village community. 
Most of the villagers have abandoned their villages and migrated to 
cities. 
As regards the city communities, there are no clear-cut lines 
between the townsmen and the villagers in terms of social values. Many 
townsmen were of relatively recent tribal origin. Even today, a 
large number of the inhabitants of Baghdad - the capital of Iraq -
quite apart of the tribal immigrants of the last forty years. still 
remember the name of the tribe to which they once belonged. In the 
towns, the influence of the old norms and traditions. even if 
considerable reduced. nevertheless. still persist. The psychology and 
the ways of the old order - the work of long years- as well as the 
bedouin and villager values, traditions and norms are still embodied 
in the life of a broad cross-section of the people, and will not 
easily wither away. 
Social Structure: Past and Present 
Social Structure in the past: The Tribe, the Clan and The Family 
Under the never-ending pressure of environment, three interlocked 
social institutions characterised the ancient society of Iraq: The 
Tribe, the Clan and the Family. All developed in the context of 
conventional ancient and primitive patriarchal society. In such a 
social structure the man regarded himself as highly superior as 
a strong chief. the boys the future chiefs; the woman was the 
weak creature or servant, the girls the future servants. So too, 
within each clan the men were all-powerful and the women totally 
subservient. In the same vein, within each tribe the men dominated 
completely and the women were good insofar as they produced boys, 
served their men and responded to their whims. 
Indeed, this acute perception of male superiority also existed 
between tribes and clans. Within a clan or even tribe, men related 
to one another as men; except that when a man somehow failed to 
carry out his male role - exacting revenge for some offence to his 
clan or tribe or family, for instance - he was declassed into a 
status akin to womanhood. Within such a value system, then, not 
only were men superior to women, but certain men were superior to 
other men, certain families, it thus followed, were superior to 
other families - for if a man disgraced himself. reduced himself to 
womanhood, then his family was reduced as well. 
from this evolved the consecutive ideas that certain clans 
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were superior to other clans, certain tribes within an area superior 
to other tribes of that area, the tribal society of one area superior 
to that of another, and so on up the ladder. 
Contemporary Social Structure: The Extended Family and the Clan: 
The extended family is the principal social structure 1n 
contemporary Iraq despite the fact that the clan structure pervades 
villages and small towns. 
The Iraqi family has a different and wider connotation than 
that which is customary existing in the developed countries. The 
term includes many more distant relatives and kinsmen than in. say. 
the United Kingdom. in the narrower sense. In most villages and 
cities. the extended family consists of the father and wife. 
their unmarried children. their married sons with their families. 
The trends towards nuclear family is something new in the cities 
of Baghdad. Mosul and Basra and when it exists. it does not mean 
that the new married couple have freed themselves from their social 
and economic obligations toward their parents. 
The father in the Iraqi family plays a dominant role. and his 
image is that of a patriarch presiding over his family's affairs. 
The descent in the family is patrilineal. That is. each man is 
identified as belonging to his father's family. not his mother's. 
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The Iraqi family controls and shapes its members' behaviour in 
such a way that they must think twice before deciding such decisions as 
marriage and the type of business to engage in. Marriage is a family 
rather thJn a personal affair. Because the sexes do not ordinarily 
mix socially. young men and women have few or no acquaintances among 
the opposite sex. 
Males in the family look at females as weak creatures. The 
honour of the family. easily damaged and nearly irreparable, depends 
on the conduct of its women. Consequently. women are expected to be 
decorous. modest and circumspect. 
Within the large cities the extended families are grouped into 
lineages. Paternal descent and authority. family loyalty and 
co-operation within the lineage are still prevailing, although the 
cohesiveness of the extended kin group varies from the traditional 
closeness to the looser ties of the western-influenced family. 
Educational Status of the People: Massive illiteracy, Men 
are better educated than women. Urban dwellers have better 
chances in education. 
Education plays a significant role in the economic and social 
development in every society. Nowadays, a society must be an 
educated society in order to progress, to grow, even to survive. 
Many of the traditional beliefs, values and customs discussed above 
can be eradicated or, at least minimized by modern education. 
Unfortunately. modern education is new in Iraq. Let us here 
reconsider some of our findings. Illiteracy is the most salient 
feature in Iraq. In 1950, 96% of the population were illiterate. 
The most recent census of 1977 showed that 53% of the people were 
illiterate) in urban areas the proportion was 41% as against 75% 
in the rural areas. Men, whether in urban or rural areas. are better 
educated than women. 
Though the contemporary government has made massive efforts to 
eradicate illiteracy and the number of students in all studying 
stages has increased dramatically, the quality of education leaves 
much to be desired and the role of university inside the society is 
weak and fails to develop an integrated philosophy of life to the new 
generation. Old fashioned teaching methods still linger. dictation 
of lectures is common and passively received by students - committed 
to memory. 
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3. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT 
Political Environment: Instability across the centuries. 
Corruption and Lack of Order. 
Iraq's history is a vivid record of easily awakened antagonisms. 
conflicting interests and political instability. During the 
Turkish empire (1534-1917). numerous campaigns between the Turks and 
the Persians were fought on Iraqi soil. Tribal and clan life 
dominated the country and tribal chiefs (sheikhs) were often at 
loggerheads with each other. and were more or less independent of 
effective Turkish control,- Likewise. the Turkish Walies were 
unable to maintain order. nor were they honest persons; they were 
preoccupied with the task of extracting as much wealth as they could 
for themselves. Little was done to enrich the country and the 
continual popular demand for tax reform and social justice was never 
seriously considered. 
of 
During the British mandate/the monarchical regime (1917-1958). 
the dominant features in Iraq. were insecurity. corrupt administration 
and flagrant abuse of authority. 
Between 1920 and 1950, 47 cabinets came to power. and more than 
24 cabinets between 1950 and 1968. The aim of each cabinet was to 
prepare its own development programme and to bring its own supporters. 
The political welter of narrow interests prevented a well-directed 
economic policy. even though each new regime (or cabinet) was anxious 
to further economic development and political order. Corruption has 
increased dramatically at almost all levels of the government. The 
gap between the people and the successive governments has increased 
and distrust increased over the years. 
Economic Environment: Oil revenue is the main resource for 
development. Mainly Agriculture. Modern industry is new. 
Oil revenues: 
The Iraqi economy is heavily dependent on oil revenues. After 
the nationalization of oil industry in 1972. the share of the oil 
sector in the national product jumped from 35% in 1970 to 60% in 
1974. Its contribution to the total government revenues increased 
from 52% in 1971 to 87% in 1976. and crude oil accounted for 98% 
of the total exports in 1975. The economy is firmly directed by 
central government. whose objectives are to expand the public sector 
to encompass eventually the entire economy. Centralised planning 
and decentralised execution are the basic ideals and principles 
which guide the economy in Iraq. 
Agriculture: The everlasting problem 
Iraq is predominantly an agricultural country with about half 
of its population deriving their income directly or indirectly from 
cultivation and animal husbandry. 
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During the last forty years. thousands of peasants have moved 
from the agricultural land and settled in the major cities of Iraq. 
Different but interlocked factors caused their migration. chief among 
them were: 
Feudalism: Until 1970. the agricultural sector characterized itself 
by the control of feudalism over the most fertile land. 
whereas the majority of the peasants lived in utter poverty 
and ignorance. The feudal system brought grave economic 
defects and was often socially vicious. It lies behind 
most of the social and economic problems in Iraq. 
Land salinization and irrigation methods: 
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The salt and silt that characterise the land. together 
with the problems of floods and scarcity of water during 
the summer period are among the principal factors for 
peasants' migration. Poor irrigation and drainage systems 
still impede agricultural progress and enrich land 
salinization. 
Land reform laws: 
During the last thirty years more than one land reform 
law was enacted. The aim of these laws was to re-
distribute the land ownership between peasants and 
reduce the size of the land holding of the large holders. While 
these laws were progressive in terms of their social 
justice. the successive governments before 1968 did not 
realise the scale and complexity of the agricultural 
problems nor had they a clear understanding of the 
strength of the feudalists. nor did they have enough 
officials capable of effective farm management. Land 
was expropriated rapidly while distribution was extremely 
low. 
The above factors combined to produce continuous rural-urban 
migration which not only affects agricultural productivity but 
creates considerable difficulties against industrial progress. 
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Industry: New era, Baghdad has the lion's share, the industrial 
workers are villagers in origin 
Iraq witnessed modern industry at the beginning of 1950 when 
oil revenues started to accumulate. During that decade, the industrial 
sector was hindered because the royal regime believed that Iraq is 
an agricultural country and, therefore, should not expand industry. 
Though this sector expanded steadily during the sixties, its 
expansion was arbitrary and brought unfavourable results to the 
economy as a whole, because it aimed at creating new basis of 
politics and finding new opportunities to large numbers of unemployed 
persons. 
The present government is forging ahead with an industrialization 
programme at a speed unmatched by any of the previous regimes. It 
believes that the baCKward Iraq society cannot be radically changed 
without giving to industrialization its due importance, since 
industry constitutes one of the basic pillars of progress in the 
modern age. As a result, the industrial sector took the first 
place among the economic sectors in the years that followed 1968. 
In the first economic comprehensive plan (1970 - 1974) total allo-
cation for industry was 1.0. 391 million, whereas the agriculture 
sector, for instance, took the second position with an allocation 
of 366.2 million. Meanwhile, the total investments of the 
industrial sector during the first three years of the second devel-
opment plan (1975 - 1980) was 1.0. 2123 million, representing 
about 47% of the combined investments in all the economic sectors. 
Most industrial establishments are located in Baghdad. 
Baghdad has the lion's share in industrial establishments. In 
1977. 67% of all large industrial establishments were located in 
Baghdad - the capital of Iraq. 
Most industrial workers - and managers in Iraq are of 
village origin. The industrial worker is a peasant villager. and 
a member of the traditional agricultural society. This fact. 
combined with the novelty of industry in Iraq and the continual 
villagers' migration. keeps in the factory worker many of the 
attitudes of the non-industrial societYJ he remains a villager 
and industrial employment. for him. is not yet a way of life. 
While the agricultural environment has a very specific quality 
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which impresses itself on the mentality of the villager and is reflec-
ted in his social life. the urban factory worker is an employee 
working under immediately supervision at a task specifically assigned 
to him. 
In Iraq. the factory workers are still a very minor group 1n 
the society and most of them are unskilled. 
Second: THE IRAQI SENIOR MANAGERS. PRODUCT OF THEIR 
ENVIRONMENT 
The previous findings indicate what is Iraq its geography. 
its social and economic environments. In the following section of 
findings. we are going to look at the Iraqi managers. their personal-
social characteristics and career patterns. how they spend their 
time and what activities do they perform. What are the principal 
social constraints they face in their society and their decision-
making styles. Many of the findings we discuss here are, in 
fact, the result of the larger society with all its conflicting 
interests, values, customs and traditions. 
1 - BACKGROUNDS AND CAREER PATTERNS: 
The average age of the forty four managers studied is 46.7 
years. It 1s 41.9 years in the public sector and 50.8 years in 
the private sector. This is quite different from what we have 
observed 1n the studies of the Western managers, where managers 
1n the public sector are more aged than those working in the 
private sector. Two principal reasons can clarify the situation 
in Iraq. They are political instability and the acute shortage of 
skilled manpower in the public sector establishments. 
Education: 
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The public sector managers in Iraq have more formal education 
when compared with the private sector managers. 95% of the public 
sector managers have university education compared to just 29% of 
the private sector managers. While there is no manager holding a 
primary school certificate in the public sector, 46% in the private 
sector have this degree or less. Two principal factors can explain 
why. The first is that a high level of education is preferred by 
the government in senior management positions in the public sector. 
The second is that, in the private sector, once you are rich 
you can become a managing director. Likewise, as we have seen above, 
the private sector managers are more aged compared with their 
counterparts in the public sector. Indeed, in Iraq the more elder 
the person is, the more likely he is to be less educated than the 
younger persons more than 90% of the Iraqis were illiterate in 
1950. Add to this fact, most of the private managers covered by 
this study are of rural origin, if we remember, the rural areas 
have less chance in education when compared with the urban areas. 
Size of the family: 
Evidence indicates that 75% of the Iraqi managers in this 
study have three children or more. It also shows that public sector 
managers tend to have less children in comparison with the private 
sector managers. While 95% of the public sector managers have four 
or less children each, only 55% of the private sector managers fell 
into this category. The remainder have between five and ten children 
each. To explain the reason, the author will mention two factors: 
a: In Iraq, as mentioned earlier, the people admire large 
families and the extended family is a good example. We 
must not forget the influence of Islamic religion in this 
respect. 
b: Age of the manager and his place of birth have also to 
be considered as well as his level of education. The 
aged managers are less educated and more likely to have 
come from villages. Orthodox Islamic faith in the villages, 
according to the author's view, is more prevalent, 
particularly among the uneducated and the aged people. 
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Place of birth: 
24 managers out of the 44 managers studied are from rural 
areas. This reflects the horizontal social movement between the 
rural and the urban areas in Iraq. If we still remember. between 
1965 and 1977 there were more than one million who had migrated 
from villages and settled in the main cities of Iraq - notably 
Baghdad. 
Social origins: 
The evidence indicates that 53% of the managers are from 
the lower class (their fathers are either unskilled or semi-skilled 
workers). A strong relationship exists between the educational 
level of the manager and his social class. 70% of the managers 
from the upper class and all those from the middle class have 
university education. while only 44% of the managers in lower class 
have such a qualification. 
Indeed. whether in Iraq or elsewhere. the financial situation 
of a family plays a decisive role in children's educationJ the 
richer the family. the more it is financially able to spend on the 
children's education. 
Career patterns: 
While all the public sector managers have twenty years service 
or less, 58% of the private sector managers have twenty one years or 
mora. Tha aga of the manager has a significant relation with the 
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length of a manager's service in Iraq. Our evidence also indicates 
that 75% of the public sector managers have ten years or less in 
their current companies. Only four managers have between eleven and 
twenty years and only one has 25 years experience in his current 
company. As for the private sector managers. eleven have 10 years 
or less, twelve have between 11 to 20 years. and only one manager 
has 28 years in his current company. 
The length of time these managers have served in their present 
posts as managing directors also varies. In the public sector, 
90% of managers have served 5 years or less while the remainder 
have served between 6 and 10 years. In the private sector. 50% of 
managers have served between 11 and 25 years; 21% between 6 and 
10 years and the remainder either have 5 years or less in their 
current posts. 
The length of the service whether in the whole life of these 
managers or whether in their present companies. or in their present 
posts has its explanations in the problems of political instability 
across the years. the problems of the shortage of the management cadre 
as well as the educational levels of the managers studied. 
The previous analysis of the lengths of service of these managers 
indicates that the public sector managers are more mobile than the 
private sector managers. 75% of the private sector managers have 
spent their entire career either in one or two companies. whereas 55% 
of the "public sector managers have moved between three and six companies. 
The age of a manager is not positively associated with the 
number of manager's moves in Iraq. In this study the evidence 
indicates that the older managers have less inter-firms mobility 
when compared with the young managers' situation. The young 
managers work in the public sector. The older the manager is the 
more likely he is to work in the private sector and, the less 
movements between companies he has. 
Mobility inside the public sector in Iraq is largely outwith 
the control of managers. A public sector manager is like a soldier 
at the mercy of the government and does not know when he will be 
transferred or retired, nor what his destination will be. 
If we look at these managers in the light of the size of 
their companies we find that those working in the large companies 
(501 employees or more) are younger than those working in medium 
(101 to 500 employees) and small companies (100 employees or less)J 
they are more educated, more mobile and have less service years 
than those working in medium and small companies. 
2 - HOW THEY SPEND THEIR TIME AND WHAT ACTIVITIES DO THEY PERFORM? 
The evidence presented in this study indicates that the average 
working hours for these managers is 10~ hours. It is 10~ hours in 
the public sector and 10 hours in the private sector. Total average 
hours per week is 63 hours for the public sector manager compared with 
60 hours in the private sector. 
276 
Paperwork 
In the public sector. if we exclude communication activity, 
the paperwork activity takes up more of the manager's time than 
any other type of activity. He spends on paperwork matters around 
16% of his daily time. on average. while the private sector manager 
spends around 5% of his time in this activity. 
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One of the principal reasons that make the public sector 
manager devote more time to paperwork activity in comparison with 
the private sector manager's situation is that they are working in 
larger companies. 60% of the public sector managers take a lot of 
their paperwork to their home after working hours to finish it in due 
time. Yet some of them prefer to come early in the morning to his 
office for the same purpose. Contrary to the public sector managers. 
all the private sector managers studied perform their paperwork 
activity inside their companies and during the working hours. 
This result must not surprise us. In addition to the fact that 
the public sector companies are larger in their size when compared 
with the size of the private sector companies. the public sector 
manager cannot control his own time inside the company. His daytime 
is for inter-personal work, interaction with other managers, clients, 
customers, meetings and so forth. Thus paperwork has to be taken home 
because only at home can he be protected from outside interruption 
and he controls the use of his own time. 
Planning and Organising Activities: 
Scholars of management and organisation theories agreed that 
at the top of an organisation structure. conceptual skill, such as 
planning and organising activities are the most important skills 
a manager has to perform. Unfortunately. evidence in hand indicates 
that the Iraqi manager devotes more time to his personal activity 
than that devoted to planning or organising. We believe that the 
industrial sector in Iraq would achieve more progress if the managers 
devote some of their personal time to management activities. We 
also believe that central planning in the public sector. together 
with the negative attitude of the Iraqi personality are among the 
reasons that are responsible for the meagre time· these managers 
give to planning activity. The distrust that exists between the 
governmental establishments and the people must also be considered 
in this respect. 
The evidence also shows that these managers devote more time 
for organising activity compared to what they accord to planning 
activities. We believe that when a manager spends little time on 
planning it would be more likely that he will devote more time for 
other activities including organisation. 
Communication Activity: 
Like the Western managers. the Iraqi managers devote the 
bulk of their daily time to communication activity. In this study. 
communication activities have been divided into three types: manager-
subordinate communications;manager-superiors communications and 
manager-customers communication. The Iraqi manager, irrespective 
of his sector. engages himself with subordinates communications more 
than any other type of communication. In the public sector. a manager 
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spends, on average, less time on face-to-face contacts with sub-
ordinates, customers and superiors when compared with the private 
sector manager. Likewise, he spends more time on telephone 
contacts with subordinates and superiors, but less time with 
customers, than that of the private sector manager. Size of the 
company and the manager's office location are among the principal 
reasons for time variation as well as for the method used by these 
managers in communication. While the public sector manager has 
a large company and usually consists of two factories or more, 
the private sector manager has either medium or small company. 
Consequently, subordinates of the public sector manager are working 
over a large area and the distance between them and the manager's 
office permits telephone contacts rather than face-to-face contacts. 
The evidence indicates that the public sector manager devotes 
less time to superiors and customers contacts when compared with 
his counterpart in the private sector. 
Research Activity: 
The link between planning and research activities is profound. 
When planning is outwith a manager's control, when the government 
is responsible for the future of the public sector companies, and 
when (in the private sector) there are illiterate managers. and 
finally. when the demand for the products these companies produce 
is high compared with the actual supply, then one would expect little 
time for research activity. While the evidence indicates that all 
the public sector managers devote less time to research activity 
compared with what they accord to planning and organising activities, 
63% of the private sector managers devote no time for this activity 
at all. We believe that only through continual systematic research 
can an organisation retain its dynamic equilibrium and keep up to 
date. 
Personal and Complex Activities: 
The findings indicate that the Iraqi manager. irrespective of 
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his sector. devotes more time for personal activities than that 
devoted to planning. organising and research activities. The findings 
also show that this activity takes up around 94 minutes of the 
manager's daily time on average. In addition. the private sector 
manager devotes more time for this activity compared with the public 
sector manager. 
The evidence also shows that the forty four managers studies 
devote more time for what we had called "complex activities" compared 
to what they accord to planning. or organising or research activity. 
Yet. the public sector manager devotes more time for this activity 
than that granted to personal activity. while the private sector 
manager devotes less time to this activity in comparison with what 
he accords to his personal activities. Size of the company. the 
ownership of the company and other personal qualifications are among 
the factors that are responsible for this divergence. 
3. SOCIAL CONSTRAINTS HINDERING MANAGEMENT WORK 
There are different but interlocking social constraints or 
pressures which face and hinder these managers in their work. The 
managers studied cannot work in a completely unconstrained way. 
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They are not able to exercise the same degree of freedom over their 
own organisations of work as the Western managers. There is no 
surprise in this result. The Iraqi managers are working in a group-
oriented society; they have to pay special attention to their families. 
relatives and friends. Iraqi society is a developing society and 
the people still admire the bedouin and village values. The worker 
himself still dislikes his manual work and continuously seeks 
clerical works because. in his opinion. such works are more respectful 
than manual work. So, too. he still pays little weight to the value 
of time and lack of punctuality in time schedules and appointments, 
procrastination and the "tomorrow" attitude are quite cOlllT1on among 
the workers and the Iraqis as a whole. 
Among other social constraints are inequality of sex. the 
problem of mediation and private visits to these managers from the 
outsiders while they are working. 
While all these sorts of pressures and constraints can be linked 
with the bedouin and the village communities, these managers face 
another type of constraint, largely because the society still lives 
in agricultural environment and industry itself represents a new 
era in Iraq. Chief among such constraints are the problem of low 
level of industrial mentality. low level of productivity and 
shortage of skilled manpower. The problems of marketing constraints 
must also be remembered in this respect. 
What is obvious from this study is that the Iraqi managers 
are under strong social pressures from their families, relatives 
and friends. their subordinates and finally. from the society at 
large. Most. if not all. of these pressures do not exist in 
Western countries. To cope with such pressures and work in a way 
similar to that of the Western managers. the Iraqi manager needs 
a long time. 
4. DECISION-MAKING STYLES 
Despite the fact that these managers used different styles 
for each one of the ten decisions or problems that we had given to 
them, the evidence indicates two principal points. The first is 
that most of the managers have used style 1 (own decision) with 
all these decisions. The second is that most of them have avoided 
style 4 (delegation) with this set of decisions. 
While these results give support to the crosscultural manage-
ment stUdies which confirms that the authoritative management style 
is fairly common in the developing countries. it also gives some 
support to the theorists of organisational behaviour who emphasise 
that there is no one best management style and a manager's style 
is a contingent variable - depending on the situation in which he 
works. 
The findings presented in this study also differt from what 
Muna has found in other Arab countries. He found that style 2 
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(consultation) is predominantly preferred by the managers when they ~~~ 
dealt with problems similar to the problems used in this study. 
The principal reason for this difference. we believe. is that in 
Muna's sample there were 2B managers working in trade and service 
organisations. while all the managers of the present study are 
industrial managers. In the Arab world. trade and service managers 
are more flexible and tolerant in such matters as time. formalities 
and other regulations including decision maKing. than managers of 
industrial organisations. 
The results presented. whether in this study or Muna's study. 
show that the Arab managers. irrespective of their countries and 
type of the business. are more inclined to use style 1 (own decision) 
and style 2 (consultation). That is, they use the authoritative 
management style with their subordinates and do not permit them 
to participate in decision-making process. By so doing, these 
managers have eliminated a valuable training opportunity and 
experience for their subordinates. 
It is those customs. traditions. values. together with other 
social and industrial constraints. which are largely responsible 
for the managers' aversion toward subordinates participation in 
decision maKing process. 
The evidence also shows that the public sector manager in 
Iraq is more inclined to use style 3 (joint decision) across 
different problems. whereas the private sector manager prefers using 
style 1 (own decision) irrespective of the type of the problem in 
hand. The principal reason for this different situation is that the 
public sector manager does not have, like his counterpart, a free 
enterprise. nor has he a free hand in the organisation. If we still 
2B3 
remember. the Iraqi economy is centralised economy and the public 
sector manager has to work within the limits of the central economic 
plan. The industrial organisation. on the other hand. is organised 
as a part of the state bureaucracy and the manager has very little 
autonomous power of decisions. There are several levels of authority 
over the industrial enterprise. Nearly all decisions have to go 
through layersJ many of them. particularly those relating to 
investment. creating of new products or new markets, have to go high 
up in the relevant government body. To achieve radical changes 
in his enterprise, the public sector manager must have prior 
approval from his superiors, including the minister. 
All the points presented indicate that the environment has a 
great influence on the manager's characteristics (personal-social 
and career patterns), thinking and behaviour. We do not say 
that these managers have only a small role in their society. nor 
have we over-estimated their importance in the progress of the 
economy. The thing that we have repeatedly emphasised throughout 
this study is that in order to understand the principal character-
istics of a group of managers working in a given country, a prior 
understanding of their society is essential. Without such a prior 
understanding. the analysis, the interpretation of their character-
istics. attitude and behaviour will be incomplete. 
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APPENDIX 1: METHODOLOGY, DATA ANALYSIS AND REPRESENTATIVE OF THE SAMPLE 
METHODOLOGY 
The forty four managers studied were senior managers. Forty one 
of them were managing directors and the remaining were deputy managers. 
The term "managing director" means in this study the person who 
formally heads the organisation (either because he is the owner, or because 
the owner or the government has appointed him to fill this position); 
He overseas the whole organisation and is responsible for all its activities 
such as production, marketing and finance. 
The term "deputy manager" means the person who exercises the work 
of managing director but he does not formally head the organisation. 
All the managers were personally interviewed in their organisations. 
Two days have been spent almost in each organisation. The researcher 
undertook three main activities while he was in the organisation. 
a) Interviewing the manager. This activity took the major share of 
" the researchers time. 
b) Interviewing his direct subordinate(s) and secretary. The aim here 
was to gather information about the manager's previous time and how 
he divided his daily work. In addition, the researcher was 
investigating the soundness of the manager's discussions which 
related to his decision making approaches. 
c) Observing the manager while he was working. The observation here 
took two aspects. The purpose of the first aspect was to obtain 
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an idea about the manager's behaviour with his subordinates, supervisors 
and outsiders. The purpose of the second aspect of our observations 
was to obtain a general notion of how the manager uses his time and 
how much he devotes to his various activities. Examples of the first 
group of observations were to observe how the manager behaves, speaks 
with his subordinates and how they respond when he talks with them 
or asks them certain questions or to give their opinions on a certain 
matter and to what extent he permits them to express their own opinions 
on the various matters they come across. In addition, how the manager 
behaves, speaks with his superior(s) and outsiders including customers 
were among this group of observations. Examples of the second type 
of the observations were how many visitors he received in this two 
day period, how much time he devoted to his personal activities. 
How much he communicated with his subordinates, superiors and what 
was the types of these communications (e.g. telephone, interview). 
What party initiated communication was also noted. 
The researchers started each interview by explaining the importance of 
managers' co-operation in the success of this study and in achieving 
its various objectives. In addition, each manager was assured that 
his personal information and attitudes would be regarded as confidential 
and would only be used for the purpose of the study. After that, the 
researcher proceeded with his~arious questions. 
General information about the manager and his organisation. 
The manager's decision making approaches. 
Manager's attitudes towards his subordinate(s) and Iraqi 
society. 
Finally, the manager's average time that he spent in the various 
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activities in his working day. 
To obtain information about managers' approaches in decision making, 
each manager was presented with a description of four alternative decisions 
1 
styles. 
Each manager was then given ten decisions and requested to specify 
which of the four alternatives he would normally use. 2 
To avoid response bias, two methods were used. The first was to 
ask each interviewee to give some documents which support his argument 
of using a certain alternative while the second method was to ask his 
direct subordinate(s) about the same alternative and to what extent his 
manager normally uses it with a given problem (e.g. one of these ten 
decisions).3 
As regards manager activities, seven activities were chosen to cover 
the bulk of his work. They were paperwork; planning; organising; 
communications; research; personal activities and complex activity.4 
Each manager was asked to estimate how he divides his daily time on 
average among these activities. The definition of an activity was left 
to the manager himself. When a manager failed to distinguish a certain 
episode from others, he was asked to put his estimate in "complex activity". 
Thus, complex activity has been defined in this study to mean any combination 
of two or more activities which the manager was unable to allocate 
individually. This method was used by Rubert Dubin and S. Lee Spray 
when they examined the behaviour and interaction of a group of executives. 4 
To make the findings more useful, the working day of the manager 
was broadly divided into two periods; the morning period which ends 
at noon, and the evening period. 
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DATA ANALYSIS 
Before starting the analysis presented in this study, a preliminary 
cluster analysis using the "CLUSTAN PACKAGE" was used for the data gathered 
to discover the most frequent patterns of associations among these variables. 
The analysis broadly indicated two patterns of clusters; the public 
sector managers' cluster and the private sector managers' cluster. It 
is these two clusters that we analysed in depth by using the "STATISTICAL 
PACKAGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCE" (SPSS). The aim was to expand the analysis 
of these clusters in the light of the major variables that caused such 
a difference on the one hand, and to examine the degree of associations 
that exists between a given variable and the other variables, on the 
other. 
Because the current research is an exploratory study, therefore, 
most of the data collected were based on nominal and ordinal level scales. 
Thus, the simple XZ test as well as Cramer's and Kendall's tests and 
coefficient test were used. Sometimes more than one test was used in 
analysing the association between two variables; the purpose of this 
procedure was to show the reader the strength of this relationship across 
different tests. 
As regards the assumption of internal scale we made when analysed 
the managers' decision-making styles, it is indeed consistent with assumptions 
made by other scholars. Thus, Heller, Muna, using a similar continuum, 
assumed a four-point equal interval scale. The same assumption can be 
5 found in the work of Vroom and Yetton. 
All these researchers have regarded delegation (style 4 in this 
study) as a separate style distinguishes itself by an equal distance 
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from the other three styles. (See Figure 9.1 and Table 9.1). The present 
study assumes the same thing, that is, delegation is also separated from 
style 3 (joint decision). 
The ten decisions given to the managers studied were broken down 
into three groups; personal decisions; departmental decisions and, 
organisational decisions. This was based on the nature of the decisions 
as well as on the high intercorrelation between the decisions within 
each group. For example, decisions 1, 3, 4 and 5 were highly interrelated 
and, belonged more to personal problems or group than to any other groups 
of decisions. 
Two methods were used to analyse the ten decisions. The first was 
to use the frequency distribution of responses to each one of these decisions 
in the light of the four decision-making alternative styles. The second 
method was to make use of the power-sharing continuum and the assumption 
that its four styles are separated by equal intervals. (see Figure 9.1). 
Indeed, this assumption allows using the main scores of all the managers 
or each group of managers according to their sectors. This second method 
also enabled us to analyse the variances among each group of the managers. 
The following values were assigned to the components of the power-
sharing continuum; Style 1 (own decisions) = 10; Style 2 (consultation) 
= 20j Style 3 (joint decision) = 30; and Style 4 (delegation) = 40. 
Thus, a high score indicates that the manager allows his subordinate(s) 
large influence in decision making process. Conversely, a low score 
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indicates that the manager allows his subordinate(s) little influence 
in decision making process. Or simply, the manager has more control 
over the outcome of the decision. 
THE REPRESENTATIVENESS OF THE SAMPLE 
Originally it was intended to base the analysis on a sample of 100 
managing directors drawn equally from the public and private sectors. 
However, due to unforeseen difficulties in arranging interviews with 
sampled managers, a final achieved sample of 44 managers was obtained. 
A sample of this size can not be regarded as representative of modern 
manufacturing industry but the following points are relevant: 
a) The sample was drawn from public and private industrial sector. 
b) All these managers and their organisations have been selected from 
modern manufacturing industries and modern industry itself is new 
in Iraq. The year 1950 can be regarded as the beginning of the modern 
industry in this developing country. 
c) An attempt was made to select managers from three organisational 
size categories: small (100 employees or less); medium (between 
101-500 empemployees), and large (over 501 employees). 
d) The sample was drawn from more than one province. . There were 24 
managers from Baghdad, 12 managers from Mosul and 8 managers from 
Arbil and Sulaimaniyah provinces. 
e) An attempt was also made to select managers from different age groups 
and different social classes. There were 14 managers their age between 
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31 and 46 years; 18 managers between 41 and 45 years old and 12 
managers between 51 and 70 years old. The same is equally true if 
we examine their social backgrounds: 23 managers were from lower 
class, 4 from middle class and 17 managers from upper class. 
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NOTES 
1. See p. 230. 
2. See p. 231 for these ten decisions. 
3. See p. 232. 
4. Robert Dubin and S. Lee, Spray, "Executive Behavior and Interaction", 
Industrial Relations, A Journal of Economy and Society, 3 (February 
1964): 99-108. 
5. See Chapter 9. 
APPENDIX 2 THE INTERVIEW SCHEDULE 
Dear Sir, 
The present research is intended for the doctorate degree 
in management studies, University of Glasgow. Its principal 
aim is to explore the personal-social characteristics of the 
Iraqi senior managers. It also tries to cast light on their 
career patterns; decision-making styles) attitude toward Iraqi 
societYJ how they spend their time in wo·rk and what activities 
they perform. 
The interview will cover the following points: 
1. Background information 
2. Manager's decision-making styles 
3. Manager's attitudes towards subordinates and Iraqi 
society as a whole 
4. The average time spent by the manager in different 
activities during the day. 
The researcher, knowing your invaluable time, would highly 
appreciate your permission to interview him. All your personal 
information and attitudes would be regarded as confidential and 
would only be used for the purpose of this research. 
Your personal help would be deeply appreciated. It would 
also contribute to the advancement of management in Iraq of 
knowledge on this subject. 
Moayaid S. Sulieman 
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1. GENERAL INFORMATION 
Code Number •••••••••••••• 
Date and place of birth: 
Date: ........................... 
Place of birth: City: ...........•.... Village: ................ 
Marital Status: 
Single: . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Married: . ............ . Widower ••••••••• 
Number of children ............................ 
Principa I product (s) of t he company ......................... . 
Position held in the company ................................. 
How long have you held this position? ........................ 
Total number of employees .................................... 
Ownership of the company: 
Private:· . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Public: ........ ,. .................. . 
Manager Status: 
Owner: ..................... Employed: •••••••••••••••••••••• 
When did you commence with this company? •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
What was your first work in your life. and how old were you at that time? 
......................................................................... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 
What type of school did you last attend full time? 
Type of sc hoo I: 
a Elementary Sch. 
b Intermediate Sch. 
c - Secondary Sch. 
(Please tick one) 
Did you attend college? 
Yes o No o 
If Nyes N, please give details as follows: 
College attended University Country Degree 
a -
b -
c -
d -
How many companies have you been employed by during your career? 
Only one company 
Two companies 
Three companies 
Four companies 
(Please tick one) 
If more,please specify the number •••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
Have you attended management training coursers)? 
Yes o No o 
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If Ny e s N, ho w long wa sit? ••••••••••••••••••• Where? ••••••••••••••••. 
Have you undertaken any vocational full/part time study? 
Yes o No o 
If NYes N, how long was it? •••••••••••••••••••••• Where? ••••••••••••••••• 
What is/was your father's occupation? ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 
What / ••• 
What is/was your father's level of education? 
Illiterate 
Read and write only 
Elementary School 
Intermediate School 
Secondary School 
College 
31.6 
(Please tick one) 
2 • DECISION-MAKING STYLES 
In this section. we are concerned with managerial decision-
making styles. Decision making in any organisation can be 
regarded as a prime factor in management. Many alternative 
methods of decision making exist. among them the following. 
Rarely is there one perfect method that can be applied to all 
problems in all situations. 
I. Own Decision: 
You make the decision, no previous consultation with your 
subordinate(s). You may tell your subordinate(s) what the 
problem 1s in getting the information from them but their 
role is to provide you the necessary information rather than 
generating or evaluating alternative solution. Sometimes 
you may discuss the problem with your superiors, partners 
or with outsiders. 
II. Consultation: 
You share the problem with your subordinate(s). getting 
his/their ideas and suggestions, then you make your decision 
which mayor may not reflect his/their influence. 
III. Joint Decision: 
You share the problem with your subordinate(s). and to-
gether you analyse the problem and arrive at a mutually 
agreeable solution. You may consult and discuss the 
problem with your superiors, partners or with outsiders. 
IV. / 
I V. Delegation 
You delegate the problem to your subordinate. providing him 
with any relevant information that you possess. but giving 
him responsibility for solving the problem by himself. You 
mayor may not ask him to report his decision to you. You 
seldom veto his decision. 
Below is a set of decisions •. Would you indicate which of 
the above four alternative decision-making styles you normally use 
to arrive at each one of these decisions. 
1 - The decision to increase the salary of one of your direct 
subordinates. 
Own decision 
Consul tation 
Joint Decision 
Delegation 
2 - The decision to increase the number of the workforce in a 
certain Department. 
Own Decision 
Consul tation 
Joint Decision 
Delegation 
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3 - The decision to hire one of several applicants to work in your 
subordinates' departments 
- Own Decision 
- Consultation 
- Joint Decision 
- Delegation 
4 - The decision to promote or to increase the salary of one of your 
subordinate's workers 
- Own decision 
- Consul tation 
- Joint Decision 
- Delegation 
5 - The decision to terminate one of your subordinate's workers 
Own decision 
Consultation 
Joint Decision 
Delegation 
6 - The decision to introduce a new productCs) 
Own Decision 
Consul tation 
Joint Decision 
Delegation 
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7 - The decision to enter a new market 
- Own decision 
- Consultation 
- Joint Decision 
- Delegation 
8 - The decision to expand the total current production capacity 
of your company 
- Own decision 
- Consultation 
- Joint Decision 
- Delegation 
9 - The decision to change or modify the formal organisation 
chart of the company 
- Own decision 
- Consul tation 
- Joint Decision 
- Delegation 
10 - The decision to change responsibilities and authorities of the 
head of a certain department. 
- Own Decision 
- Consultation 
- Joint Decision 
- Delegation 
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3 • THE MANAGER'S ATTITUDE TOWARD SUBORDINATES 
AND THE IRAQI SOCIETY 
1 - In your society. what are the major social pressures that 
interfere with your work as a manager such that you are unable 
to exercise full control over them. Will you give us some 
examples? 
2 - Could you please mention some of the ideas. programmes or 
even changes that you as a manager would like to implement. 
but find yourself restricted from doing so because of the 
Iraqi traditions. customs and values. or because of some 
governmental laws and procedures? 
3 - Can you specify the major characteristics of your sub-
, 
ordinates in particular and the Iraqi workers in general. 
How would you rank them in comparison with their Western 
counterpart? 
4 - Do you think that mediation (nepotism and patronage system) 
exists in the Iraqi society? 
Yes D No D 
a: / 
a: If "Yes". do you think it is. (within the last five years): 
a Less than before 
b Same as before (Please tick one) 
c More than before 
d No answer 
b: In your opinion. what are the principal reasons that are 
responsible for mediation in Iraq? 
324 
325 
4 • THE MANAGER'S ACTIVITIES 
In this section, we are concerned with your job activities and 
how long you spend in your working day. To help you estimate as 
precisely as possible your working time, a group of activities is 
presented below. These activities are divided into two periods: 
the morning period and the evening period. You are requested to 
estimate the average time that you normally spend on each of these 
activities. The definition of each activity is your responsibility. 
you can define each activity the way you like. When you fail to 
distinguish a certain episode from others. you are advised to put 
your estimate in "complex activityw. 
Type of Activity Before Noon 
(average time) 
After Noon Total Time 
(average time) (average) 
1 - Reading and answering 
ma11 (paperwork) 
2 - Planning activity 
3 - Organising activity 
4 - Communications: 
a .. With employees 
face to face 
- telephone 
b .. With public 
- face to face 
.. telephone 
c - With superiors 
- face to face 
.. telephone 
5 - Research and development 
activity 
6 - Personal activity 
7 - Complex activity 
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